This field observation compares the behavior and welfare of ultimate Frisbee players in three settings. The first setting, Corning College, was an informal group at a private university. The second setting, Stuart University, was a seasonal, open collegiate team at a public university. The third setting, the Mallards, was a seasonal, elite, open club team. The players’ interactions and behaviors in the three settings were influenced by a number of norms, practices, and an ethos known as the spirit of the game. Through the presentation of field notes, video recordings, and informal conversations, the author argues via rational choice theory and game theory that players selectively create, negotiate, and manipulate norms and practices to maximize game interaction, quality, and/or fluidity depending on the particular conditions such as level of competition between players, history between teams and players, and the rewards at stake.
Adler, P.
, & Adler, P. (1987). Membership roles in field research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
2.
Axelrod, R.
(1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3.
Axelrod, R.
(1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80, 1095-1111.
4.
Bockrath, F.
, & Franke, E. (1995). Is there any value in sports? About the ethical significance of sport activities. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 30, 283-310.
5.
Boudon, R.
(2003). Beyond rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 1-21.
6.
Cahill, S. E.
, & Eggleston, R. (1994). Managing emotions in public: The case of wheel-chair users. Social Psychology Quarterly, 57, 300-312.
7.
Coakley, J. J.
(1986). Sport in society: Issues and controversies. St. Louis, MO: Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing.
8.
Coleman, J. S.
(1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
9.
Collins, R.
(1981). On microfoundations of macrosociology. American Journal of Sociology, 86, 984-1014.
10.
Cooter, R.
(1998). Expressive law and economics. Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 585-608.
11.
Coser, R. L.
(1960). Laughter among colleagues. Psychiatry, 23, 81-89.
12.
Cranford, D. J. (2001). A physiological profile of ultimate Frisbee players. Unpublished master’s thesis, University of South Alabama, Mobile.
13.
Dambra, N.
, & Reynolds, J. R. (1991). Ultimate: The team disc sport (Take a quick look at a fast game). UPA: The ultimate players association (1st ed.) [Brochure].
14.
Dawes, R. M.
(1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169-193.
15.
Eitzen, S.
(1999). Fair and foul: Beyond the myths and paradoxes of sport. Boston: Rowan & Littlefield.
16.
Ellickson, R. C.
(1991). Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
17.
Fine, G. A.
(1979). Small groups and culture creation: the idioculture of Little League baseball teams. American Sociological Review, 44, 733-745.
18.
Fine, G. A.
(1983). Shared fantasy: Role-playing games as social worlds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
19.
Fine, G. A.
(2001). Enacting norms: Mushrooming and the culture of expectations and explanations. In M. Hechter & K-D. Opp (Eds.), Social norms (pp. 139-164). New York: Russell Sage.
20.
Friedman, D.
, & Hechter, M. (1988). The contribution of rational choice theory to macrosociological research. Sociological Theory, 6, 201-218.
21.
Geertz, C.
(1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic.
22.
Glaser, B.
, & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine.
23.
Goffman, E.
(1967). Interaction ritual. New York: Pantheon.
24.
Gouldner, A. W.
(1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178.
25.
Hammerly, S.
(2003). Ultimate players association. Retrieved from http://www.upa.org/
26.
Hardin, G.
(1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
27.
Hardin, R.
(1982). Collective action. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
28.
Hechter, M.
(1987). Principles of group solidarity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
29.
Hechter, M.
(1994). The role of values in rational choice theory. Rationality and Society, 6, 318-333.
30.
Hechter, M.
, & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191-214.
31.
Hechter, M.
, & Opp, K-D. (Eds.). (2001). What have we learned about the emergence of social norms? In Social norms (pp. 394-415). New York: Russell Sage.
32.
Heckathorn, D. D.
(1988). Collective sanctions and the creation of prisoner’s dilemma norms. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 535-562.
33.
Heckathorn, D. D.
(1990). Collective sanctions and compliance norms: A formal theory of group-mediated social control. American Sociological Review, 55, 366-384.
34.
Hirsch, P.
, Michaels, S.,& Friedman, R. (1987). “Dirty hands”versus “clean models”:Is sociology in danger of being seduced by economics?Theory and Society, 16, 317-336.
35.
Hobbes, T.
(1962). Leviathan. Glasgow, Scotland: Fontana. (Original work published 1651)
36.
Hoffman, E.
, & Spitzer, M. (1982). The Coase theorem: Some experimental results. Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 73-98.
37.
Horne, C.
(2000). Community and the state: The relationship between normative and legal controls. European Sociological Review, 16, 225-243.
38.
Horne, C.
, & Cutlip, A. (2002). Sanctioning costs and norm enforcement: An experimental test. Rationality and Society, 14, 285-307.
39.
Jimerson, J.B.
(1996). Good times and good games: How pickup basketball players use wealth-maximizing norms. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 25, 353-371.
40.
Jimerson, J. B.
(1999). “Who has next?” The symbolic, rational, and methodical use of norms in pickup basketball. Social Psychology Quarterly, 62, 136-156.
41.
Kreps, D. M.
, Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252.
42.
May, R. A. B.
(2001). The sticky situation of sportsmanship: Contexts and contradictions in sportsmanship among high school boys basketball players. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 25, 372-389.
43.
Neyman, A.
(1985). Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Economics Letters, 19, 227-229.
44.
Oberschall, A.
,& Leifer, E. (1986). Efficiency and social institutions: Uses and misuses of economic reasoning in sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 12, 233-253.
45.
Oliver, P.
(1980). Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 1356-1375.
46.
Papp, G.
, & Prisztoka, G. (1995). Sportsmanship as an ethical value. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 30, 375-389.
47.
Pilz, G.
(1995). Performance sport: Education in fair play? (Some empirical and theoretical remarks). International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 30, 391-418.
48.
Posner, E. A.
(2000). Law and social norms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
49.
Rubinstein, A.
(1986). Finite automata play repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 83-96.
50.
Sally, D.
(1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7, 58-92.
51.
Scheff, T. J.
(2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. Sociological Theory, 18, 84-99.
52.
Simon, S.
, Frever, T., Deaver, W., VanHolmes, C., Murray, T., Hoyle, A., et al. (2003). Official rules of ultimate: 10th edition. Boulder, CO: Ultimate Players Association.
53.
Strauss, A. L.
, & Corbin, J. (1995). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
54.
Thornton, A. D. (1998). Ultimate masculinities: An ethnography of power and social difference in sport. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
55.
Weber, M.
(1997). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1930)
56.
Yamagishi, T.
(1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116.
57.
Yamagishi, T.
(1988). Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 32-42.
58.
Yamagishi, T.
(1992). Group size and the provision of a sanctioning system in a social dilemma. In W.B.G. Liebrand, D.M. Messick,&H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp. 267-287). Oxford, UK: Pergamon.
59.
Yamagishi, T.
(1995). Social dilemmas. In K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, & J. S. House (Eds.), Sociological perspectives on social psychology (pp. 311-335). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
