When institutions are not present to establish decision rules and authority hierarchies, negotiations are necessary to turn conflict into order. More than simply an exercise to be determined and explained by power, negotiation requires an agreement on the appropriate notion of justice to govern the subsequent disposition of details and resolution of the conflict. This thesis is illustrated by five cases: negotiations over South-Western Africa (Namibia and Angola) between 1977 and 1988; over disarmament in Europe between 1984 and 1986; over the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; and over two economic issues, the 1983-84 contract renegotiations between Ghana and its aluminum consortium and the 1977-79 trade negotiations over gas between Mexico and the United States.
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