The Treaty of Maastricht should be understood as a political compromise in the process of European integration, rather than as a definitive legal document. This article analyzes the integrative and fragmenting elements of the Treaty and concludes that, on balance, it contains more of the latter than the former. In particular the Treaty may exacerbate the problems increasingly faced by the European Court of Justice, by forcing it to decide politically controversial cases. Nevertheless, the ability of the European institutions, particularly the Commission, to turn crises to their advantage means that the future of Europe remains uncertain.
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