Abstract
Although the constitution of India envisages a federal form of government, its evolution in practice over the years, along with several of its provisions, threatens its definition and disrupts its functioning. This article in particular deals with the position of the Governor and with Emergency Powers. It also analyzes two court decisions on the dismissal of the duly elected state governments of Karnataka in 1989 and Madhya Pradesh in 1992. In both cases, the proclamation of Emergency by the President of India was successfully challenged in court, and the court asserted its power of judicial review. The article concludes with the observation that while the founding fathers of the Indian constitution argued for a strong federal government, they would probably be surprised and baffled by the arbitrary and capricious way some of the powers have been used by the federal government over the states, particularly those belonging to the opposition.
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