Talk in politics is effective only insofar as the speaker is able to persuade his or her audience of the relevance of some point, or the validity of some claim, contained in the speech. From a rational choice perspective, therefore, such speech making is a strategic activity in which speakers seek to influence the beliefs of decision makers. This paper is an informal introduction to rational choice models of political decision making involving the strategic use of speech.
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