Abstract
The impact of international interactions on the level and allocation of a nation's expenditures for police protection and law enforcement are discussed: A model is developed and used to analyze various types of international interactions such as crime spillovers from one nation to another, effective police action in one country against a crime organization active in a number of countries, and the assistance that one country offers another in the securing of information and evidence. The impacts of these interactions are then evaluated in terms of the concept of Pareto-optimality. International cooperation through police and legal institutions is discussed as a way of narrowing the gap between actual and optimal expenditures, and an international body is proposed to deal with criteria, coordination, and compensation for international discovery orders. In the final section the results of a number of studies are presented that suggest the importance of interjurisdictional interactions and cooperation. These results are used to evaluate the possible impacts of international interactions in crime, police protection and law enforcement.
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