Models of the decision-making process assuming the rationality of the major actors are not apt to explain actual decision making between states when major values are at stake. Situational, domestic political and bureaucratic constraints, as suggested by this case study of the US response to Iran's taking of American hostages, constrain choices. Beyond these factors, the chief executive's own personality is apt to have an impact on policy, especially when he has considerable authority to act independently in the foreign policy arena. His responses may to some extent show good reality testing, as evident in Jimmy Carter's rejections of military sanctions and his initial search for a diplomatic resolution of the hostage issue. But threats to major values can bring out more ego-defensive traits, as evident in Carter's inflation of the hostage issue, his avoidance of questions about the viability of the rescue operation and his difficulties in confronting incompatible policy goals. The result in this instance was a failure to fully consider policy options, otherwise feasible, that might have entailed fewer risks for the American national interest.
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