Abstract
This article discusses the difficulties encountered by military men when they attempt to disengage from politics and relates these to the Nigerian experience. These difficulties have hindered the disengagement efforts of the various Nigerian military administrations until the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime. The success of the Muhammed/Obasanjo administra tion lies in three factors: the dogged determination of the regime to check antidisengage ment factions, the ability of the officers to use civilian-based institutions as legitimizing fronts for the desires of the officers, and the ability of the officers to maintain an outward position of neutrality. The posture of neutrality is, however, found to be hypocritical. The officers had their plans and, as long as they found civilians who could produce desired results, the military was content to remain in the background. When desired results were not guaranteed, the officers intervened openly and forcefully.
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