Digitalization,value change and political consumerism in Europe: A multi-level trend analysis over two decades

Abstract

Political consumerism, including boycott engagement, has become an increasingly prominent form of political participation. Digitalization and value change are often cited as key drivers of this trend. However, there is a lack of empirical studies analysing the influence of these factors on political consumerism over time and across countries. This study utilizes data from 11 waves of the European Social Survey (n = 313,061) across 15 countries to explore these dynamics. Results show that both individual-level internet usage and self-transcendence values significantly predict boycott engagement, as do self-transcendence values at the country level. In contrast, cross-country differences in digitalization levels have no effect. Moreover, the effects of self-transcendence values on boycott engagement increase slightly over time. Contrary to expectations that internet usage would grow in importance for political participation, the effects of both digitalization and individual internet usage have remained remarkably stable over time.

Keywords

Boycott digitalization internet self-transcendence values postmaterialism European Social Survey participation

Political consumerism, encompassing the avoidance (i.e. boycotting) or deliberate purchase (i.e. buycotting) of products or services for political, ethical or environmental reasons, has evolved into one of the most prevalent forms of political participation in many western democracies (Boulianne et al., 2024; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). Alongside globalization and individualization, changing values and digitalization are considered the main drivers of political consumerism (Copeland and Atkinson, 2016). The core arguments posit that the shift to postmaterialist (Inglehart, 1971, 2008) or self-transcendence values (Schwartz, 1992, 2007) has increased the importance of the ‘politics of products’ (Micheletti, 2010) and that digital media have expanded the opportunities for accessing information, connecting with like-minded others and consuming alternative products and services (Kelm and Dohle, 2018).

Several studies support these arguments, demonstrating a positive association between political postmaterialist values or universal self-transcendence values and digital media use with political consumerism at the individual level (e.g. Boulianne et al., 2024; Copeland, 2014; Kelm, 2024; Kelm and Dohle, 2018; Koos, 2012). These studies predominantly rely on cross-sectional data, which reflect the relationships at a specific point in time. Given the long-term nature of digitalization and value change, longitudinal studies are needed to replicate these findings across multiple time points and examine their (changing) relevance for political consumerism. For example, as internet opportunities (e.g. the rise of social media platforms) and accessibility (e.g. cost reductions through flat rates) have changed significantly during the past two decades, it is plausible that the impact of internet usage on political consumerism activities has evolved as well.

At the country level, some findings suggest that citizens in postmaterialist societies are more inclined to engage in green lifestyle politics (Leissner, 2023). It is therefore also feasible that the prevailing values in a society serve as a potential explanatory factor for variations in political consumerism across different countries. Another potentially important but largely unexplored explanatory factor is the level of digitalization across countries. Digitalization is a ‘driver for structural change’ (Vowe, 2022: 82) by creating opportunity structures. In countries where these structures are more prevalent, the decision to engage in political consumerism may be facilitated, as citizens are better informed by journalists, motivated by political activists, connected with like-minded individuals and more easily able to buy alternative products online. Therefore, cross-country comparisons are also essential for a comprehensive understanding of political consumerism and its drivers.

This study has three main objectives. First, it seeks to replicate prior findings on the influence of internet use and values on political consumerism across multiple time points. Second, it investigates the role of macro-level factors, such as societal digitalization and values, in shaping political consumerism, which has largely been neglected in previous research. Third, it examines whether the influence of these factors changes over time.

The European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial cross-national survey conducted in European countries since 2002, provides a unique opportunity to examine the evolving relationship between digitalization, values and political consumerism across time and nations. This study utilizes survey data from the 15 countries that participated in 11 rounds of the ESS (n = 313,061), complemented by macro-level indicators.

Descriptive results highlight shifts in digitalization, values and boycott engagement from 2002 to 2023. Multilevel logistic regression models reveal that internet usage and self-transcendence values at the individual level as well as self-transcendence values at the country level are positively associated with boycott engagement, whereas the level of digitalization within a country is not. Interaction effects indicate that self-transcendence values at the individual and country levels have become slightly more important over time, whereas the influences of internet usage and digitalization remain constant. The latter finding contradicts findings from meta-analyses that indicate increasing effects of digital media use on political participation over time (Boulianne, 2020). This study is one of the few to analyse the factors influencing political participation in a cross-national and longitudinal context, providing a deeper understanding of how these factors and their influence evolve over time across different nations.

Literature review

Political consumerism is defined as ‘consumers’ use of the market as an arena for politics in order to change institutional or market practices found to be ethically, environmentally, or politically objectionable’ (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013: 39). This concept embodies a form of individualized responsibility-taking, whereby individuals consider the societal effects of their own actions (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013: 21). In addition to boycotting and buycotting, political consumerism also includes discursive political consumerism (e.g. attempts to influence others to make more conscientious shopping decisions) and lifestyle political consumerism (e.g. veganism; Kelm, 2024; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013).

Empirical studies primarily focus on boycotting (Copeland and Boulianne, 2022), probably because boycotting is commonly measured in large comparative survey studies such as the ESS. Boycotting is a popular form of political participation in many western democracies. For example, about half of the citizens in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (Boulianne et al., 2024) and in Germany (Kelm, 2024) reported that they had boycotted products within the past 12 months, while about one-third did so in Switzerland (Ackermann and Gundelach, 2022). In contrast, boycotting is less common in Southern and Eastern European countries (Theocharis and Van Deth, 2018) as well as in the Global South (Gundelach, 2020a).

This study aims to explain engagement in boycotting across European countries and over time by examining both micro-level factors, such as individual internet usage and values, and macro-level factors, such as the level of digitalization and prevailing values in different countries.

Internet usage and digitalization

Stolle and Micheletti (2013: 38, emphasis is original) argue that ‘the Internet is the infrastructure or architecture for individualized responsibility taking’, as it facilitates access to information, interaction with like-minded others, and access to alternative products (Kelm and Dohle, 2018). Survey research supports this assertion, indicating that internet news consumption is positively related to political consumerism (e.g. Boulianne et al., 2024; Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017; Kelm and Dohle, 2018).

The role of social media is particularly significant. Several studies corroborate the link between social media use and political consumerism (e.g. Boulianne et al., 2024; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). Specifically, active engagement on social media, such as creating content, plays a more substantial role than passive use, such as reading content (Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017). Moreover, some studies differentiate between active and passive media use, as well as between online and offline media (e.g. Cheng et al., 2023; Kelm, 2024; Kelm and Dohle, 2018; Shah et al., 2007), often referring to communication mediation models. For example, Cheng et al. (2023) demonstrate that receiving news via the internet, social media platforms and WhatsApp encourages active social media use, which influences political discussions that ultimately affect political consumerism. Overall, it can be hypothesized that individual internet use is positively related to political consumerism (H1).

However, access to high-speed internet varies significantly between countries, both globally and within Europe (Speedtest.net, 2025). This ‘digital divide’ can have substantial real-world consequences, affecting aspects ranging from economic opportunities to political engagement and access to information (Norris, 2001). For instance, Norris (2002) demonstrates that the percentage of online users in a country correlates with civic engagement. Similarly, Splendore (2016) finds that a country’s level of digitalization is positively related to unconventional forms of political engagement, such as political consumerism.

There are three main reasons for these positive correlations. First, digitalization has fundamentally changed journalism (e.g. Hanusch et al., 2019; Neuberger, 2024). In particular, it has made research easier for journalists and increased the speed of journalism. More digitalized societies therefore facilitate access to information that might be essential for citizens’ purchasing decisions. Second, and even more importantly, awareness of others’ political activities influences political consumerism (Bimber and Gil de Zúñiga, 2022). This awareness is likely stronger in more digitalized societies, as the internet enables individuals to observe not only the behaviour of their immediate social environment but also the behaviour of a broader public. Such observation can lead to social contagion (e.g. Bond et al., 2012). People may be motivated to engage in political consumerism activities by seeing others considering political, ethical or ecological reasons in their shopping decisions or by encountering direct calls to do so (Makarem and Jae, 2016). Third, online shopping is more prevalent in more digitalized societies (Gerlich et al., 2024), allowing citizens to choose more easily from a much wider range of product alternatives than those available in local supermarkets. This, in turn, makes it easier to consider political, ethical or ecological factors when making purchasing decisions (Kelm and Dohle, 2018). Based on this argumentation and the state of research, we hypothesize that in countries with a high level of digitalization, individuals are more likely to engage in political consumerism (H2).

Digitalization and individual internet usage have transformed dramatically over the past two decades: more and more people have access to high-speed internet, the financial costs of using the internet have been significantly reduced by flat rates, and the possibilities for using the internet have multiplied, particularly through the development of social media platforms. These shifts could influence the relationships between these variables and political consumerism. Some studies suggest that these relationships may have evolved. Boulianne’s (2020) meta-analysis on digital media use and political participation reveals a trend from ‘small, positive average coefficients turning into substantial positive coefficients’ (Boulianne, 2020: 947) over the past 20 years. She attributes this change to the widespread adoption of the internet, the rise of social media platforms and the expansion of online participation opportunities. Given that social media use has a significantly stronger impact on political participation compared to general digital media use (Boulianne, 2019), it is plausible to assume that the effects of internet usage on political consumerism have also intensified.

Similarly, the importance of the level of digitalization for political consumerism could increase over time, as access to relevant information becomes easier, social contagion strengthens and alternative shopping options become more widespread. However, it is also plausible that digitalization and boycott engagement develop in parallel without directly influencing each other. For this reason, we pose a research question (RQ1) instead of a hypothesis: to what extent have the effects of individual internet use and the level of digitalization in countries on political consumerism changed over time?

Values and value change

Purchasing or rejecting products is not inherently a political activity unless these decisions are guided by political, ethical or ecological considerations (Van Deth, 2014). The presence of such motivation hinges on individuals’ values, whereby values are defined as ‘desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity’ (Schwartz, 1994: 21). Consequently, whether, how and to what extent people become politically active likely depends on their values.

Prominent conceptualizations of value orientations have been presented by Inglehart (1971, 2008) and Schwartz (1992, 2007). Inglehart distinguishes between materialist values, emphasizing individual security and economic well-being, and postmaterialist values, emphasizing individual freedom and self-expression. Schwartz’s theory of basic human values distinguishes 10 universal values, which can be grouped under 4 higher-order values: self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), self-enhancement (power and achievement), openness to change (hedonism, stimulation and self-direction) and conservation (tradition, conformity and security).

Both postmaterialist and self-transcendence values emphasize non-materialistic aspects of life. While postmaterialism is related to societal changes driven by economic development, self-transcendence is more closely related to individual psychological traits and is therefore part of a broader, more universal value framework. Nevertheless, postmaterialist and self-transcendence values share similarities, which explains why they are positively correlated (Beckers et al., 2012; Wilson, 2005).

Empirical studies suggest that individuals with postmaterialist values are more likely to engage in political consumerism compared to those with materialist values (e.g. Kelm and Dohle, 2018; Stolle et al., 2005; Theocharis and Van Deth, 2018). Similar findings are observed for individuals with self-transcendence values – those who aim to understand, appreciate, tolerate and protect the welfare of all people and the environment (universalism) as well as those who aim to preserve and enhance the welfare of people close to them (benevolence). Self-transcendence values are positively related to political activism (e.g. Rudnev, 2021). Moreover, they are particularly important for fair trade consumers (e.g. Ma and Lee, 2012) and correlate with boycotting and buycotting in Europe (Koos, 2012; Neilson, 2010), as well as with political consumerism in Brazil (De Barcellos et al., 2014). Therefore, we posit (H3) that self-transcendence values are positively related to political consumerism.

Values not only influence political activities at the individual level but also determine the culture of societies (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). In societies where postmaterialist values or self-transcendence values prevail, individuals may be more willing to engage in political consumerism, as political, ethical or ecological aspects of consumption hold greater importance. This argument finds support in Leissner’s (2023) work, which indicates a positive relationship between the level of postmaterialism within European countries and engagement in green lifestyle politics, such as purchasing products with environmental labels. Thus, we hypothesize (H4) that individuals are more likely to engage in political consumerism in countries with a high level of self-transcendence values.

A substantial body of research, primarily grounded in Inglehart’s (1971) work, delves into the dynamics of intergenerational value changes. Inglehart’s (1971) postmaterialism thesis states that the conditions under which individuals grow up, particularly the level of security and well-being, shape their basic values. Given the transformations in these conditions after World War II in advanced industrial societies, materialist values tended to predominate in older generations, while postmaterialist values are more pronounced in younger generations. Consequently, postmaterialist values have gained increasing prevalence in societies over time. Empirically, Inglehart (2008) illustrates this shift: individuals with materialistic values outnumbered those with postmaterialist values fourfold in Western Europe in the 1970s, whereas in 2006, postmaterialists surpassed materialists. Moreover, drawing on data from the ESS, Atif et al. (2022) demonstrate a growing significance of self-transcendence values in European societies from 2002 to 2016.

However, to date, limited research has explored whether shifts in value over time are associated with changes in their explanatory power for other behaviours. For instance, if self-transcendence values were considerably less prevalent in European societies two decades ago than they are today, the impact of these self-transcendence values on activities such as political consumerism may have evolved. Journalists, for example, might have responded to this value change by focusing more often on issues such as climate change (Schmidt et al., 2013) or human rights (Powers, 2016). Companies may also have responded to this shift by adapting their production methods, thereby increasing the availability of sustainable products. Both trends could have enhanced the importance of self-transcendence values for political consumerism, which is why we pose the following research question (RQ2): to what extent have the effects of individual self-transcendence and the level of self-transcendence in countries on political consumerism changed over time?

Method

The study relies on data from the ESS, a cross-national survey conducted biennially since 2002 in participating European countries (2002–2023). The samples are representative of individuals aged 15 and above residing within private households in each country. This study focuses on data from the 15 countries that participated in 11 rounds of the ESS (n = 313,061; Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom).

The ESS primarily relies on face-to-face interviews for data collection. However, in the 10th round of the ESS, the survey mode shifted to self-completion in some countries (Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the results from the 10th round must be interpreted with caution for these countries.

Political consumerism

The study considers only one form of political consumerism – boycotting – as it was the only behaviour regularly measured in the ESS. Boycotting was measured in all 11 rounds using the question: ‘There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Boycotted certain products’ (recoded: 1 = yes, 0 = no). Although this measurement is well established, it has several limitations (e.g. Gundelach, 2020b; Stolle et al., 2005). It does not capture the frequency or motivations for boycotting. Additionally, boycotting products is not necessarily aimed at improving things in the respondents’ home country, but may extend to global concerns (e.g. combating child labour).

Individual-level predictors

Internet use and self-transcendence are the primary predictors at individual level. The measurement of internet use varied across ESS rounds. In the first five rounds, participants were asked ‘How often do you use the internet, the World Wide Web or e-mail – whether at home or at work – for your personal use?’ (0 = no access at home or work, 1 = never use, 2 = less than once a month, 3 = once a month, 4 = several times a month, 5 = once a week, 6 = several times a week, 7 = every day). In rounds 8–11, the question changed to: ‘People can use the internet on different devices such as computers, tablets and smartphones. How often do you use the internet on these or any other devices, whether for work or personal use?’ (1 = never, 2 = only occasionally, 3 = a few times a week, 4 = most days, 5 = every day). Due to these variations, the responses were dichotomized (1 = every day, 0 = not every day). Internet use was not measured in the sixth and seventh round, nor in the first ESS round for Germany and the first two rounds for France.

Self-transcendence was measured with the Human Values Scale (Schwartz, 1992), a well-established tool for classifying respondents according to 10 basic value orientations. Respondents indicated the extent to which interviewer-described character traits of a person resembled them (recoded: 1 = not like me at all to 6 = very much like me). Self-transcendence was operationalized as the mean value of three items measuring universalism (e.g. ‘He/she strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him/her’) and two items measuring benevolence (e.g. ‘It’s very important to him/her to help the people around him/her. He/she wants to care for their well-being’). The mean value of these 5 items (α = .72) has been centered by the mean of all 21 Human Value Scale items to correct for response tendencies (Schwartz, 2007: 180). The Human Value Scale was not measured in the 10th ESS round in Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden.

Additional individual-level predictors were incorporated as control variables. Building upon previous research on political consumerism (Copeland and Boulianne, 2022), demographic factors such as gender (1 = male, 2 = female; 52.5% female), age (in years; M = 48.8, SD = 18.7) and education (recoded: 1 = primary education (13.2%), 2 = secondary education (57.2%), 3 = tertiary education (29.6%)) were considered. Furthermore, respondents’ political interest (recoded: 1 = not at all interested to 4 = very interested; M = 2.4, SD = 0.9), political ideology (0 = left to 10 = right; M = 6.0, SD = 2.2), political trust (mean index: trust in politicians, political parties (not in the first round), and in country’s parliament; 0 = no trust at all to 10 = complete trust; M = 5.1, SD = 2.2, α = .91) and generalized trust (mean index of three items, e.g. ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’; 0 = low generalized trust to 10 = high generalized trust; M = 6.4, SD = 1.9, α = .75) were taken into account.

Country-level predictors

The primary country-level predictors are the level of digitalization and self-transcendence values within a society. The fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) within a country served as a proxy for digitalization (data derived from the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/). The aggregated self-transcendence values within a country served as proxy for the self-transcendence values at country level (ESS data, aggregated per country).

Furthermore, previous research has shown that the country’s affluence is positively related to political consumerism (Koos, 2012) and lifestyle politics (Leissner, 2023). Thus, the logged gross domestic product (GDP) was used as proxy of the country’s affluence (M = 10.5, SD = 0.6). The data was derived from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/).

Results

Descriptive analysis indicates that boycott engagement in Europe increased from 19.0% in 2002 to 27.3% in 2023 (Figure 1(a)). Most countries studied experienced an increase (Table A1), with the exceptions of Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.¹ However, significant country-level differences persist: for example, more than 50% of Swedes and Finns boycotted products in 2023, while less than 5% of Hungarians and Portuguese did so.

Figure 1.

Descriptives changes over time: (a) weighted percentages of respondents indicating that they have participated in boycotting; (b) weighted percentages of respondents indicating that they have used the internet on daily basis (no data available for 2012 and 2014); (c) broadband subscriptions per 100 persons (data derived from the World Bank); (d) entries are weighted and centred mean values of self-transcendence. The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.

From 2002 to 2023, daily internet usage in the surveyed countries rose from 15.0% to 77.5% (Figure 1(b); Table A2), and the broadband subscriptions per 100 persons increased from 4.1% to 40.2% (Figure 1(c); Table A3). Additionally, the level of self-transcendence increased from 2002 (M = 0.50, SD = 0.00) to 2023 (M = 0.62, SD = 0.00; Figure 1(d)). However, no significant changes in self-transcendence were observed in Switzerland, and Hungary showed a decrease in self-transcendence over this period (Table A4). Overall, the findings highlight a general increase in boycott engagement, daily internet usage, broadband subscriptions and self-transcendence values across Europe.

To test the hypotheses – whether internet usage and self-transcendence values at the individual level and the country’s level of digitalization and self-transcendence values are related to boycotting – all continuous individual-level predictors were centred by the country mean, and country-level predictors were centred by the grand mean (Heisig and Schaeffer, 2019). Moreover, we recoded age into decades and multiplied self-transcendence and internet use by 10 to avoid convergence problems. Then, we calculated the residual intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the null models (results not shown). The ICCs ranged from 0.19 to 0.23, indicating that approximately 20% of the variation in boycott engagement can be attributed to differences at the country level. This justifies the use of multilevel models (Snijders and Bosker, 2010).

Next, we estimated the effects of individual-level predictors on boycott engagement (see Table A5, Model 1). The results are notably consistent and largely replicate the results of existing studies: women, younger individuals, those with higher education and people who are politically interested, left-oriented and those with low political trust are more likely to engage in boycotts. In contrast, generalized trust does not significantly impact boycott engagement across any of the models. Moreover, daily internet usage and higher levels of self-transcendence are associated with an increased likelihood of boycott engagement, which supports hypotheses H1 and H3 (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Predictors of boycotting.

Finally, we introduced country-level predictors (Table A5, Model 2). The results reveal that affluence of countries is only related to boycotting in rounds 7, 8 and 10. The level of digitalization in countries does not generally affect boycott engagement, leading to the rejection of H2. Conversely, the level of self-transcendence at the country level positively affects boycott engagement: individuals are more likely to boycott products in countries with a high level of self-transcendence, supporting H4 (see Figure 2).

The research questions ask whether the effects of individual internet use and the level of digitalization in countries on political consumerism (RQ1), as well as the effects of individual self-transcendence and the level of self-transcendence in countries (RQ2) on political consumerism, have changed over time. To answer these questions, we pooled the ESS data from the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 11th survey waves. For the other survey waves, data were missing for some questions or countries (see Method), which is why we excluded these waves from the further analyses.

We calculated logistic multilevel models with cross-level interactions using the pooled data set. First, we estimated the effects of the individual-level predictors (Table 1 – Model 1) and country-level predictors (Model 2) on boycott engagement. Next, we added the survey wave as a predictor at the third level (Model 3). The results of this model support the findings of the previous analyses and indicate that the likelihood of boycotting increased over time.

Table 1.

Multilevel logistic regressions on boycott engagement (pooled data).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Intercept	0.08*** (0.05 – 0.12)	0.08*** (0.06 – 0.10)	0.06*** (0.05 – 0.08)	0.06*** (0.05 – 0.08)	0.06*** (0.05 – 0.08)	0.06*** (0.05 – 0.08)	0.07*** (0.05 – 0.08)
Individual-level
Female	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)	1.21*** (1.17 – 1.24)
Age	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)	0.95*** (0.95 – 0.96)
Secondary education	1.61*** (1.51 – 1.72)	1.61*** (1.51 – 1.73)	1.62*** (1.51 – 1.72)	1.61*** (1.51 – 1.72)	1.61*** (1.51 – 1.72)	1.62*** (1.51 – 1.73)	1.62*** (1.51 – 1.73)
Tertiary education	2.54*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.54*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.55*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.55*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.55*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.55*** (2.38 – 2.72)	2.55*** (2.38 – 2.72)
Political interest	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)	1.64*** (1.61 – 1.68)
Political ideology	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)	0.92*** (0.91 – 0.93)
Political trust	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)	0.91*** (0.91– 0.92)
Generalized trust	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)
Self-transcendence	1.98*** (1.91 – 2.05)	1.98*** (1.91 – 2.06)	1.98*** (1.91 – 2.05)	1.81*** (1.65 – 1.99)	1.81*** (1.65 – 1.99)	1.98*** (1.91 – 2.05)	1.98*** (1.91 – 2.05)
Internet usage	1.35*** (1.30 – 1.40)	1.35*** (1.30 – 1.40)	1.35*** (1.30 – 1.40)	1.35*** (1.30 – 1.40)	1.35*** (1.30 – 1.40)	1.33*** (1.23 – 1.44)	1.33*** (1.23 – 1.44)
Country-level
Digitalization		1.00(1.00 – 1.01)	1.00(0.99 – 1.01)	1.00(0.99 – 1.01)	1.00(0.99 – 1.01)	1.00(0.99 – 1.01)	1.00(0.99 – 1.01)
Self-transcendence		1.92***(1.60 – 2.29)	1.96***(1.64 – 2.35)	1.96***(1.64 – 2.35)	1.96***(1.64 – 2.35)	1.96***(1.64 – 2.35)	1.76***(1.45 – 2.12)
Affluence		1.10(0.92 – 1.30)	1.07(0.91 – 1.25)	1.06(0.91 – 1.25)	1.06(0.91 – 1.25)	1.07(0.91 – 1.25)	1.20*(1.00 – 1.43)
Survey wave			1.04***(1.02 – 1.06)	1.04***(1.02 – 1.06)	1.04***(1.02 – 1.06)	1.04***(1.02 – 1.06)	1.03**(1.01 – 1.05)
Interactions
Survey wave × Self-transcendence (individual)				1.01*(1.00 – 1.03)
Survey wave × Internet usage (individual)					1.00(1.00 – 1.01)
Survey wave × Self-transcendence (country)						1.01***(1.00 – 1.02)
Survey wave × Digitalization (country)							1.00(1.00 – 1.01)
Random effects
Within-country variance (σ2)	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
Intercept variance (τ00)_country	0.77	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.14
Intercept variance (τ00)_{survey wave}	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ICC	0.19	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
n _{survey waves}	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
n _country	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
n _individual	133,431	133,431	133,431	133,431	133,431	133,431	133,431

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals; significance levels: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p <. 05.

ICC: intraclass correlation.

In the fourth to seventh models, we separately added cross-level interaction terms between the survey wave and self-transcendence at the individual level (Model 4), individual internet usage (Model 5), self-transcendence at the country level (Model 6) and digitalization at the country level (Model 7). The results indicate that the influence of individual self-transcendence values and the impact of self-transcendence values at the country level slightly increase over time.

Plotting the effect of individual self-transcendence on boycotting in 2006 (ESS wave 3) and 2023 (ESS wave 11) reveals that the likelihood of boycotting is about 12% higher in 2023 than in 2006 for those with high self-transcendence values. Similarly, the likelihood of boycotting has increased by approximately 5% between 2006 and 2023 among people living in countries with high self-transcendence values. In contrast, the effect of individual internet usage and digitalization on boycotting was not influenced by the survey wave (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Moderation effects of individual and societal self-transcendence, internet usage and digitalization on boycotting over time.

Discussion

Political consumerism, including activities such as boycotting, has become a popular form of political participation in many western democracies, with digitalization and value change cited as potential driving forces behind this trend. However, cross-national and especially longitudinal studies on political consumerism are rare, leaving it unclear whether digitalization and value change are indeed as significant as often assumed. This study examines the impact of individual internet usage and self-transcendence values as well as the digitalization and self-transcendence values at country level on boycott engagement using survey data from 15 countries across 11 rounds of the ESS (n = 313,061). Thus, the study contributes to the growing body of research on the antecedents of political consumerism, offering a more nuanced understanding of these effects over time and across different contexts.

The results confirm and expand upon previous findings that boycott engagement has increased in Europe (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Theocharis and Van Deth, 2018). This trend appears to be ongoing and is evident in almost all countries analysed. In some cases, there have been significant increases in recent years, which can presumably be attributed to specific contextual developments. For example, the proportion of Finns engaging in boycott engagement rose substantially between 2020 and 2023, from 39.1% to 51.7%. One potential reason for this rise is the Russian war against Ukraine. Due to Finland’s geographical proximity to Russia and its associated geopolitical implications, many Finns stated that they began or intend to boycott Finnish companies operating in Russia (Rajamäki, 2022).

Interestingly, the proportion of political consumers identified in the ESS studies is lower than in survey studies specifically focused on political consumerism (e.g. Boulianne et al., 2024; Gundelach, 2020b; Kelm, 2024). This discrepancy is likely due to measurement differences. The proportion of political consumers tends to be higher when the frequency of political consumer activities is measured, rather than using a dichotomous measure that simply asks whether individuals engage in political consumerism or not. To better align future studies with international surveys like the ESS, it would be helpful to initially ask about political consumerism in a dichotomous format and then ask about the frequency if the respondent has engaged in such activities.

Unsurprisingly, the analyses show a dramatic increase in the number of daily internet users across all countries analysed from 2002 to 2023. However, despite this overall growth, significant differences persist between countries. For example, while only 60% of the population in Hungary uses the internet daily in 2023, approximately 90% of the Dutch, Swedes and Norwegians do so. Furthermore, the level of self-transcendence has also risen in nearly all countries analysed, with Hungary being a notable exception. This suggests that non-material aspects of life are becoming increasingly important to citizens in many European countries.

Internet usage and self-transcendence values may also influence boycott engagement. The results of multilevel logistic regressions indicate that both individual internet usage and individual self-transcendence values are positively associated with boycott engagement, which confirms previous findings (e.g. Boulianne et al., 2024; Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017; Kelm and Dohle, 2018; Koos, 2012; Neilson, 2010). Additionally, the level of self-transcendence at the country level is positively related to boycott engagement. This finding supports Leissner’s (2023) work, which demonstrates that the level of postmaterialism in European countries is linked to engagement in green lifestyle politics. However, as research also shows that political consumers are motivated to express their values to others (Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017), further research is needed to investigate the effects of other values besides self-transcendence on political consumerism (e.g. achievement). In addition, further studies might analyse differences between universalism and benevolence to examine whether political consumerism is motivated more by global concerns (i.e. universalism) or by relationships with friends and family (i.e. benevolence).

The results indicate that the level of digitalization at the country level does not correlate with boycott engagement, even though the internet is considered to be the primary infrastructure for individualized responsibility-taking such as political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013: 38). One potential reason for this finding lies in the measurement of digitalization. It is possible that it is not the speed of the internet that is important for political consumer activities, but merely whether people have access to the internet. However, as access is available almost everywhere in Europe, further analyses also considering developing countries are needed to examine the effect of the digital divide (Gundelach, 2020b; Norris, 2002).

Self-transcendence values at individual and national level have not only had a significant and positive influence on the likelihood of boycotting products, but have also strengthened slightly over time. Individuals with high self-transcendence values and those living in countries where such values are prevalent are more likely to boycott products in 2023 compared to 2006. The findings of this study suggest that a value change has been occurring in Europe during the first decades of the 21st century and, more importantly, that this shift is influencing actual political behaviour – albeit to a modest extent.

Future studies should aim to investigate the mechanisms behind this phenomenon more closely. Does the value change lead to quicker criticism of companies that have yet to adapt their production processes to ethical or environmental standards? Or does it encourage the media to report more frequently on ethical and ecological aspects of consumption, thereby fostering political consumerism? Long-term content analyses of media coverage would be particularly valuable in addressing these questions.

In contrast, the effects of internet use and digitalization on boycott engagement have remained stable over time. This is notable, given that meta-analyses suggest the influence of digital media use on political participation has increased over time (Boulianne, 2019, 2020). One possible explanation for the constant effects is that the trend observed in these meta-analyses may not apply to political consumerism; instead, the influence of digital media may have shifted towards other forms of participation. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the changes in effect sizes reported in the meta-analyses may not reflect an actual increase in effects over time but rather result from more refined measurements of digital media use. For example, recent studies differentiate between active and passive digital media use as well as between political and non-political digital media use. Active and political media use are more strongly associated with political participation than passive and apolitical media use (e.g. Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017). Since this level of differentiation was in many studies not considered at the beginning of the millennium in measurement approaches, this may explain why the effects were smaller in earlier studies compared to those conducted more recently.

The study has several limitations. First, the dichotomous measurements of boycott engagement and internet use have weaknesses. They do not consider that political consumerism can occur on a daily basis and that internet use encompasses a wide range of activities and opportunities. Simply measuring whether individuals use the internet daily does not capture the specific activities through which internet use might influence political consumerism, such as accessing information, exchanging ideas with others or engaging in online shopping (Kelm and Dohle, 2018). Despite these limitations, it is particularly noteworthy that a consistent influence of internet use on political consumerism can still be observed. Second, self-transcendence and internet use were not measured in every country and every wave of the survey. Moreover, the wording of the question on internet use was changed from the fifth to the eighth survey wave. Third, the change in survey mode in the 10th wave – from face-to-face interviews to self-completion methods in some countries – appears to have caused a sharp increase in reported boycott engagement (e.g. in Poland: 2018: 5.9 % boycotters; 2020: 23.6 % boycotters). Therefore, the results from the 10th wave should be interpreted with caution. Fourth, the analyses rely on cross-sectional surveys, which precludes any causal inferences about the observed relationships. Finally, the results are limited to 15 European countries. Comparing established and developing countries (e.g. Gundelach, 2020a) could yield valuable insights into the influence of digitalization, values and political consumerism.

Despite these limitations, the study makes a valuable contribution to the current research on the antecedents of political consumer behaviour across different countries and over time. The findings highlight the significant role of internet use and self-transcendence values in fostering political consumerism. Building on these insights, future studies should further investigate the underlying mechanisms of these relationships. Additionally, greater attention should be given to the fact that forms of individualized responsibility-taking, such as political consumerism, can be practiced in everyday-life settings.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121251348226 – Supplemental material for Digitalization, value change and political consumerism in Europe: A multi-level trend analysis over two decades

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121251348226 for Digitalization, value change and political consumerism in Europe: A multi-level trend analysis over two decades by Ole Kelm in International Political Science Review

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Marco Dohle for his valuable suggestions, which significantly improved the quality of this paper. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback, and to Daniel Stockemer, editor of International Political Science Review, for his pragmatic and supportive editorial decisions.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Ole Kelm

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author biography

Ole Kelm (PhD, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, 2020) is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany. His research focuses on political communication, the consequences of media-related perceptions, and political consumerism.

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