Ambition,meet reality: The European Union’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific

Abstract

The European Union is undergoing a major transformation as it strives to be perceived as a credible geopolitical actor, along with being an economic and normative superpower. Its ‘Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ is symptomatic of this change as it far surpasses strategic outlooks it has for other developing regions. This article builds on the actorness literature as it examines the nature of the European Union’s growing ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It focuses on the economic, security, and normative aspects of the Strategy, and it identifies the tensions, opportunities and challenges in its vision and implementation. The article concludes by arguing that although there are opportunities for greater engagement with the region, they have grown more complicated given the war in Ukraine. Moreover, much will also depend on recalibrating the European Union’s relationship with China, as well as finding the most effective way to leverage the affordances of transatlantic cooperation.

Keywords

European Union European Union foreign policy actorness Indo-Pacific

Introduction

This article delves into the European Union’s (EU) Indo-Pacific strategy and its significance in the context of the EU’s ongoing transformation into a geopolitical actor (European Commission and High Representative (HR)/Vice President (VP), 2021a). The ‘Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ was designed to complement the EU’s evolving role as more than just an economic and normative power, aligning with its Strategic Outlook on China, the Global Gateway and the Strategic Compass (European Commission and HR/VP, 2019; European Commission, 2021; Council of the European Union, 2022). As time has passed since the Strategy’s release, questions have arisen regarding its actual implementation and outcomes, particularly in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, the article evaluates the EU’s announcements and deliverables related to the Indo-Pacific and analyses the key factors influencing its ability to assert itself as an individual actor in the region. The article adopts a tripartite framework that was presented by the Symposium, focusing on economic, security and normative concerns of the EU’s presence in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from existing scholarly works on EU actorness, it examines essential elements that shape the EU’s distinctiveness and impact as an actor, such as its intent, capabilities, cohesion and opportunities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Rhinard and Sjöstedt, 2019). Furthermore, the article explores the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, prospects of transatlantic cooperation and the EU’s relations with China. The ultimate goal is to assess the EU’s potential to make a meaningful impact in the region, with a particular emphasis on trade and economic development.

This article highlights inherent tensions in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its implementation challenges. Balancing cooperation with assertiveness, especially with China, is bound to become increasingly difficult. Although the region offers trade opportunities, security issues and minilateral defence cooperation limit the EU’s competitiveness. The EU will have to rely on its capable Member States for hard security matters while leading multilateral efforts in trade, development and capacity-building.

Balancing economic, security and normative concerns

Economic concerns

The EU seeks to assert itself as an actor in the Indo-Pacific primarily through its economic power. The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is true to the EU’s institutional strengths by stating that the top priority remains economic engagement – whether it is through furthering free trade negotiations in the region, setting standards around responsible business conduct, building resilient supply chains, and linking economic prosperity and green growth. Indeed, this is the area where the EU’s capabilities are sans pareil. However, it is equally important to stress that the Indo-Pacific as a region – a highly contested term given the difference in geographical interpretations and political charges it might carry – was not high on the priorities list for the EU until late 2020. In fact, even as late as February 2021, the EU’s Trade Policy Review stated that its priorities lay in improving relations with the US and China, followed by the regions that the EU identified as priority and Africa (European Commission, 2021). The document referred to the Asia-Pacific and grouped it with South America, signalling that the change in strategic jargon had not yet trickled down to the level of specific issue area policies.

By promoting an a priori trade and development agenda, the EU is responding to the openings in the region, which is highly receptive to prospects of building high-quality infrastructure, supporting trade liberalization, collaboration in research and innovation, advancing connectivity and digitalization, and contributing to capacity-building and greater societal and economic resilience (Kliem, 2022). For instance, given the growing disillusion with the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) there is an opening for the EU to set standards on connectivity and infrastructure development, which would also serve to advance issues such as labour and human rights, as well as help address challenges posed by climate change (Gong, 2019). The ‘27+30’ Indo-Pacific Forum was a recent example of the regional receptivity to the EU’s agenda setting on digital connectivity, climate and energy, transportation, health, education and research (Lau, 2022). Another example has been the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the EU funding for protective equipment, vaccines and related health aid in Southeast Asia, which far surpassed other extraregional partners (Kliem, 2022).

Two issues emerge with respect to EU’s economic actorness by examining its capability and coherence. The first concerns the political will and policymaking bandwidth to see this agenda through. For instance, aligned with the vision of economic engagement is the focus on improving connectivity in the region which draws on the EU’s new connectivity initiative ‘Global Gateway’ (European Commission and HR/VP, 2021b). The scepticism surrounding the initiative currently stems from the fact that there are significant trade-offs that will have to be made given the resources that will be needed to assist Ukraine with the post-conflict reconstruction require significant sums of money. Without a large-scale engagement of the private sector, Global Gateway is at peril of becoming a rebranding exercise in the sphere of infrastructure diplomacy.

Another important issue concerns the evolving dynamics of trade and economic engagement, which have been undergoing a significant shift in recent years. Although the EU already holds a prominent position as an investor, trading partner and development actor in the region, it is evident that the terms of engagement are increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations. The Indo-Pacific Strategy acknowledges the importance of supply chain security and resilience. In this context, the EU’s economic relations with China play a pivotal role, as they constitute a significant portion of the bloc’s trade with the region and provide essential imports, including critical raw materials, for the EU’s economy (Eurostat, 2022, 2023). As it recalibrates its China policy, the EU has adopted a ‘de-risking’ agenda (European Commission, 2023). Yet internal coherence is clearly lacking on this front as Member States such as France and Germany still seem to be pursuing a strategy that keeps leaning into the China engagement of past years (Ghiretti and Stec, 2023).

Security concerns

Over the past decade, the EU has engaged in major self-reflection exercises regarding its role in the world. The publication of the Global Strategy in June 2016 was a pivotal point on this journey, seeing the introduction of language that refers to realpolitik calculations, such as the insistence on ‘principled pragmatism’ in foreign policy and the focus on boosting third countries’ ‘resilience’ (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2016). Although the EU has long pursued the goal of ‘effective multilateralism’ in its foreign policy, the von der Leyen Commission has highlighted the need for the EU to enhance its crisis response capabilities and ensure its security without relying solely on pacifist and civilian principles. Since taking office in 2019, the Commission President has advocated for a geopolitical Commission, emphasizing the importance of the EU’s role in global affairs (European Commission, 2019).

This period also coincided with the EU’s increasingly harder stance towards China. The Joint Communication ‘EU–China: A Strategic Outlook’ published in March 2019 marks a critical juncture in EU–China relations as it defined China as an economic competitor and a systemic rival, along with being a negotiating partner (European Commission, 2019) This was only exacerbated by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 to early 2020 as China reciprocated by coarsening its rhetoric towards the EU and its Member States and actively engaging in information warfare (Bachulska and Pu, 2021). As a result, public opinion supportive of Beijing began to rapidly decline across Europe (Silver et al., 2020).

It is through this lens that we should approach the security aspects of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. In defining its interest, the EU Strategy defines the region in rather maximalist terms – stretching from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Island States – which is consistent with all the other European definitions (Insisa and Pugliese, 2022). The Strategy is unequivocal about the fact that security in the region is deteriorating. Primarily, these assessments are predicated on the negative hard security trends which include geopolitical competition, arms races and military build-up, increasing nuclear proliferation in the region, and malicious cyber activities (Rajagopalan, 2021). Along with this, a trend of hostile manipulation of economic dependencies and supply chains has become more apparent, as well as the increasing human rights abuses, decline in democratic governance and increasing threats from insufficiently addressing the climate crisis (Medcalf, 2020). The assessment of negative trends is consistent across all EU member states that are strategically engaging with the Indo-Pacific (i.e., France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy), as well as in the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review and 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, as highlighted in the contributions to this Symposium.

The Strategy discusses the EU’s role as a growing security actor drawing on its engagement in the region thus far. It emphasizes its naval capabilities and its role in capacity-building and crisis management. Thus far, the EU’s naval presence has been more focused on the Indian Ocean, where it has conducted Operation Atalanta aimed at deterring and countering piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalia coast (Dombrowski and Reich, 2019). More recently, the EU has begun participating in joint naval exercises with the likes of Japan, India, South Korea and Indonesia around the Arabian Sea (Pugliese, 2022). Although the EU aspires to cooperative security and expanding its operational portfolio to address new security challenges, it still relies on bilateral and ‘minilateral’ cooperation led by Member States due to the dependence on individual defence capabilities. This type of cooperation has already been successful, as seen in joint exercises conducted by France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands in the East and South China seas with regional partners (Gomez, 2023).

The EU’s stance on China and its ambitions in security and defence are crucial for building cohesion. The Strategy is often seen as a ‘third way’, emphasizing engagement and partnerships without taking overt sides (Christiansen et al., 2021). In fact, the entire document emphasizes that the Strategy is inclusive and not against any particular country, and it goes so far as to have cooperation in the very title of the document. The idea of a ‘third way’ path can also be seen in Italy’s own contribution to the EU Strategy, emphasizing multilateralism and openness to cooperation, which would resonate well with both the EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (see Gabriele Abbondanza’s article in this Symposium). A less generous interpretation would deem it an exercise in trying to have it all, while minimizing the costs – expressed as both material investments and reputation. This could be read also as a way of reassuring some EU Member States, such as Germany, which are careful about challenging China due to their economic interests (see Rafał Ulatowski’s article in this Symposium). However, China’s assertiveness and coercive tactics, as well as its relationship with Russia, have led to a notable shift in policies among countries that were once seen as key in implementing China’s Europe policy. The original 16+1 group has shrunk with the withdrawal of the 3 Baltic states, and relations between China and Poland, Czechia and Romania have faltered. This suggests that there will be fewer dissenting voices in articulating a more decisive EU stance towards China.

Normative concerns

Although the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is noticeably infused with realpolitik assertions and aspirations regarding the EU’s role in the region, it still tends to be more fluent in the language of norms and principles that underpin EU practices. The calls for engagement based on democratic principles and commitment to the protection of human rights are a prominent part of the Strategy.

The Strategy prioritizes cooperation as the main approach in a competitive region. Existing dialogues, relationships, territorial possessions and historical ties with key regional states facilitate engagement, although it is not always guaranteed. The Strategy highlights bilateral, regional and multilateral forums, as well as commitment to the rules-based international order and open markets. Bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and the new Partnership Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries serve as primary avenues for cooperation. The EU also collaborates with regional and extraregional partners, including ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the US (European Commission, 2021; 2022a). The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a strategic dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India, is mentioned as another platform for engagement and cooperation. This reflects an awareness of security trends that favour more minilateral and coalition-type arrangements (D’Ambrogio, 2021).

Similar to the 2019 Strategic Outlook, the Strategy lays out a multifaceted engagement with China – from the bilateral engagement on common challenges and interests, to working with international partners to push back where fundamental disagreements exist with China (European Commission and HR/VP, 2019). In previous years, those opportunities came from the regular EU–China summits, as well as at its biannual Asia–Europe Meetings (ASEM) which included the regional heavyweights, such as China, India and Russia (Gaens and Khandekar, 2018). Given the growing dissonance between the EU’s and China’s visions of the regional and international order, the likelihood of more fruitful meetings is precipitously diminishing and hard to conceive (He and Li, 2020).

Finally, in keeping with the more sober assessment of regional trends it is interesting to observe how the discussion of the protection of human rights is broached. The Strategy is unambiguous regarding the full spectrum of policy tools that are at the EU’s disposal – particularly as it stresses its willingness to use restrictive measures and a sanctions regime in order to ensure compliance with those norms. The question of effectiveness of such policy measures will be crucial down the line for a myriad of reasons. Firstly, sanctions regimes are far from being universally proven methods of coercive behaviour change (Demarais, 2022). Secondly, plenty of states in the region are put off by the western proselytizing about human rights while they still practise exemptionalism at home and in dealing with other partners that might be of geostrategic value (Kelemen, 2020). Thirdly, China’s influence and the allure of its development financing without principles-based conditionality is still considerable around the region (Tekdal, 2022).

Between aspirations and implementation: finding opportunities and addressing challenges

Given the size, diversity and economic and security demands of the Indo-Pacific region, there are opportunities for the EU to assert itself. However, the EU’s ability to stand out as a distinct actor in the Indo-Pacific largely depends on external factors, such as the regional economic, security and political order that allows for the presence of extraregional actors. Although the EU has recently gained more prominence in the economic, political and security agendas of Indo-Pacific countries, challenges remain in implementing the established strategy (Brown, 2022). Policymaking bandwidth and resource allocation are significant hurdles, especially considering the ongoing war in Ukraine. Furthermore, coordinating with the US and recalibrating relations with China add further complexities that require attention.

The impact of the war in Ukraine

Optimistic observers note that the EU still has several reasons to effectively engage with the Indo-Pacific. From an economic standpoint, the region offers the highest potential for return on investment and trade liberalization. Additionally, there are various areas of functional cooperation where the EU has a significant stake and relevant experience, such as addressing climate change and global health challenges. The revised threat perception and the interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres resulting from the war in Ukraine may lead to increased resource allocation for the region. The EU’s enhanced capabilities in defence and security cooperation, stemming from the war in Ukraine, could further enhance its capacity in the Indo-Pacific. EU Member States have committed to an additional €200b in spending over the coming years, with Germany’s special €100b fund playing a significant role. The EU’s increasing engagement in defence research and procurement, along with the incentives for cooperative projects within Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), could transform defence cooperation within the EU (European Commission, 2022b).

The war in Ukraine spurred closer collaboration between the EU and the UK. Although the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review had minimal emphasis on security cooperation with the EU, it prioritized the enhancement of cooperation with individual EU member states. The UK signed bilateral security and defence cooperation agreements with several European partners, including Germany (2018 and 2021), Italy (2021 and 2023), Poland (2018 and 2022), the Netherlands (2017) and the Baltic states (2021). Some harbour hopes about a closer and mutually advantageous defence relationship between the UK and the EU in the near future. These aspirations revolve around the establishment of a formal dialogue on defence and security between the UK and the EU, as well as the potential conclusion of an administrative arrangement between the UK and European Defence Agency (EDA) (Scazzieri, 2023).

On the glass-half-empty side, the main worry is that the war in Ukraine will drain the EU of the needed resources, whether they are expressed as monetary or bureaucratic or simply as attention, and that there will be very little left to signal credible and intensified engagement (European Commission, 2022c; Kliem, 2022). For instance, the overseas development assistance and funding for connectivity projects will now inevitably be prioritized to assist the rebuilding of Ukraine. Ultimately, even if the EU finds the needed resources, it is going to be more likely to continue a strategy of selective engagement with the key strategic partners rather than implement a major reorientation of its policy in this vast region. Indeed, for as long as there is an ongoing high-intensity warfare on the European continent, the EU–Indo-Pacific engagement sceptics will have the upper hand in the opening arguments of this debate (Grare and Reuter, 2021).

The prospects of transatlantic coordination and cooperation

The relief felt by transatlanticists in Europe when Joe Biden became the 46th US president cannot be overstated. Prior to his inauguration, the EU leadership published ‘The New EU–US Agenda for Global Change’ on 2 December 2020, explicitly highlighting the EU’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region and the importance of deepening cooperation with like-minded partners (European Commission, 2020). The war in Ukraine further emphasized the interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, leading to increased cooperation among US allies from both regions (Simón, 2022).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) growing interest in and response to China is particularly significant in this context. The absence of a clear transatlantic strategy to address challenges to US and European security from China was deemed conspicuous (Odgaard, 2022), but NATO has since articulated its position in its 2022 Strategic Concept (NATO, 2022). The concept recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and increased Sino-Russian cooperation as challenges to the NATO’s security, interests and values. It also acknowledges the direct impact of developments in the Indo-Pacific region on Euro-Atlantic security, making a case for strengthening existing partnerships and forging new ones in the region. Although NATO’s focus remains on the Euro-Atlantic, there is an opportunity for the Alliance to coordinate responses to transatlantic defence and security issues. Initiatives to better coordinate defence industrial strategies, cyber and space cooperation, and other functional areas have been identified as top priorities (Haroche and Quencez, 2022). However, there has been little discussion about how the EU would coordinate with NATO on these fronts.

Transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific hinges on the articulation of strategic objectives. The EU cannot act as an equal to the US in terms of hard power balance, and its Member States have rejected scenarios involving regional hegemony or a condominium of great powers in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the common denominator for transatlantic cooperation lies in functional areas and initiatives aimed at capacity-building, particularly in connectivity and infrastructure development, climate change action, human security, and the industrial and technological aspects of defence (Judah, 2022).

The future of EU–China relations

On the one hand, the dominant tone of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is about seizing opportunities presented by a region that holds significant strategic and economic significance for the EU. On the other hand, in examining each of the three areas of concern for this Symposium, it becomes clear that even when it is not explicitly mentioned, the issue of EU–China relations looms large in the implementation of the Strategy. China’s expanding economic presence, military modernization and strategic activities have raised concerns among EU Member States regarding security, economic interests and the protection of international rules and norms. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is partly a response to China’s growing influence and assertiveness in the region.

However, as it stands now, it is clear the EU is faced with the imperative of recalibrating its China strategy. As the analysis above demonstrated, this will potentially be an overdue exercise for the new Commission. Thus far, the most we have seen is a change in rhetoric with respect to economic concerns. This has entailed the idea of ‘de-risking’ as a realization that the EU must develop a coherent and coordinated response to safeguard its economic sovereignty and ensure a level playing field (Huotari and Stec, 2023). On the security front, the EU should develop a comprehensive approach that combines security cooperation with partners, technology screening mechanisms and resilience-building to mitigate risks and ensure its own security interests are protected given China’s military modernization, assertive maritime claims and expanding influence in critical infrastructure. Finally, the EU should consistently raise human rights concerns, support civil society and advocate for greater transparency and accountability from China. Only by upholding its own values and coordinating messaging with Member States can the EU maintain credibility and influence in its engagement with China.

Conclusion

The EU is undergoing a major transformation as it strives to be perceived as a credible geopolitical actor. Crafting an Indo-Pacific strategy aligns with this change, even though the bulk of the strategy still reflects the EU’s traditional roles as a trading and normative power. This article has highlighted inherent tensions in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy vision, and the opportunities and challenges in its implementation. The strategy builds on Member States’ existing strategies in the region, carefully balancing the need to be more assertive while leaving room for cooperation, even with China. This balancing act is going to become harder to maintain. Furthermore, the region allows entry to extraregional powers in trade and economic development, but deteriorating security circumstances and a preference for minilateral defence cooperation make it difficult for the EU to compete fully. It will need to defer to its most capable Member States on hard security matters while spearheading multilateral initiatives in trade, development and capacity-building.

The fact that the EU has opted to use the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, and that recently the United States has adopted the EU’s “de-risking” discourse, indicates a greater strategic alignment between the two. Initial engagement with the Biden administration emphasized adding a transatlantic dimension of cooperation in the region. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the security crisis in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood have shifted the focus back to the European continent. There are thus well-founded concerns that the EU’s plans to engage with the Indo-Pacific may face resource shortages amidst and in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. To address these tensions and avoid the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy becoming a mere list of good intentions, leveraging existing resources and partnerships is crucial. Playing to the EU’s strengths in trade, overseas development aid and normative frameworks can provide a more honest promise regarding its future role in the Indo-Pacific. Reassessing the EU’s approach to China will also be necessary, requiring a potentially overdue exercise for the new Commission.

Footnotes

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This research was co-funded by the European Union’s Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Module programme (2021 call) under action 101047664 – USYDJMM2021.

ORCID iD

Gorana Grgić

Author biography

Gorana Grgić is a jointly appointed Senior Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences (Discipline of Government and International Relations) and the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. Most recently, she was a Research Fellow in grand strategy at the Hertie School – Centre for International Security. Her research interests include US foreign policy, transatlantic relations, conflict resolution, and democratization, and her current research projects and teaching activities are funded by the EU, NATO, and the Australian Department of Defence.

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(2022) America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Runs Through Ukraine. War on the Rocks, 16 December. https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/americas-indo-pacific-strategy-runs-through-ukraine/

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Tekdal

Veysel

(2022) Taking the Power Shift Seriously: China and the transformation of power relations in development cooperation. Australian Journal of International Affairs 76(5): 596–616.