Abstract
Despite concerns that women candidates are hampered by gender gaps in campaign financing, few scholars have examined how gender quotas impact women candidates’ access to campaign funds. We examine the effect of a party-based gender quota on women candidates’ financing and electoral success in Ireland. Under the gender quota, the number of women candidates increased and parties acted strategically to provide women challengers with increased financial support. However, women challengers spent less candidate funds than men challengers and were less likely to have prior officeholding experiences associated with fundraising. Women challengers’ disadvantage is concerning because candidate expenditures are associated with winning votes. Our findings show that the effectiveness of a gender quota is partly determined by how the quota interacts with the campaign finance system and the political opportunity structure.
Keywords
Introduction
Campaign spending can be a critical component to electoral success across a variety of electoral systems (Benoit and Marsh, 2010: 159–160). Although women candidates raise as much as men in the USA (Burrell, 2014), women in many other countries face fundraising disadvantages (Cigane and Öhman, 2014; Sidhu and Meena, 2007; Tovar, 2007). Moreover, in the USA and elsewhere, women and men are not similarly situated when it comes to factors associated with raising money: women are less likely to be incumbents (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005), more likely to run in non-competitive races (Murray, 2008) and less able to leverage political experiences and professional contacts to raise money (Ballington and Kahane, 2014; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Hillman, 2018; Sidhu and Meena, 2007). As Murray (this issue) points out, women face a number of gender-based disadvantages that make it more difficult to raise money, including the gender pay gap, gender inequities in candidate selection processes, sexist abuse and family responsibilities.
In recognition of social, political and financial barriers facing women candidates, some nations have introduced gender quotas to increase women’s representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2010; Krook, 2007, 2009). Though they take different forms, when party leaders and organisations have considerable control over the candidate-selection process, gender quotas incentivise parties to nominate a minimum percentage of women. Whether and how much gender quotas increase women’s representation depends on quota design (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, 2010; Dean and Dos Santos, 2017) and how the quota interacts with different elements of the electoral system.
In systems where fundraising is key to candidate success, party-based gender quotas may do little to advance women’s representation if women lack the funds necessary to run competitive races. However, few studies have examined the impact of gender quotas on campaign finances. Accordingly, we extend the research on this subject through a case-study that examines the impact of a party-based gender quota law on campaign expenditures in Ireland. Do quotas level the financial playing field for women candidates? Do parties respond to quotas by increasing support for women candidates or redouble their efforts to protect entrenched party men? Are women candidates better able to leverage campaign funds to win votes under a quota system? Addressing these questions and understanding what happened in Ireland – and why – can help explain how gender quota laws impact women candidates’ campaign finances, both directly in terms of money spent by candidates and parties, and indirectly through candidate selection.
Our analysis of four elections – three prior to the quota and one afterward – finds that Irish parties responded to the quota by strategically and pragmatically providing funding to less-experienced women challengers. At the same time, women challengers nominated by parties under the quota had lower levels of campaign spending than men and were less likely to have prior officeholding experiences associated with candidate fundraising and electoral success.
Gender quotas and women’s representation
Since the mid-1990s, numerous countries adopted gender quotas for legislative elections (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, 2010; Krook, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Gender quotas have been implemented across a range of electoral systems and take numerous forms, including voluntary party quotas, government-mandated party quotas, alternating lists and reserved seats (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Krook, 2007). Though gender quotas are intended to alter political opportunity structures so more women are nominated and elected, the quotas themselves are ‘nested’ and ‘bounded’ within existing norms of practice (Mackay, 2014). The extent to which a quota increases women’s descriptive representation depends on many factors, including quota design and how it interacts with features of the electoral system (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, 2010; Krook, 2007; Wylie and Dos Santos, 2016).
Researchers find gender quotas are more effective at increasing women’s representation when adopted under closed-list proportional representation systems with multiple parties and high levels of district magnitude (Jones, 1998; Krook, 2007), when the quotas are legally mandated rather than voluntary (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2010; Pruysers et al., 2017), and when parties face meaningful penalties for failing to meet the quota (Pruysers et al., 2017; Rosen, 2017) rather than incentives to comply (Shin and Hyun Kwon, this issue). Incumbency advantage is another factor, as men are more likely than women to be incumbents, even under gender quotas (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005).
Because parties are the gatekeepers for who runs for office, party culture, organisation and the strategic decisions of party leadership impact quota effectiveness. Left-wing parties are more likely to nominate women (Davidson-Schmich, 2010; Pruysers et al., 2017), while traditionalist parties are more likely to take advantage of loopholes in quota design to avoid nominating women or run women in non-competitive races (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2010; Davidson-Schmich, 2010; Dean and Dos Santos, 2017; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012). Wylie and Dos Santos (2016) argue that quotas developed in masculinised political cultures and implemented by male-dominated parties are unlikely to see substantial gains in women’s representation.
Party organisational structures and rules also impact how quotas are implemented. Verge and De la Fuente’s (2014) study of gender quotas in Catalonia identifies informal party practices and norms – which they term the ‘daily enactment of informal gendered institutions’ (77) – as obstacles that prevent women from gaining equal access to officeholding opportunities. Likewise, Wylie and Dos Santos (2016) find that the gender quota in Brazil was undermined by the distribution of nomination decisions to male-dominated party organisations at the subnational level.
Parties sometimes respond to quotas by pursuing sacrificial-lamb strategies, nominating women to hopeless races, unsafe seats or unrealistic ballot positions (Davidson-Schmich, 2010; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Górecki and Kukołowicz, 2014; Murray, 2008) or simply ignoring the quota directives altogether (Wang et al., this issue). Sacrificial-lamb strategies can be viewed as cynical party behaviour because party leaders voice their support for quotas while taking actions to protect male incumbents and well-established male challengers (Buckley et al., 2014). Fréchette et al. (2008) argue that self-interest explains why French party leaders placed the interests of incumbent men ahead of newcomer women, despite supporting the gender quota law, as they believed gender quotas would give incumbent legislators an electoral advantage over new and inexperienced women candidates. Murray et al. (2012) offer a different view of the French case, asserting that women candidates did just as well as men when running in similar electoral environments. According to Murray et al., seemingly disparate approaches to gender quotas are best understood as pragmatism by party leaders seeking to balance electoral, ideological and strategic goals in a competitive political environment.
Campaign finances and gender quotas
Research on campaign finance in the USA indicates women are not disadvantaged when it comes to campaign funding once factors like incumbency are considered (Burrell, 2014; see also Atmor and Kenig, this issue; Feo et al., this issue). Evidence from other countries is more mixed, and numerous studies find that women face a fundraising disadvantage relative to men (Cigane and Öhman, 2014; Sidhu and Meena, 2007; Tovar, 2007). As in the USA, women’s fundraising disadvantages are often rooted in gender differences in incumbency, political experience and professional background (Ballington and Kahane, 2014; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Sidhu and Meena, 2007; see also Feo et al., this issue), though intersectional identity, discrimination and cultural factors also play a role (Hillman, 2018; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2020).
Though numerous countries have some form of gender quota, few studies examine the effect of quotas on women candidates’ ability to raise funds, the funding support they receive from parties, and the impact of funding on their ability to win votes. The studies which have been done indicate that gender quotas do not necessarily put women on equal footing with men when it comes to campaign finances. Research on Brazil (Sacchet, 2018), Indonesia (Hillman, 2018) and Belgium (Smulders et al., 2019) suggests that, despite implementation of gender quota laws, women remain at a fundraising disadvantage.
There is evidence that a gender quota’s impact on campaign finances depends partly on how the quota interacts with the electoral system and the larger social, cultural and economic environment that structures political opportunities (see the case of Israel, for instance, from Atmor and Kenig, this issue). Hillman (2018) found that Indonesia’s open-list proportional representation (PR) system encouraged intraparty competition that escalated campaign spending, putting women candidates at a disadvantage because cultural and economic limitations made it more difficult for them to fundraise. In a study of nine elections in Belgium, Smulders et al. (2019) find that the effects of gender quotas on campaign finances may change over time. When the quota was made stricter, the gender gap in finances expanded for both realistic and unrealistic candidates. After a few years, however, the gender gap narrowed, but only for women candidates nominated to realistic list positions. The disadvantage faced by women placed in unrealistic list positions in Belgium illustrates the role parties play in determining whether women candidates under a quota are given a realistic chance to succeed.
Women also face disadvantages when it comes to party funding, particularly within male-dominated party cultures. Wylie and Dos Santos (2016) find that male party leaders in Brazil subverted the quota law by providing women with less funding and organisational support than male candidates. Likewise, Öhman’s (2018) comparative case study across five nations indicates that the funding parties receive for nominating women is rarely targeted to the benefit of women candidates and is used instead to benefit incumbents and well-established male challengers (see also the case of South Korea in Shin and Kwon, this issue). At the same time, recent research on Ghana (which lacks a quota) and Cabo Verde (which has a quota) suggests party leaders can recognise the disadvantages women face when seeking office and act to encourage women’s candidacies (see Wang et al., this issue).
Building on this research, our first set of hypotheses is based on expectations that quotas lead to increased campaign spending and that women remain disadvantaged relative to men with regard to candidate and party expenditures:
H1a Following implementation of the quota, candidate campaign expenditures will increase.
H1b Following implementation of the quota, party expenditures will be lower for women challengers than men challengers.
H1c Following implementation of the quota, women challengers will have lower candidate expenditures than men challengers.
Research indicates that the persistence of fundraising disadvantages for women under quotas is closely connected to the gender gap in political experience. Prior experience as an officeholder or party leader significantly enhances the fundraising position of male and female candidates under quotas (Hillman, 2018). However, women elected under quotas are less likely to have prior officeholding experiences than men (Dauti, 2020; Górecki and Kukołowicz, 2014) and to be less well-positioned to leverage experience to raise money. There is also evidence that parties respond to gender quotas by nominating fewer mediocre male candidates (Besley et al., 2017), which may contribute to gender experience gaps by reducing the number of inexperienced male candidates. Accordingly, our second set of hypotheses details the expectation that gender experience gaps expand following implementation of gender quotas, putting newcomer women at a financial disadvantage to experienced men:
H2a Following implementation of the quota, women challengers will be less likely to have prior officeholding experience than men challengers.
H2b Both before and after implementation of the quota, party expenditures on candidates with prior officeholding experience will be greater than party expenditures on those without prior officeholding experience for both men and women.
H2c Both before and after implementation of the quota, men and women candidates with prior officeholding experience will have higher candidate expenditures than those without prior officeholding experience.
The persistence of women candidates’ campaign finance disadvantages under gender quotas is concerning because campaign spending remains associated with electoral success (Sacchet, 2018). In fact, Speck and Mancuso’s (2014) study of Brazilian elections finds the association between campaign spending and electoral performance is strongest among female challengers. Absent a design that guarantees women competitive electoral positions, the extent to which a quota increases women’s representation depends partly on whether women are on a level playing field with men when it comes to funding. Our third set of hypotheses is based on the expectation that, for both men and women, candidate spending, party spending, and prior officeholding experience are associated with winning votes:
H3a Both before and after the implementation of the quota, candidate spending will be positively associated with first-preference votes for men and women candidates.
H3b Both before and after implementation of the quota, party spending will be positively associated with first-preference votes for men and women candidates.
H3c Both before and after implementation of the quota, prior officeholding experience will be positively associated with first-preference votes for men and women candidates.
Ireland as a case study for quotas and campaign finances
Ireland is especially suitable for a case study of how gender quotas affect campaign funding for women candidates. Ireland’s PR-single transferrable vote (STV) electoral system, candidate-selection processes and campaign-finance system includes features – a multi-party PR system, higher district magnitudes and strict campaign finance limits – which facilitate a more level playing field for women when it comes to fundraising and winning votes (Baker, 2006; Ballington, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005). The Irish system also has other features – a decentralised nominating process and a party culture that privileges incumbency and localism – which place women at a disadvantage relative to men (Krook, 2010; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005; but see Pruysers et al., 2017). Ireland’s gender quota law incentivises parties to nominate women candidates to meet the quota. Thus, the Irish case provides an opportunity to assess how implementation of a meaningful party gender quota affects the campaign finances and electoral competitiveness of women candidates in a decentralised, candidate-centred system with strict campaign finance limits.
The members of the lower house of the Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, are elected by a PR-STV electoral system. They contest races that take place across electoral districts which vary in magnitude from three to five seats. Voters cast ballots that rank candidates in order of preference. Features of the PR-STV system such as preference voting and multi-seat constituencies facilitate the emergence of multiple parties. Between 2002 and 2020, 14 different parties had representation in the Dáil. More than three-fifths of legislators represented one of Ireland’s two traditional large parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which held 31.9% and 29.8% of seats, respectively. Labour, with 11.2% of seats, and Sinn Féin with 10.2% of seats were the next two largest parties. Representatives from smaller parties (8.9%) and independent candidates (8.0%) made up the balance. Because the district magnitude ranges from three to five seats, it is common for larger parties to nominate more than one candidate for a single constituency.
There is relatively little government regulation over the candidate-selection process. Though each party has its own way of doing things, Irish parties have historically privileged incumbency, localism and personalism in their nomination process (Culhane, 2017). Having a strong personal profile that includes prior officeholding experience, a past record of delivering for constituents, a reputation for promoting and protecting the local constituency, and an extensive network of contacts is a trait that party selectors look for in a candidate to aid vote-getting and fundraising (Benoit and Marsh, 2010). These informal norms of candidate recruitment are highly gendered as disproportionately male selectorates at the local level often base their judgements about candidate quality on the experiences and backgrounds of the male legislators who dominate Dáil Éireann (Galligan and Buckley, 2018).
A majority of incumbents are men, so men benefit disproportionately from the benefits of incumbency (Galligan, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). Incumbents often have ‘large war chests of campaign funds’ (Ballington, 2003: 4) built up over years, and an existing network of donors to help fund their campaigns. For challengers, opportunities to raise campaign money on their own are limited, making them more reliant on parties to support their campaigns (Ballington and Kahane, 2014).
Women’s prospects are further diluted by the privileging of localism and personalism in Irish political culture (Buckley and Gregory, 2019; Culhane, 2017). Being well known, well integrated and well connected to the local community bolsters selection and election prospects and there is no better way to develop these attributes than through local government experience. However, women’s representation on local councils in Ireland has never exceeded 26%, thus ‘fewer women than men can harness this attribute’ (Buckley et al., 2015: 311).
Gender differences in economic status and economic opportunity also play a role in determining who runs, and how successful they are at raising campaign money. Research indicates that unequal access to cash, a gender pay gap and a ‘motherhood penalty’ for women who leave the workforce after the birth of a child are among the deterrents to women running for election in Ireland (Galligan and Buckley, 2018; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2017: 146). A continuing inclination towards traditional gender roles may also play a part, as Ballington (2003: 2) identifies psychological barriers, family responsibilities and gendered networks among the gendered barriers that make obtaining financial resources ‘especially problematic for women’.
In Irish elections, more spending equates to more votes. Benoit and Marsh (2010: 159) found ‘outspending one’s rival means winning more of the vote share’ and ‘spending more . . . directly increases a candidate’s chance of winning a seat’. At the same time, Ireland’s election laws impose relatively strict donor-contribution limits, candidate-spending limits and disclosure requirements. Parties receive funding support from the state but are prohibited from using state funding for electoral purposes. 1 Yet, because the amount of state funding parties receive is determined by electoral performance, parties carefully manage candidate selection to ensure good electoral returns. To help fund campaigns, parties raise money through membership fees, contributions from candidates, and fundraising events such as dinners and raffles. At election time, parties expect their candidates to raise their own campaign money and not depend heavily on the party for contributions. For candidates, the vast majority of their campaign spending comes from money they raise themselves, rather than funding they receive from the party. The most common ways candidates raise campaign money are by hosting events such as table quizzes or race nights, setting-up online fundraising platforms and taking out bank loans.
Research on electoral systems finds that gendered barriers are more pronounced in candidate-centric electoral systems such as PR-STV, where individual candidates carry more responsibility to fundraise than parties (Ballington, 2003; Ballington and Kahane, 2014). Moreover, there is growing recognition that the gendered nature of campaign financing undermines women’s participation in politics (Ballington, 2003; Ballington and Kahane, 2014; Öhman, 2018). As a result, women in Ireland have faced a particularly challenging political opportunity structure that limits their ability to secure nominations, raise money and win legislative seats (Galligan and Buckley, 2018; Mariani et al., 2021). In the six general elections between 1989 and 2011, only 17% of Dáil candidates and 12% of those elected to office were women.
To address the problem of women’s political under-representation, Ireland adopted a legislative gender quota in 2012 which stipulates that for general elections, at least 30% of a party’s candidates must be women and at least 30% must be men. The gender quota threshold rises to 40% in 2023. Parties that fail to meet the quota lose one-half of the state funding they would receive for party organisational activities. 2
The gender quota was first implemented in 2016. Despite concerns parties would deliberately undermine the quota and suppress women’s election, all parties met their obligations under the law. With the quota in place, the number of women seeking election nearly doubled and the proportion of women elected to the Dáil increased from 15.1% to 22.2%. Though women made gains under the quota, Brennan and Buckley (2017) identify trends to suggest that the two largest and oldest parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, selected women as sweeper candidates to shore up votes to be transferred to a lead male incumbent party colleague. In addition, Mariani et al. (2021) found Fine Gael engaged in a ‘sacrificial lamb’ strategy under the quota, increasing the number of women nominated to no-hope races and selecting significantly less-experienced women candidates compared to prior elections.
Initial studies of Ireland’s 2016 general election – the first under the quota – suggest women received party support but remained hampered by a lack of political experience (Mariani et al., 2021) and a gender gap in self-financing (Buckley and Gregory, 2019). Building on these findings and previous research suggesting incumbency and localism have a powerful impact on candidate success (Buckley and Gregory, 2019; Buckley et al., 2015), we examine whether Ireland’s gender quota altered patterns of candidate experience and campaign expenditures for men and women candidates, and assess the impact of these changes on electoral performance.
Research design
Our analysis relies on the Ireland Elections Dataset compiled by the authors. 3 The dataset includes biographical, electoral and finance information for candidates seeking election to the Dáil in four consecutive elections, three without the gender quota (2002, 2007 and 2011) and one with the gender quota (2016). 4
In our first analyses, we examine the impact of the quota on the relationship between gender, officeholding experience and campaign expenditures. Our main dependent variables are party expenditure 5 (how much a party spends on a candidate’s campaign), candidate expenditure (how much self-raised money a candidate spends on the campaign) and the sum of both, total expenditure. Except when presented in euros, campaign expenditures are expressed as a proportion of the spending limit in the district, which varies depending on district magnitude. Our main independent variables are candidate gender (woman) and prior political experience in local office, the Dáil, and the Seanad (the upper house of parliament). The gender quota implemented in the 2016 election serves as a conditional variable in both analyses, reflecting that the relationship between gender and fundraising may change with the quota in place. Other variables control for incumbency and candidate party.
In a secondary analysis, we examine the impact of the quota on the relationship between gender, spending, political experience and first-preference votes. The number of first-preference votes received by a candidate is the dependent variable; candidate expenditure and party expenditure are independent variables. Party and prior experience again serve as control variables. 6 Candidate gender and the gender quota serve as conditional variables, reflecting that the relationship between spending and first-preference votes may vary for men and women candidates and the relationship between spending and first-preference votes may change with the gender quota in place.
Analysis
First, we compared the mean campaign expenditures of men and women candidates in each election year. All figures are presented as a proportion of the spending limit, which varies according to the size of the constituency (three, four or five seats) and election year. Candidates who reported zero total spending on their campaigns were excluded from the analysis. 7
We find no significant differences in candidate, party or total expenditures among women and men candidates in 2002, 2007 and 2011 (Table 1). In 2016, however, we find that women candidates received more financial support from parties than men candidates. On average, parties spent more than twice as much on women candidates than on men. In addition, women and men had similar levels of candidate expenditures in all years but 2016, when women reported less than men. This finding supports previous studies (Hillman, 2018; Smulders et al., 2019) indicating that the gender gap in individual campaign finances increases in the elections immediately following implementation of gender quotas.
Party expenditure, candidate expenditure and total campaign expenditure as proportion of spending limit, by gender.
Among candidates with any total campaign expenditures.
Comparison of means test: *p <.05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
When controlling for incumbency, we find the party expenditure advantage for women in 2016 persists among challenger candidates, while the candidate expenditure disadvantage for women disappears for incumbents and challengers. Gender differences in party spending were driven by the two major parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which spent significantly more on women challengers than men challengers in 2016. We find no gender difference in party expenditure among Labour, Sinn Féin and other parties in the 2016 election or any other election in the series. There was, however, a gender difference among Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael challengers in candidate spending, with women spending less than men in 2011 and 2016.
An analysis of party expenditures on candidates (Figure 1) indicates the quota spurred the parties to distribute financial resources equitably. In elections before the gender quota, women candidates received one-fifth of total party investment in candidacies, roughly similar to the proportion of women put forward by the parties. With the quota in place in 2016, half of party expenditures were devoted to women (who made up 32.8% of all candidates put forward by parties). Notably, party support of women candidates more than doubled between 2011 and 2016, even as total party expenditure dropped 14%.
Sum of party investment, by gender.
Turning attention to candidate expenditure, there was no significant difference between men and women candidates in 2002, 2007 or 2011 (Table 1). In 2016, however, women spent less than men. That year, just 17% of women candidates were incumbents, compared with 44% of men candidates. Women candidates’ campaign finance disadvantage in 2016 appears to be due to the fact that few women were incumbents. In addition, women candidates were further disadvantaged by a gender experience gap among challenger candidates. Following implementation of the quota, women challengers were less likely than men to have experience in local office, and less likely than men to have served in the Seanad (Table 2). In previous elections, there were no significant gender differences in local or Seanad experience (we found no significant gender difference in Dáil experience in 2016 or other years).
Challenger candidates with prior elected experience, by gender.
Candidates may have more than one prior experience. Sample: challenger candidates with any total expenditures.
Pearson chi square: * p <.05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Across all years, challenger women without experience reported lower expenditures than those with experience (Table 3). The parties appear to have responded to these developments by shifting financial support to women challengers, particularly those without experience. Between 2002 and 2016, a time of declining party expenditures on candidates, total party spending on women challengers increased by 150%. Over the same period, party expenditures on women challengers with no experience (local, Seanad or Dáil), increased by 1500% (not shown).
Women challengers’ mean candidate expenditure as proportion of limit, by experience.
Candidates may have more than one prior experience. Sample: challenger candidates with any total expenditures.
Pearson chi square: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Next, we assessed the impact of gender on campaign spending when holding party and local experience constant. For our dependent variables, we adjusted campaign expenditures to account for the varied spending limits for candidates running in seats with different district magnitudes. Because campaign finance variables were negatively skewed, we normalised the variable prior to the analysis using Templeton’s (2011) two-step approach to normalisation. 8
Our first regression analysis examines the relationship between candidate gender and party expenditure. Because our focus is party spending, our sample is limited to candidates nominated by parties with expenditures during that cycle. When controlling for party and experience, women candidates received as much party support as men in 2007 and 2011, elections which took place prior to the gender quota (Table 4). In the 2002 election (which lacked a gender quota) and the 2016 election (the first with the gender quota), women received greater party support than men. Contrary to the expectation that parties focus resources on well-known incumbents, years of service in the Dáil was negatively associated with party expenditure in 2007, 2011 and 2016.
Impact of candidate gender on party expenditure, controlling for party and experience.
Sample: candidates from parties with expenditures on candidates during the respective election cycle.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; dependent variable: party expenditure as a proportion of the limit (normalised).
Heteroskedastic corrected robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Next, we examine the impact of gender on candidate spending while controlling for experience and party (Table 5). Here, we limit our sample to candidates with any total campaign expenditures. Once again, we use candidate expenditure as a proportion of the district spending limit to take into account differences in district size and Templeton’s (2011) two-step approach to normalise the variable. For the years prior to the quota, we find women did not report lower candidate spending than men when controlling for other factors. In 2016, however, women had lower levels of candidate spending than men, when controlling for other factors. Across all years, years of service in the Dáil, local experience and party membership in Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael are associated with greater candidate expenditures. Seanad service is associated with greater levels of candidate expenditure in 2007 and 2016.
Impact of candidate gender on candidate expenditure, controlling for party and experience.
Sample: candidates with any total campaign expenditures.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; dependent variable: candidate expenditure as a proportion of the limit (normalised).
Heteroskedastic corrected errors in parentheses. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
In our final set of analyses, we examined the impact of party spending, candidate spending and political experience on the electoral success of women and men candidates, as measured by the first-preference vote (Table 6). 9 As before, we eliminated candidates with zero total spending and normalised the dependant variable (votes) using Templeton’s two-step approach.
Impact of candidate and party expenditures on first preference votes as a proportion of the election quota, by gender.
Sample: candidates with any total campaign expenditures.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; dependent variable: first preference votes as a proportion of the election quota (normalised).
Heteroskedastic corrected robust standard errors in parentheses; #p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
For women, party expenditure does not impact votes won in any of the elections examined here. For men, party expenditure has a positive impact in 2002 and 2007 only. Higher levels of candidate expenditure are associated with more first-preference votes won across all years for men and women. As expected, for both groups, prior experience is positively associated with votes across all elections. 10 Running from one of the two major parties has a consistently positive and significant effect on first-preference votes for men across all elections. For women candidates, however, running from one of the major parties is associated with more first-preference votes in 2007 only and has no effect in 2002, 2011 or 2016.
Summary of findings
Our examination of the impact of the gender quota on campaign finances for men and women in Ireland generated some unexpected findings. Following implementation of the quota, candidate and party spending declined rather than increased (contrary to H1a). In addition, parties spent more on women candidates than men candidates, rather than less (contrary to H1b). Though parties provided more support for women candidates in one pre-quota election (2002), the number of women candidates was small and the vast majority of party spending went to men. The reverse was true in 2016. Though women candidates under the quota received strong party support and were not disadvantaged by a campaign-spending arms race, women reported lower campaign expenditures than men under the gender quota (consistent with H1c).
In relation to the impact of the quota on experience we find women challengers were less likely than men to have prior officeholding experience after implementation of the quota (in partial confirmation of H2a). Surprisingly, women challengers were not less likely to have local officeholding experience than their male counterparts in elections prior to the quota. Also contrary to expectations (H2b), the largest share of party spending went to women candidates who lacked prior experience. As expected (H2c), prior officeholding experience was associated with higher candidate expenditures for men and women before and after the quota. In fact, when holding incumbency, party and officeholding constant, being a woman was not associated with lower candidate spending. Under the quota, however, women candidates were less experienced than men; though parties tried to balance the playing field, the lack of prior officeholding experience disadvantaged women when it came to candidate expenditures.
Our final analyses confirmed expectations (H3a, H3c) that, for both men and women, prior political experience and candidate spending were associated with winning votes before and after implementation of the quota. Contrary to expectations (H3b), party spending was not associated with votes for women candidates in any election before or after the quota. Party spending was associated with votes for men in 2002 and 2007 but made no difference in 2011 or 2016.
Discussion
Unlike studies that find party support under quotas is rarely targeted to benefit women, our analysis indicates that in Ireland, political parties increased expenditures on women candidates following implementation of the gender quota. The beneficiaries of this financial support were newcomer women. At the same time, the Irish case provides additional evidence that women newcomers put forward by parties under a gender quota may lack the officeholding experiences associated with the candidate fundraising that is often critical to electoral success. When it comes to raising money and winning votes, experience matters.
Our study serves to integrate gender quota and party organisational research by assessing the impact of gender quotas on party behaviour and campaign financing. It underscores the complexities involved in managing candidate selection and resource allocation under a gender quota scheme and highlights that gender quotas operate within the context of a particular electoral system, political environment, electoral context and the norms, practices and power arrangements that define a nation’s political opportunity structure. Our findings suggest that some parties in the Irish case exhibited strategic behaviour in response to the first rollout of legislative gender quotas in 2016. Fine Gael’s response, for example, was shaped by the party’s historically successful showing in the 2011 election. As a result, there were very few favourable seat opportunities for Fine Gael candidates in 2016 not already held by an incumbent (typically a man). Party officials responded to this situation by nominating inexperienced women challengers and invested heavily to incentivise newcomer women to run in situations unlikely to yield electoral success. In contrast, Fine Gael incumbents could raise their own funding and did not need the party’s financial support. Fine Gael’s response to the quota shows how well-resourced political parties can use money to meet quota obligations while simultaneously undermining the quota’s effectiveness by protecting male incumbents.
One surprising finding is that party money spent on women challengers had no impact on votes. This finding may indicate that party leaders are not solely concerned with electoral performance when it comes to distributing funding. Party leaders may view the shift in resources towards women candidates as a strategic act that strengthens their party’s position by sending voters, the press, advocates of gender balance in politics and potential donors a message that the party is inclusive. Alternatively, party leaders may see spending as a pragmatic and long-term investment to help women candidates build recognition and experience to enhance the party’s long-term electoral performance.
In elections for Dáil Éireann, candidate expenditures are associated with winning election. At the same time, a candidate’s capacity to raise funds is at least partly determined by past political experience. Given these findings, in countries where funding is key to electoral success, increasing women’s representation through party-based gender quotas at the national level would be more likely to succeed when paired with measures that ensure women have equal access to the local and subnational-level officeholding experiences associated with raising money and winning votes.
In interpreting the results, some caution is warranted given research showing that the fundraising disadvantages that women initially face following implementation of a quota may diminish over time as women become more fully integrated into the political system (Smulders et al., 2019). This study includes data from a single ‘gender quota’ election (2016) and, at the time of writing, expenditure data was not yet available for the 2020 general election. Further research is needed to assess whether gender gaps in experience and fundraising narrow in the future and whether parties devote time and resources to recruit, develop and support women candidates ahead of the implementation of a 40% gender quota for Dáil elections from 2023 onwards.
Supplemental Material
sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 – Supplemental material for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates
Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates by Fiona Buckley and Mack Mariani in International Political Science Review
Supplemental Material
sj-pdf-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 – Supplemental material for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates by Fiona Buckley and Mack Mariani in International Political Science Review
Supplemental Material
sj-sav-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 – Supplemental material for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates
Supplemental material, sj-sav-1-ips-10.1177_01925121211041028 for Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates by Fiona Buckley and Mack Mariani in International Political Science Review
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Max Buot of the Mathematics Department at Xavier University for advice on statistical analysis, and Mary Cianciolo at Xavier University for her assistance with data collection and development.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
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