Mandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms or to advance minority objectives and become seen as ‘Uncle Tom’ type figures who no longer represent their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.
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