Institutionalist views emphasize that identical institutional rules should function in similar ways across nations, thus making electoral engineering possible. This article utilizes the case of Brazil (eight elections in 27 states) to show that there is considerable cross-sectional variation in party system size under indistinguishable institutional rules. Confirming previous works, we find that the interaction between institutions and societal complexity plays a key role in determining party system size. In addition, we show that the educational profile of voters and subnational economic conditions also contribute to the phenomenon. Overall, our results call for caution on electoral engineering projects at home or abroad.
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