This article investigates the interactive effects of ruling party stability and veto players on economic performance. We show that ruling party duration has an inverted U-shaped relationship with growth when the number of veto players is low, while it has a regular U-shaped relationship when there are more veto players. We find support for these contentions using time-series cross-section data on the economic growth of a sample of 66 democracies between 1975 and 2007.
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