Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore, this article also analyzes different types of authoritarian leader exit and repression. The article distinguishes between, on the one hand, nonviolent and regular exits and, on the other hand, violent and irregular exits as well as between political terror and restrictions on civil liberties. It argues that terror is effective against threats from organized groups, while restrictions on civil liberties essentially serve to prevent collective action. The empirical evidence confirms that political terror only reduces the likelihood of nonviolent and regular exits. Instead, restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring both sorts of threats.
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