Policy coherence, understood as synergy between policies, has been found to facilitate development and economic growth. However, there is little research on the conditions in which it emerges. This article identifies different paths conducive to policy coherence in the process of transforming centralized economies of Central and Eastern Europe into market-driven ones. It shows that government characteristics with likely impact on the quality of policy-making, such as accountability and institutional constraints, are associated with coherent policies only in a limited number of cases. It also shows that governments that are not constrained and accountable, formulate coherent policies if they find themselves in contexts that do not pose constraints, or that offer strong incentives.
Ahrens J. and Meurens M. ( 2002) How governance affects the quality of policy reform and economic performance: new evidence for economies in transition. Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition (IB Review)6: 35-56.
2.
Alonso-Gamo P., Fabrizio S., Kramarenko V. and Wang Q. ( 2002) Lithuania: history and future of the Currency Board arrangement . IMF Working Paper No. 02/127. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (IMF).
3.
Amsden AH, Kochanowicz J. and Taylor L. ( 1998) The Market Meets its Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4.
Armingeon K. and Careja R. ( 2007) Comparative Political Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1990- 2007. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern.
5.
Bird G. and Willett TD ( 2004) IMF conditionality, implementation and the political economy of ownership. Comparative Economic Studies46(3): 423-450.
6.
Blanchard O. ( 1997) The Economics of Post-Communist Transition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
7.
Bleber A. ( 2002) Slovenia’s smooth transition. Journal of Democracy13(1): 135-138.
8.
Brusis M. and Dimitrov V. ( 2001) Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy8(6): 888-910.
9.
Careja R. ( 2010) Policy Coherence and Economic Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: The Great Transformation. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac.
10.
Carlson JA and Valev NT ( 2001) Credibility of a new monetary regime: the currency board in Bulgaria. Journal of Monetary Economics47(3): 581-594.
11.
Casale G. ( 1999) Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: International Labour Organization (ILO) .
12.
Cernat L. ( 2006) Europeanization, Varieties of Capitalism and Economic Performance in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke /New York: Palgrave Macmillan .
13.
Conway N. ( 2006) Endogenous IMF conditionality: theoretical and empirical implications. In: Ranis G, Vreeland G and Kosack S (eds) Globalization and the Nation State. New York: Routledge, 82-108.
14.
Crepaz ML ( 1996) Consensus versus majoritarian democracy: political institutions and their impact on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes. Comparative Political Studies29(1): 4-26.
15.
Crowley S and Ost D (eds) (2001) Workers after Workers’ States: Labor and Politics in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
16.
Dabrowski M. and Gortat R. ( 2002) Political Determinants of Economic Reforms in Former Communist Countries. CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 242. Warsaw: Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE).
17.
de Macedo JB and Martins JO ( 2006) Growth, reform indicators and policy complementarities . Faculdade de Economia Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FEUNL) Working Papers No. 484. Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
18.
de Melo M., Denizer C., Gelb A. and Tenev S. ( 2001) Circumstance and choice: the role of initial conditions and policies in transition economies. World Bank Economic Review15(1): 1-31.
19.
Deacon B. and Hulse M. ( 1997) The making of post-Communist social policy: the role of international agencies.Journal of Social Policies26(1): 43-62.
20.
di Francesco M. ( 2001) Process not outcomes in new public management? ‘Policy coherence’ in Australian government. The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs1(3): 103-116.
21.
Dye T. and Gray V. ( 1980) The Determinants of Public Policies. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
22.
Ervik R., Kildal N. and Nielsen E. ( 2009) The Role of International Organisations in Social Policies . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
23.
Evans P. ( 1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
24.
Grofman B. and Schneider CQ(2009) An introduction to crisp-set QCA, with a comparison to binary logistic regression. Political Research Quarterly62(4): 662-672.
25.
Hanley E., King L. and János IT ( 2002) The state, international agencies and property transformation in postCommunist Hungary. American Journal of Sociology108(1): 129-167.
26.
Havrylyshyn O. ( 2006) Divergent Paths in Post-Communist Transformation: Capitalism for All or Capitalism for the Few?Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
27.
Hoen H. ( 1996) ‘Shock versus gradualism’ in Central Europe reconsidered. Comparative Economic Studies38(1): 1-20.
28.
King L. ( 2002) Postcommunist divergence: a comparative analysis of the transition to capitalism in Poland and Russia. Studies in Comparative International Development37(3): 3-34.
29.
Knöbl A., Sutt A. and Zavoiceo BB ( 2002) The Estonian currency board: its introduction and role in the early success of Estonia’s transition to a market economy. International Monetary Fund Working Papers No. 96. Washington, DC: IMF.
30.
Kornai J. ( 1988) The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31.
Kornai J. ( 1994) Transformational recession: the main causes. Journal of Comparative Economics19(1): 34-63.
32.
Krouwel A. ( 2003) Measuring presidentialism and parliamentarism: an application to Central and EastEuropean Countries. Acta Politica38(4): 333-364.
33.
Kuczynski P-P and Williamson J (eds) (2003) After the Washington Consensus . Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
34.
Laver M. and Schepsle K. ( 1999) Government accountability in parliamentary democracy. In: Przeworski A, Stokes SC, Manin B (eds) Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 279-296.
35.
Machado A. ( 2004) XXIX. In: Machado A, Dream: Selected Poems of Antonio Machado. Port Townsend, WA: Copper Canyon Press. Available at: http://www.bibliotecamachado.es/poesia/traduciones/poesiaingles.htm (accessed September 2010).
36.
Mainwaring S. and Shugart MS ( 1997) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37.
May PJ, Sapotichne J. and Workman S. ( 2006) Policy coherence and policy domains. Policy Studies Journal34(3): 381-403.
38.
Nellis J. ( 2002) The World Bank, privatization, and enterprise reform in transition economies: a retrospective analysis. International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper No. 38. Washington, DC: World Bank.
39.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1996) Building Policy Coherence: Tools and Tensions. Paris: OECD.
40.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2002) OECD Economic Surveys - Romania 2001-2002 . Paris: OECD.
41.
Parsons W. ( 2004) Not just steering but weaving: relevant knowledge and the craft of building policy capacity and coherence. Australian Journal of Public Administration63(1): 43-57.
42.
Pleskovic B. and Sachs JD ( 1994) Political independence and economic reform in Slovenia . In: Blanchard O (ed.) The Transition in Eastern Europe: Country Studies. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
43.
Popov V. ( 2000) Shock therapy versus gradualism: the end of the debate (explaining the magnitude of transformational recession). Comparative Economic Studies42(1): 1-57.
44.
Ragin C. ( 2000) Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
45.
Ragin C. ( 2008) Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.
46.
Rihoux B. and Ragin C. ( 2008) Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications.
47.
Rodrik D. ( 1996) Understanding economic policy reform. Journal of Economic Literature34(1): 9-41.
48.
Santiprabhob V. ( 1997) Bank soundness and currency board arrangements: issues and experience. International Monetary Fund Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment No. 11. Washington, DC: IMF.
49.
Schedler A. ( 1999) Conceptualizing accountability. In: Diamond L, Plattner MF and Schedler A (eds) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 13-28.
50.
Schimmelfennig F. and Sedelmeier U. ( 2004) Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy11(4): 669-687.
51.
Schmieding H. ( 1993) From plan to market: on the nature of the transformation crisis. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv129(2): 216-253.
52.
Shugart MS and Carey JM ( 1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
53.
Staehr K. ( 2003) Reforms and economic growth in transition economies: complementarity, sequencing and speed. BOFIT Discussion Papers No.1. Helsinki: Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT).
54.
Stark D. and Bruszt L. ( 1998) Post-Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
55.
Stiglitz J. ( 2002) Globalisation and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
56.
Tommasi M. ( 2003) Crisis, political institutions, and policy reform: the good, the bad and the ugly. In: Stern N, Kolstad I and Tungodden B (eds) Toward Pro-Poor Policies: Aid, Institutions, and Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 135-164.
57.
Vreeland JR ( 2003) The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
