A number of articles in the past few years have found that democracies are more likely to commit to a floating exchange rate regime. I argue that we do not have a solid understanding of the causal mechanism that explains why democracies would float more often. I test a variety of hypotheses to explore exactly what features of democratic practice might account for the propensity to declare a float, using two different datasets. While the tests are not conclusive, they suggest that the number of veto players or the regular use of open, competitive elections may influence exchange rate commitments.
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