Abstract
We propose, in this article, a model for multimember districts in which voting choice is a function of the product of relative benefits and the probability of breaking a tie between their preferred party and its trailing party. We transform people’s perception of the parties’ positions on specific issues in order to obtain the probability of each party winning. “Feeling thermometer” and “like/dislike” questions are employed to measure the perceived benefit that an individual might expect to receive from each party if elected. We test our model using the 1995, 1998, and 2001 legislative elections in Taiwan, simulating the level of closeness with logistic estimates. Based on the simulation, we identify four types of voting behavior: sincere, straightforward, irrational, and strategic. The study of these four types of voting behavior sheds light on party competition in Taiwan and provides models likely to be useful elsewhere as well.
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