In “Goods, Games, and Institutions,” we discussed the underlying conditions under which institutions might promote cooperation among states. Our unified theoretical framework specifies bargaining games based both on the costs and benefits of different types of goods and actors' capabilities. Klaus Wallner argues in his critique in this issue that our modeling approach is seriously flawed. We show that Wallner comes to his conclusion because of several simple analytical errors on his part. After pointing out the flaws in his reasoning, we show that our framework is robust and can be easily extended to explore key features of international relations.
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