This paper examines the role of emotions in recognizing others’ vulnerability and motivating care practices, proposing a Kantian model centered on the emotion of respect. The argument develops through a critical engagement with Michael Slote’s empathy-based approach, which assigns empathy a central role in perceiving vulnerability and generating moral motivation. I argue that approaches grounded exclusively in empathy risk producing asymmetric and unbalanced moral relationships. As an alternative, I propose shifting the focus from empathy to respect. The paper first analyzes vulnerability in relation to autonomy, understood as the capacity to freely pursue one’s conception of happiness, and defines vulnerability as a limitation in the full exercise of autonomous agency. Respect, on a Kantian view, enables recognition of the equal value of autonomy in oneself and others, even in relationships involving vulnerability. Moreover, respect makes violations of this value salient and motivates re-empowerment practices aimed at restoring autonomy. The final section applies this respect-based framework to Italians’ moral and social responsibilities toward immigrants.
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