Moral Wrongs,Epistemic Wrongs: Epistemic Injustice as a Global Failure of Recognition

Abstract

This paper addresses the increasing discussions concerning the normative nature of epistemic injustice. I argue that epistemic injustice is best described as a global failure of recognition: one that downgrades and attacks the normative standing of the individual as a whole. First, I discuss the role of epistemic agency in the global cluster of identity and show that it is both essential and inseparable to the development of autonomous and ethical agency. Second, I engage with contemporary articulations of epistemic injustice as a phenomenon of (mis)recognition and argue that these could be expanded in two important ways: epistemic injustice should be redefined as involving abuse, disrespect, and insult at the same time and not only in epistemic terms. Third and finally, I reinforce my redefinition of epistemic injustice as a global failure of recognition by revealing how the lived experience of epistemic injustice strikes victims’ self-perception globally.