Abstract
This article revisits Max Weber’s theory of values by focussing on the often-overlooked concept of ‘worldview’ (Weltanschauung). By exploring Weber’s distinction between reason, decision and historical context, this study shows the role of worldviews in shaping and creating values. In doing so, it proves that Weber’s approach to values is more nuanced and complex than the so-called reason-value dichotomy and voluntarism, as it seeks to make sense of how collective cultural frameworks contribute to individuals’ practical and ethical life (Section 1). The article also addresses Weber’s famous claim of an antagonism of values, contrasting it with competing views such as relativism and universal values systems. It argues that this claim is best understood in light of Weber’s metatheoretical reflections on the difference between empirical-descriptive and speculative-interpretative analysis (Section 2).
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