Phenomenology and the status quo: Adorno’s mediation argument

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss a well-known challenge against phenomenology as a viable form of social criticism. According to this challenge—the Mediation Argument—phenomenology falls short of the requirement that any kind of critique needs a suitable medium of representation because the phenomenological account of experience prioritizes immediacy or directness. I aim to show through a reconstruction of Adorno’s version of the Mediation Argument against Husserl that this challenge fails: it distorts the phenomenological account of meaning by misattributing problematic ontological commitments as well as an overly simplistic idea of normativity to phenomenology; and it systematically underplays critical aspects of the transcendental methodology of phenomenology by ignoring crucial contrasts between phenomenology and commonsense philosophy. Contrary to what the Mediation Argument suggests, I conclude, phenomenology is well-placed to confront the ontological commitments and normative assumptions that commonly lend ideological support to the status quo.