Justifying judicial review as a democratic institution is a core concern of Cristina Lafont’s splendid new book. Even though her interpretation is appealing, this also poses some problems. This is due to the non-thematization of ideology that results from Lafont’s ideal-theoretical and argument-privileging approach. I will first address this ideology-problem and then reflect on the implications that this has for the question of what is considered legitimate political action.
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