In my article, I want to focus on the critique Cristina Lafont makes to expertocracy and epistocracy, mainly through the institution of judicial review, to which she dedicates chapter 7 and part of chapter 6 of her book Democracy without Shortcuts. First I will reconstruct the premises that support her arguments in favour of a democratic reading of judicial review. Then, I will pose some questions about its viability as an institution that favours the participation of the citizens in the shaping and the determination of the scope of the norms they are subjected to.
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