Following Oliver Williamson’s passing in 2020, associations and journals in institutional and organizational economics have undertaken various initiatives in recognition of his contribution. The organization research field, though, has remained quite silent, and I wish to not only raise a voice, but also reclaim a legacy. The article offers an organizational re-reading of what is often (mis)classified as an ‘economics of organization’, highlighting how organization as a discipline contributed to shaping that Nobel-prized vision of ‘a science of organization’ integrating the basic social sciences (most notably economics and law, but also, as retrieved here, sociology) with organization theory; and the methodological lessons for interdisciplinary research that can be drawn from it. The analysis then pushes the boundaries further, extracting from the ‘market and hierarchy’ perspective a ‘court of justice’ notion of hierarchy, and arguing that such type of hierarchy is consistent with, and even complementary to, the forms of horizontal organization and polycentric governance of our times, as well as the ‘thirdness’ of institutions prescribed by modern law.
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