Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.
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