This article presents the results of extensive field research on youth radicalization as a driver of violent Islamic extremism in Northeastern Nigeria. Previous scholarly attempts to understand this problem paid very little attention to the phenomenon of youth radicalization as a process that sustains extremism by facilitating the recruitment of new members. Accordingly, the essay draws on the social movement theory, where radicalization is viewed as a recruitment strategy that radical groups adopt to ensure group survival. The article, therefore, examines the push and pull factors of youth radicalization in the Northeast. To generate empirical insights for the stated purpose, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants. Key factors of youth radicalization that were revealed include material attraction, ideological appeal, coercion, and identity politics. Therefore, understanding the role these factors play in youth radicalization becomes indispensable to counter-extremism strategies in the region.
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