Cash transfer programs have become a common, and broadly supported, poverty intervention. After the success seen in Brazil and Mexico with their cash transfer programs, a number of other countries began adopting similar interventions, but many more have not. We ask why some countries have adopted these impactful programs and others have not, and in this article, we look at the role of women in government. We consider Sen and Nussbaum’s human capabilities approach and Anne Phillips’ politics of presence framework. We suggest that women govern and legislate differently than men do, and having more women in government may lead to improvements in important social outcomes that contribute to the development of human capabilities.
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