Killing a Country and Getting Away with It: Neopatrimonialism and Incurable Corruption by Political Elites Linked to International Development Aid

Abstract

As some countries are increasingly locked in a state of incurable corruption, while most political elites escape lavishly any prosecution, there is a growing concern that global governance is overlooking the crimes committed by some leaders who are “killing a country and getting away with it.” This phenomenon of state capture coincides increasingly with countries heavily dependent on international development aid. It also coincides within cultures where neopatrimonialism is allowed to flourish as opposed to more modern public administration standards. Inspired by a post-colonial and broader critical perspective, but with a practice-oriented focus, this article reviews the literature related to project management methods and how they can help uncover and prevent corruption. A review of governance regimes leads to a set of models to help better contextualize development aid management and identify how evidence-gathering can be enhanced to ensure that maximum sanctions are taken against corrupt political elite.

Introduction

As found in a recent literature review (Harnois & Gagnon, 2022a), extensive evidence exists showing that corruption and state capture can render International Development Projects (IDPs) inefficient and irrecoverable. This leads us to question whether modern managerial techniques, such as Project Management (PM) and International Governance Frameworks, can be used as preventive tools.

The improvement of IDPs is a common concern for organizing work and delivering change (Ika et al., 2020a). But many professionals testify that specific problems impede or handicap the attainment of satisfying results, such as foreign aid funds retained at various layers of recipient countries’ bureaucracies, instead of going directly for the implementation of the goals pursued by IDPs.

Many developing countries’ citizens constantly face instances of petty and grand corruption. Political, bureaucratic, and judicial corruption are prevalent, while elites escape any meaningful prosecution. Moreover, there is a growing concern that global governance is overlooking crimes committed by some leaders who are killing a country and getting away with it. To help uncover such crimes within a post-colonial perspective (Ahen, 2021b), analysts require a higher-level analytical framework. This question should be treated in a more structural manner with the concept of neopatrimonialism. Introduced by Médard (1979, 1991), this concept refers to political systems that vie for the enrichment of the members constituting the elite of a regime, their cronies, and business partners, thus seriously impeding the fight to reduce poverty in the region.

This article seeks to integrate several perspectives about corruption, allowing analysts and researchers to better model the phenomenon, and uncover new ways of theorizing toward enacting practicable knowledge. The next section summarizes key concerns about IDPs, namely the managerial challenges common to practitioners, the occurrence of corruption, and the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in PM. The third section introduces the concepts of neopatrimonialism and “the Big Man.” The fourth reviews some key features of post-colonial hybrid states and contrasts them to endemic challenges facing governance regimes. The fifth section synthesizes this literature, toward a set of models that may help to evaluate the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in IDPs. Our conclusion draws some lessons for theory building, that may help researchers and practitioners share a stronger common understanding of what has to be done to prosecute political elites found guilty of “killing a country.”

Incurable Corruption by Political Elite

Understanding International Development Projects

According to Ika et al. (2020a), there has been little cross-fertilization between international development (ID) and PM. Both have come of age in the middle of the twentieth century, and share a common concern for organizing work and delivering change (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 548). The project form, prevalent in ID, contributes directly or indirectly to achieve sustainable and equitable poverty reduction. It also aims to improve the living standards of citizens in low- and low–middle-income countries comprised in the Global South (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 548).

Considering their distinctive nature, IDPs qualify as a specific type of projects, though they are seldom featured in the mainstream PM literature (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469), whether in textbooks (e.g., Shenhar & Dvir, 2007), summaries (e.g., Davies, 2017), or standards (Munro & Ika, 2020).

According to Ika (2015), we still do not know much, in both PM and ID literature, about how IDPs are carried out, why they fail, how they could succeed better, and what role PM processes play in their delivery, not to mention how projects can reach time, budget, specific objectives and stakeholders’ expectations targets (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 470).

Many authors have analyzed the various causes of ID failures, such as shallow dealings made between national elites and foreign entities for rent-taking and sharing purposes (Burgis, 2015), vaguely defined and targeted projects (Winters, 2014), rent-extraction by state elites (Booth, 2012; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). The reader can also see other causes of failures of IDPs in Harnois and Gagnon (2022a, p. 867) and Harnois (2022).

The outcomes and quality of IDPs remain highly controversial, especially with the perception of corruption by various stakeholders. This article aims to integrate findings from both social and administrative sciences that focus attention on the governance challenges involved in both business and public administration of such projects. It also asks to what extent PM methods can effectively be harmonized with broader anti-corruption initiatives in both donor and receiving countries.

Taking a transdisciplinary viewpoint, this study proposes a review and synthesis of the literature about the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological issues in researching corruption as a construct in PM as applied to IDPs. Some experts recognize the inefficacy of applying classical PM tools and processes. This study concludes that an alternative approach to overcome the taboos and prejudice in studying corruption is to ask a different research question. As opposed to studying “who and why” about corruption occurrences (ex-post), given the challenge of unveiling its practices and motivations, PM researchers can ask instead “where and how” corruption occurs and helps to better understand methods to mitigate its effects on projects (ex-ante). A research agenda is proposed for the several disciplines and fields concerned with solving this phenomenon (Harnois, 2022).

According to Ika et al. (2020a), some of the foundations of PM grew out of the challenges associated with IDPs, as for funding decisions, performance assessments, and project governance (Morris, 1994). Moreover, ID has contributed a wealth of knowledge to PM, including the logical framework tool (Rodríguez-Rivero et al., 2019), feasibility studies, cost-benefit analysis, evaluations, gender analysis (Brière & Auclair, 2020), and result-based management (Biggs & Smith, 2003; Golini et al., 2015; Ika, 2012; Munro & Ika, 2020). Both PM and ID share a concern for change and rely on projects in general and interorganizational projects in particular (Manning, 2017), as means to deliver organizational (Schoper et al., 2018) or development change (Freeman & Schuller, 2020).

Also, as reported by Ika et al. (2020b), both PM (Morris, 2013; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007) and ID (Chimhowu et al., 2019; Horner & Hulme, 2019) increasingly situate project within programs, portfolios, and a strategic stance. Consequently, PM has grown from being a strictly narrow management mean, where the focus is doing things right (meeting time, costs, and quality), to a broader and more strategic and complex scope, where the focus is put on effectively delivering beneficial results for stakeholders and end-users (Meredith & Swikael, 2020; Williams et al., 2019).

Managerial Challenges in International Development Projects

IDPs are complex endeavors for change in an environment marked by an increasingly unstable and turbulent environment (Ika et al., 2020a; Picciotto, 2020). This reading of the situation is more considered by professionals engaged in ground-level work and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On the other hand, experts working for aid agencies tend to adopt, in general, a more managerialist and technocratic approach to their mission and work (as noted by Dar and Cooke (2008) and Ika and Hodgson (2014)).

Diallo and Thuillier (2004, 2005) in their study of the behavior of African project coordinators and managers, have remarked that these actors did not give sufficient attention to the needs of the targeted community in their evaluation of the results pursued by IDPs. Practitioners often have the same opinion about the relative lack of attention given to the needs of the poor who are rightly an important part of the stakeholders for IDPs.

As for the Weberian ideal-type of rational–legal bureaucracy, it is also analytically useful to take into account some situations encountered by aid professionals who deplore the lack of administrative integrity or job permanence they regularly encounter when the hierarchical bosses (in the recipient country) are moved away and replaced by new bosses, installing a new workforce, usually at the expense of administrative skills (Ika et al., 2012).

Where and How Corruption Occurs in International Development

Elite capture, as analyzed by Andersen et al. (2020), shows that a sizeable part of aid is illegally transferred abroad by top politicians of poor developing countries, in foreign banks, as a form of not retraceable fiscal evasion. This type of information is true, but not often addressed in the ID literature. On the other hand, when high- or middle-level civil servants move into a position of importance, they often replace the people in place by their cronies or “people of their village,” getting rid of experienced people, often not replacing them with competent enough people.

Various scholars and reformers have commented on corruption as being a major challenge to social, political, and economic development in any country. The consequences of corruption are detrimental to the progress of any society. The endemic nature of corruption, in the case of Nigeria for instance, from “top-to-bottom,” has negatively affected this country’s development. To change that situation, the leadership must commit to fight corruption from the top down, strengthen corruption control mechanisms, and see to it that offenders are punished. Moreover, the citizenry need to be mobilized to demand transparency and accountability (Bamidele et al., 2016, p. 107; Igiebor, 2019, p. 499).

According to Akanle and Adesina (2015, p. 421), in contemporary Nigeria, corruption remains high, prevalent, popular, problematic, and growing. The effects of corruption are deleterious: poverty affects 70% of the population, 30% of youths are unemployed, and most infrastructures have collapsed. The authors add that agencies, ministries, and parastatals lack system and structure, and that directors, governors, and presidents run public affairs as private affairs (Akanle & Adesina (2015, p. 433).

In Nigeria, family and regional allegiances compound the problem of corruption with a near-absence of trust between regions, religious groups, tribes, and even between local neighborhoods (Bamidele et al., 2016).

Corruption being a multi-dimensional phenomenon, it is important to analyze it with various analytical approaches, to better understand and fight it. Harnois and Gagnon (2022b) have done a qualitative research using a grounded theory, interviewing various ID experts, and processing the results through the analytical lens of four sociological and political theories: the organizational interests theory, the culturalist theory, the principal-agent theory, and the institutional theory (Harnois, 2022; Harnois & Gagnon, 2022b).

The World Bank (2020) report recalls the necessity of a multi-front effort to fight corruption, illustrating well the complex and protracted effort this represents. Corruption can be a concern for different actors: policemen, civil servants, judges, businesspeople, institutions involved in money laundered through various schemes such as investing in real estate abroad.

The vast informal economic sector in most developing societies is in good part due to the efforts of citizens to escape the corrupt situation surrounding them (Berrou & Eekhout, 2019). Moreover, the omnipresence of petty corruption in developing countries affects both citizens and business people (Clarke, 2011; Nelson, 2017; Nystrand, 2014).

Riak (2013), in his article about the need for South Sudan in 2013, to start on a good foot as for the integrity and solidity of its institutions, adds that this country must aim for high anti-corruption standards relatively to three types of corruption currently crippling most Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA): (a) political corruption, that takes place at high echelons of power in a country, and which refers to “corrupt acts of political leaders and activities by which they exploit their discretionary power to make national policies that serve their own interests” (Choo & Kukutschka, 2012); (b) bureaucratic corruption, which refers to acts of bureaucrats dealing with their superiors or with the public (Jain, 2001) and who regularly ask for bribes (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006), and (c) judicial corruption, that comprises corrupt judiciary activities that go from pre-trial activities to trial proceedings, and that distort the proper management of judicial duties (Teorell, 2007; Transparency International, 2007).

As for the theory of Party System Institutionalization (PSI) advanced by Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020), it shows that PM studies and ID studies should consider more the sociopolitical context in which projects take place in (SSA) countries. This invites us to establish more bridges with other social sciences, as is recommended by Ika et al. (2020a) and Picciotto (2020).

As for the various factors—economic, political and cultural—that cause corruption, they are instructive to study (Gani, 2017; Gök, 2020; Musila, 2019). The structural adjustment measures of the 1980s and 1990s, advanced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, led SSA countries, to be more linked to the neo-liberal international economic system, and contributed to significantly lower the number of civil servants and their wages in this region, and to degrade the education and health systems. The devaluation of the value of the Franc CFA also contributed to plunge millions of families into poverty.

The degraded low wages of civil servants made them much more vulnerable to temptations of adopting corrupt ways to survive or thrive. So, we come to the bleak observation that, if these SSA countries cannot count or build by themselves a better deal as for their economic situation, it will be hard to successfully combat corruption. Moreover, not only the neopatrimonial way of doing politics risks to perpetuate the present corrupt situation, but also the economic, political, and cultural mores are intertwined.

As Aidt (2003) and Jain (2001) advance, three conditions are necessary for corruption to arise and persist: discretionary power, economic costs, and weak institutions. Discretionary power needs to be contained better by stronger institutions, and the overall economic situation needs to favor people’s life conditions. A democratic context helps, but if peoples’ revenues do not attain a certain level (USD 3000/4000 per capita), western-type democracy will be at best mimicked by African regimes, to be recognized internationally and receive foreign aid.

As was advanced by Aborisade and Aliyyu (2018), since the colonial era, Africans have learned not to trust the representatives of the state, seen as exploiters. They do not find more solace in trusting the contemporary regimes’ agents in power in post-colonial times, since they are mired in such a high level of corruption.

The concept of state capture encapsulates various situations in developing societies when states are captured by special interest groups in both the private and public sectors, leading to policies that benefit a privileged minority (Hira, 2017, pp. 134–137).

Corruption is not just confined in Africa. Other regions are not immune to this predicament. In India, according to Riley and Roy (2016), that country is ingrained with corrupt habits, due to various factors such as the pervasiveness of government, the opportunities for crony capitalism, and the contemporary loss of civic sense of community (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 73). Even the passing of the license Raj at the beginning of the 1990s, and the beginning of an era of economic liberalization, it did not eliminate the various opportunities of cronyism offered. The historic anti-British Indian nationalist movement, inspired by a Gandhian ethos of nationalism, moralism, and a proud tradition of civic community and engagement, has weakened nowadays (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 74, 79). As for other countries, such as Chile (Silva, 2016, p. 190–191), Nigeria (Igiebor, 2019, p. 502) and others, the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns constitute a weak spot where corrupt practices are numerous. Moreover, Riley and Roy (2016, pp. 81, 85,93) take notice of a growing loss of morality, social capital, and community connectivity in India since the 1970s.

It is also interesting to consider the research done by Ferry et al. (2020) who found that many donor countries (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia, et al.) do not condemn or discourage a high level of corruption in some aid recipient countries they favor, because they have a similar type of non-democratic governance, even if they pay lip service to the reduction of corruption, without truly believing it.

Anti-corruption Efforts in Projects

An enormous amount of money and economic opportunities are lost to corruption each year, notably in SSA countries (Ahen, 2021b; Kaufmann, 2005; Musila, 2019). This amount of money is lost for better educating young Africans, curing ailments, such as malaria and malnutrition. There is a large consensus among professionals and academics that corruption exists on a large scale and is a plague handicapping economic and human development in this region of the world. Particularly in countries ranking high for their corruption rate, it is assumed that political elite members may expect to receive extra money or specific privileges for their services (e.g., specialized training, investments and trips abroad), beyond their salaries or contracts signed.

Various ways have been used to fight or prevent corruption with regard to IDPs, such as favoring smaller projects led by “Searchers” (Easterly & Williamson, 2011), cutting entirely foreign aid (Moyo, 2009), better targeting and informing the aid receiving groups to ensure project accountability (Winters, 2014). The reader may see other ways and means of preventing corruption in IDPs in Harnois and Gagnon (2022a, p. 871–873) and Harnois (2022).

The various anti-corruption attempts to improve the integrity and effectiveness of civil services in developing societies have rarely been successful, according to Hira (2016a, b). Moreover, this author advances that there are almost no known cases of a developing country moving from a highly corrupt situation to one of minimized corruption. He contends that many factors are at play, such as training, pay rates, audit practices, and behavioral models. Nevertheless, he concludes that cultural changes are necessary, on a long-term and on a wide-societal level, to be able to change informal norms, habits, and peer pressure, to obtain success (Hira & Shiao, 2016, p. 38).

Some countries and societies such as Singapore, Chile, and Hong Kong have effectively attained a high level of probity and professionalism (Hira, 2016a, p. 10). The level of social capital in a given society also helps to keep in check the actors gone astray from the required norms of probity. Prosecuting high-ranking officials is also a recommended practice to enact (Hira, 2016a, p. 11; Hira & Shiao, 2016, p. 23; Igiebor, 2019, p. 506). But in most instances in Africa, as in the case of Swaziland, no “big fish” are being punished (Hope, 2016, pp. 152–153).

According to Hira and Shiao (2016, p. 22, 30), some societies such as Singapore, originally poor and riven by ethnic rivalries after World War II, have succeeded, with the high-level and charismatic leadership of Lee Kwan Yew, who instituted the Prevention and Corruption Act and a rigorous anti-corruption Agency, to lead the country to a rigorous level of civil service probity nowadays. Chile also has a history of civil service probity and judicial integrity, even since the colonial period (Hira, 2016a, p. 10; Hira & Shiao, 2016, pp. 25, 32–33). Finally, the enclave of Hong Kong, which has a complex financial and economic sector, has instituted serious civil service anti-corruption measures, such as verifying the level of wealth and material possessions of its civil servants during and after tenure (Hira & Shiao, 2016, pp. 23–24).

But, in many developing countries, the norm is rather that anti- corruption agencies have mostly failed to resist to the wishes of their political godfathers, who insist they should not go too far in fighting corruption (Akanle and Adesina, 2015, p. 434). The result is that most civil services in SSA are dysfunctional (Akanle & Adesina, 2015, p. 430). According to Bamidele et al. (2016, p. 105), African anti-corruption agencies are mostly inefficient, being just another layer of corrupt bureaucracy.

Méon and Weill (2010) and Pavlik (2018) assert that, in specific cases, the usually negative correlation between corruption and economic growth may not stand when bribes are offered by businesspeople to state agents (politicians, civil servants), allowing them with relative certainty to obtain a favorable and fast outcome for their business needs. This “Lubricant factor” thesis, was also held by Huntington (1968), cited by Riley and Roy (2016). This thesis is interesting to have a better all-around view of the effects of corruption, particularly in business matters. This also highlights the interest of studying the various types of corrupt countries in relation to their specific PSI regimes, as demonstrated by the comparison between Soviet Union and post-communist Russia by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).

The study of Adam (2020) is also interesting to better put in perspective the role of e-government for modernizing the relations between states and citizens. In the Western world, we tend to consider that new technologies will have positive effects on the economic development of societies, and to fight corruption by making more transparent the relations between the state and the citizens. But this author shows well that this supposed effect of e-gov stands only when there is a favorable context around a situation, that is not yet prevalent in many SSA countries (e.g., the rate of information and communication technologies development, computer communication literacy, the efficiency and integrity of the public administrations).

There is a formal effort put by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption called UNCAC (Senu, 2020). Unfortunately, this effort until now has been rendered harmless by many regimes in SSA countries, that do not consider it in their interest to fight corruption. This demonstrates once more the resolute will of the neopatrimonialist regimes in power in SSA countries to not surrender their power and capacity to accumulate rent-seeking opportunities. They consider that any anti-corruption effort could jeopardize their hold on power. Here again, the “Realpolitik” sociopolitical factors at play seem to us to determine the lack of overture on new ways to govern.

To better control the funds transferred by foreign aid, international governance frameworks must become more effective at following the flows of money, as is advanced by Winters (2014) to avoid the capture of projects. This can be done, according to this author, by both targeting the intended stakeholders of projects, encouraging them to organize (through social capital mobilization efforts) and clarifying accountability. Project capture is a frequent reality to be aware of, as was shown by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Svensson (2005) concerning World Bank grant-based aid offered to Ugandan primary schools.

Also, in general, we have seen that the literature generally considers that poorer countries are often more corrupt and more poorly governed (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Andersen et al., 2020; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000, 2007).

As for PM, which is an important instrument to change SSA countries for the better as for their development perspectives, Rwelamila and Purushottam (2012), who concentrated their study of projects in Austral Africa, consider that many projects led by African managers often need to be better managed, due to multiple factors, such as a lack of strategic perspectives, lack of training in PM, lack of a better sense of business, the micro-management tendencies of African supervisors, and lack of superior education in PM in SSA countries.

Winters and Martinez (2015) have stressed the importance for Western aid donors to better discriminate to which governments international aid should be accorded, and also to calibrate carefully the types of aid, according to the will of SSA regimes to really care for the development of their country, the advancement of democracy, and to work for the fate of the poor. Otherwise, aid funds will be spent without results for the accomplishment of these objectives, as it is stressed by many researchers (Booth, 2012; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Easterly, 2013; Moyo, 2009).

We have shown that there is an aid industry, where thousands of people toil and to which they are dedicated. Specifically, on a more cautious note, some authors such as Monkam (2012) have shown that there is a “syndrome of moving the money” in development agencies, that can potentially hinder analytic acuity in their evaluation of some projects that should be better vetted prior to financing them.

Also, Clements (2020), an American expert in designing evaluation frameworks, notes that in more than some cases he examined, the definitions of “efficiency,” “impact,” and “sustainability,” standards recommended by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), are problematic and can differ from project to project. He adds that many reports on structural weaknesses in targeting aid’s intended beneficiaries and problems of accountability were usually erased or halved in the executive summaries, ultimately intended for the funding principals and the public at large. According to Clements (1999), instances of widespread corruption and severe mismanagement of projects are too often white-washed in evaluation and top-level reports.

Neopatrimonialism

We consider that neopatrimonialism is an important cause for the high amount of corruption found in SSA countries. This political system makes it highly difficult to renew the set of people in power (politicians) and in the bureaucracy (civil servants), otherwise than within the bounds of cronyism. Consequently, the state does not look after the interests of all citizens, and rather favors in large measure a gang of cronies, bureaucrats, and businesspeople, who are loyal and ready to collaborate with the power in place. Incumbents take all kinds of measures to keep their place and privileges, blocking the access to power of opponents and militants, who want to change the present unequal system in place (Beekers & van Gool, 2012).

Democratic rules are not respected, and politicians in the opposition and voters who want change are intimidated or put aside. Almost everywhere, the mechanisms of parliamentary functioning only serve to give a false appearance of democracy. Most contemporary African states, with rare exceptions, do not play the rules of democratic alternance.

We do not see political leaders admitting defeat in regular elections, because too many people allied with the regime in power would lose their privileges and jobs. That is what we routinely see in Africa, as the power incumbents will do everything to retain power, as was the case some months ago in Ivory Coast with Ouattara and in Uganda with Museveni (The Economist, 2021). In both countries, opposition leaders were either arrested or barred from being electorally eligible; crowds were dispersed with tear-gas or bullets.

Under these conditions, corruption in most SSA countries has become an institution with its own rules, norms, habitus(es) (Bourdieu, 1979) to follow, to make sure nothing changes and that the system in place rewards the people who collaborate to keep their privileges, in a system that creates profound inequalities, and drastically reduces the chances of real development for the rest of the citizens not included in the “System” (also called the la Mangeoire—“the Manger,” in some countries).

In a neopatrimonial type of regime, the ruling elites use the state for their personal enrichment, with the support of a public administration characterized by being “patently unstable, inefficient, non-transparent, and that fails to distribute public resources to large segments of the population” (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 1). The people left outside of this system do not (or almost do not) enjoy the services expected by citizens living in modern and functional states.

The concept of neopatrimonialism was introduced in the late 1970s by Médard (1979, 1991), to analyze the Cameroonian regime’s lack of institutionalization and state of “underdevelopment,” making it an “impotent state.”

In such regimes, the “national institutions are weak,” democracy is “deficient,” and governance is “not fully accountable” to all citizens (UNDP, 2002). In many SSA countries, “governing is characterized by the appropriation of power as a personal asset and through the clientelist redistribution of wealth and official positions” (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

Patrimonialism and the “Big Man”

Historically, neopatrimonialism typically evolved from the prior cultural–political system of patrimonialism in place, characterized by “Big Man” politics at a local level, that went upscale, to the national level of governance, after the success of independence movements (Bayart, 1993).

In pre-colonialist and colonialist times, the notion of the African Big Man signifies that a man who can use his power not only to accumulate wealth, but to redistribute to his clients, becomes a man of honor, while economic affluence represents a crucial virtue.… A chief who does not successfully use his resources, authority, and connections, to promote the prosperity of his village and/or his tribe loses his honor. (Bayart, 1993, p. 242)

We see that “the present-day ‘personalised’ rule can be traced to a more traditional moral economy of patron-client. In such exchange systems, dominant individuals provide livelihoods and/or political protection to the less resourceful in exchange for loyalty and/or labour” (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

“While petty corruption is mostly despised by all, because it is self-serving and usually arbitrary, there is often a recognition that the elite’s much more significant abuse of power serves larger and more legitimate moral purposes” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 159, cited by Ganahl, 2013, p. 140).

In the present situation, if a representative’s ability to garner wealth for himself is realized, then for many, in a clientelist state of affairs, it is only proof, for his and her constituents, of his (or her) success in getting a share of the “national cake” (Ganahl, 2013, p. 140). There is reason to believe that public development aid, if not closely monitored by donors, can and will be liberally used in such manners.

Neopatrimonialism is a distinct modern phenomenon, in post- colonial societies that have experienced the rise of the modern state organizations, incorporated in the modern international system (Médard, 1982, p. 179).

It is to be noted that the concept of neopatrimonialism has been criticized by Mkandawire (2015), who deplored that this paradigm has been too rapidly adopted by a large array of Western and African academics and ID actors. According to this late eminent scholar, neopatrimonialism falls short theoretically on many dimensions: it is too much based on cultural generalizations and stereotypes about Africans; it is based on a paucity of valid empirical data and case studies, and does not give enough importance to the role of ideas and agency relatively to the history of post-colonial African regimes (Friedman, 2018, pp. 450–451; Mkandawire, 2015, 36–40).

Other dimensions to be considered relatively to the corrupt governance of many African regimes are to look beyond and consider the various ways taken by what Ahen (2021b) calls the International Mega-Corruption Inc. (ImC) phenomenon, comprised of the various ways multinational corporations take hold of the resources from the African continent, with the complicity of politicians (local and foreign), by using multiple fiscal ways to avoid taxation, with the support of various wealth management consultancies. For this researcher, ImC constitutes a real weapon of structural violence against the attainment of the United Nations’ SDGs (sustainable development goals). Tax evasion, impunity, legal loopholes, corporate political power, complex elite networks, and the complicity of the international regulation agencies make possible the over exploitation of resources on the African continent, and the quasi-impossibility of tangibly reduce poverty in that part of the world (Ahen, 2021b, p. 15).

According to Kieh (2023, p. 87), the African state does not reflect the historical and cultural experiences of its citizens. This author adds that, historically, the colonial powers incorporated their colonies into the world capitalistic system as marginal peripheral state players (Kieh, 2023, p. 93). He concludes that as marginal and dependent social formations, the peripheral states in the Global South lack the institutional capacity to discipline all actors, both internal and external (Kieh, 2023, p. 96).

Post-colonial Hybrid States

Governance Regimes

According to Fjelde and Hegre (2014, p. 271), hybrid regimes are regimes situated somewhere between the conventional, closed authoritarian regime, and a fully developed democracy or polyarchy (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2006). Paradoxically, most hybrid regimes in SSA display a mix of democratic and autocratic traits, such as combining apparent democratic institutions and severe restrictions of suffrage.

The notion of quasi-state has been introduced by Jackson (1990) to characterize the states endowed with a limited capacity to assert their sovereignty (Bach, 2011, pp. 280–281). This type of regime is qualified as being “anti-developmental” in its worst forms (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 59), or as an “institutional curse” (Hyden, 2000, p. 19), and “klepto-patrimonial” (MacIntyre, 2000 in Searle, 1999, p. 8).

There is a wide chasm between the Weberian-type model of the modern Western state and the reality of many African states, whose hybrid nature is best captured by the terms of neopatrimonialism, clientelism, and as with a “Big Man” type of governance (Ganahl, 2013, p. 131).

About the notion of peripheral quasi-states, Kieh (2023, p. 82) considers that peripheral states have many elite pathological and institutional weaknesses. Since the end of the Cold War, these states have a reduced geopolitical value in the new global order. Mainly producers of primary goods (agriculture, minerals, oil), they are now marginal actors with regard to semi-periphery states (which have an industrial base, such as Brazil and South Korea) and central states (Kieh, 2023, p. 84). According to Kieh (2023, p. 85), the peripheral states ensure the maintenance of a dependent relationship within the global order. Their bureaucracy cooperates with the economic and most powerful classes. Moreover, historically, periphery states continue the colonial function of integrating the African continent into the orbit of capitalist imperialism (Kieh, 2023, p. 88). In such social formations, anti-corruption bodies are often captive of political manipulations. Everyday corruption reigns: private individuals offer bribes to state bureaucrats to speedily facilitate various transactions, such as getting licenses, passports, permits, receiving government contracts (Kieh, 2023, p.95). In such a weltanschauung (state of affairs), the control of state power ensures the control of state resources. And in such a culture of impunity, the accumulation of personal wealth has become for many the primary motive for working in the state bureaucracy.

Starting with the work of Max Weber (2013), the famous German economist and sociologist, the state is a social system of political domination that lays down the laws that citizens have to obey. Otherwise, the state may legally punish delinquent citizens by using the force at its disposal. By creating, enforcing, and continuously amending laws, the state succeeds to manage such a particular state of social order (Ganahl, 2013, p. 132).

According to Weber (2013), six features distinguish the modern rational–legal state. We elaborate on each of these dimensions and attempt to integrate them within a coherent analysis of governance regimes in SSA countries.

Monopoly on Force

The state possesses a monopoly on physical force, without the presence of relevant rivals to the state’s claim to authority. Indeed, only the state possesses the wherewithal to legislate and enforce the law (Ganahl, 2013, p. 132).

Many African states do not exercise even the most exiguous control over the entire expanse of their territories. The reader can refer to such examples as DRC Congo(where its citizens have to go to the capital city to fill any important administrative documents), Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, for extended parts of their recent past (Ganahl, 2013, p. 134). This situation incites African national leaders to privilege spending moneys on their clientelist groups and regions, instead of building adequate infrastructures that would effectively link the various parts of the country.

Acceptance by Citizens

The state must enjoy widespread acceptance among its citizens, who must acknowledge the state’s sovereign authority, and consent, at least in principle, to the body and laws it tries enforcing (Ganahl, 2013, pp. 132–133). For example, a state engaged in civil war can hardly be considered as a fully-accepted state by its citizens (Anderson, 1983), since the aims and principles of social order, as well as the governing apparatus, cannot be the object of a violent dispute between various factions of society (Ganahl, 2013, p. 132).

Bamidele et al. (2016, p. 103) examine the place and impact of culture upon corruption in Nigeria. According to these authors, there is a near-absence of trust between the regions, religious groups, tribes, and even between local neighborhoods. Members of ethnic groups constantly demand favors from co-ethnics when they hold any public office (Bamidele et al. 2016, p. 107). Contrary to the historic norms of honesty and uprightness in African culture, the contemporary bureaucracy in the country is bereft of any moral underpinnings. Among the recommendations to ameliorate the situation, corrections are needed to improve the civil service: better salaries are needed to resist bribes, a better monitoring by superiors, the use of incentives, and more citizens’ feedback (Bamidele et al. 2016, p. 122).

Citizens as Members of a Nation

Citizens must regard themselves as the members of a nation—as being a body of people who identify with the political community represented by the state. That entails a feeling of loyalty and subjective belonging. Of course, the concept of national identity is a social construction, which includes patriotic and nationalistic convictions (Anderson, 1983).

Despite the recent tendencies of citizens in most African states to regard themselves as Nigerians, Chadians and Mauritanians in many cases they still identify themselves to regional, tribal or clan identities, that take precedence in practice over national identity, as can be observed in various exercises of national elections (Ganahl, 2013, p. 135).

Monopoly Over a Territory

The state exercises its monopoly on force over a given territory, meaning that the state has a claim on a piece of land over which it can exert its power. It also means that the state has the capacity to broadcast and impose its laws over the entirety of its domain. With most of the SSA countries, it is far from a given state of affairs (Ganahl, 2013, p. 133).

A strong evidence is the case of Nigeria, among other examples, whose army is unable to stop the incursions of the terrorist group Boko Haram in the central and north-west part of the country, which spreads terror by killing hundreds of peasants, and kidnapping young students at will, mainly female, to extort ransoms from relatives or make expeditive marriages with their rebel soldiers (The Economist, 2020, p. 50).

Such a situation of ethno-regional fractionalization and conflict mainly finds its origin in the artificial constitution of African states at the 1884 Berlin Conference, that makes many countries constantly find themselves in low and recurring levels of civil war, as in the cases of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, the Central Republic of Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mauritania (Ganahl, 2013, p. 135).

Material Support to Sovereignty

A sovereign and autonomous state must be able to extract sufficient material resources to maintain its survival and sovereignty. Financing of the state makes it a necessity to be able to tax the economic activities of its citizens. In fact, most African states draw the lion’s share of their resources from external sources, such as international aid, emigrants’ remittances and direct foreign investments (Ganahl, 2013, p. 133).

As is also the case for Bayart (1993), Reno (1999) considers that the survival and/or enrichment strategies employed by both rulers and subjects result in the tendency for citizens not to trust the state for using well the taxes obtained, and certainly not for the profit of their own in-group for most of the persons concerned. In that sense, the informal economy that proliferates in SSA (Berrou & Eekhout, 2019) can be considered as a kind of revenge of the civil society against the formal state, since numerous people succeed to operate outside the ambit of their reviled state’s supervision and control (Ganahl, 2013, p. 142).

Many African states find themselves regularly unable to generate the material resources needed to finance their existence. Many are part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries list, making them dependent on development assistance from developed countries. Otherwise, many would be unable to fulfill the most basic economic and institutional prerequisites of political existence (Ganahl, 2013, p. 135).

International Recognition

A state needs to be recognized as such by other established states. Though African states are formerly identical to all other states of the international community, being formally recognized by the United Nations as sovereign states, entitling them to represent the inhabitants of their respective territory. Indeed, states need to be recognized by other sovereign entities to engage into international political and economical dealings.

Modern Realities of Governance Regimes

The Weberian conception of governance regimes must be confronted to modern realities. While not invalidating the features enumerated so far, several authors contend that more complex micro-factors are at play, requiring an effort of harmonizing them with the macro-view of Weber.

Jackson (1990) presents different conceptual depictions of the discrepancy between the state in theory and the African state in reality. He differentiates between the empirical statehood (when states have managed to attain real physical control over their territories, have subdued internal rivals, and defend their position against other nations) and judicial statehood (when being recognized by other states).

Bayart (1993) employs two useful concepts: la politique du ventre (the politics of the belly), as in Cameroun, to signify that the group in power will take good care of the members of their extended family and political allies, ensuring they will get hold of material benefits by the sole virtue of the power detained, instead of taking care of the needs of the larger population of the country.

The exercise of power is not intended by most rulers to serve the public interest, since for most of SSA states, there is no clean distinction between the exercise of political power and the pursuit of private aims.

Bayart (1993) considers that it is not possible, in most African states, to make the dichotomy between political and private affairs, and between the state and civil society, since most economic activities largely take place with their liberal use and control of state resources. According to him, the Weberian separation of legal–rational politics as opposed to personalized politics is constantly contradicted by the facts observed.

According to Ganahl (2013, p. 144), contrary to the Western-Weberian model, politics in Africa is personalized, informal, irreducibly plural, and patrimonial.

In the context of lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption (Jancsics, 2014), we consider that a recourse to some new concepts for analyzing corruption in developing societies is opportune. Such is the case for the Weberian separation between modern systems of rule based on legal–rational norms are expected to be found to analyze corruption in its many forms (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 3). Unfortunately, instances of corruption abound and the spoiling of public resources and unresponsiveness of public elites seem to be the norm (Cammack, 2007, p. 599).

The term good governance appears to be an ideological concept, based on Western historical experience. This view fails to consider that the political and public administration in SSA countries’ regimes continue to be marked by authoritarianism, nepotism, and corruption (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

According to Fjelde and Hegre (2014: 267), many scholars, who have studied African regimes, describe a system of governance where formal and informal institutions interpenetrate each other. The leaders’ ability to retain power, maintain elite cohesion, and placate oppositional groups rests mainly on the disbursement of regime patronage through clientelist arrangements (Bach & Gazibo, 2011; Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Englebert, 2000; Hyden, 2005; Lemarchand, 1972; Médard, 1991, 2000).

Democratic rules are not respected; politicians in the opposition and voters who want change are intimidated or put aside. Almost everywhere, the mechanisms of parliamentary functioning only serve to give a false appearance of democracy. Most SSA states, with rare exceptions, do not play according to the rules of alternance.

For Igiebor (2019, p. 493), the top-to-bottom corruption in Nigeria has negatively affected the country’s economic development. Nigerians and millions of Africans are deprived of their basic needs for food, health, education, housing, access to clean water, and sanitation (Transparency International, 2015). Moreover, high levels of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity prevail. Igiebor (2019, p. 496) stresses that political corruption is related to instances of acts committed by people who occupy authority positions of public or private trust; these acts negate the laws, regulations, values, and norms of society, and are intentionally carried for the promotion of private interests and intentions.

According to Sen (1990) cited by Igiebor (2019, p. 497), human capacity for expansion requires an adequate support from the state and civil society. Rodney (1972), also cited by Igiebor (2019, p. 497), advances that development is a multidimensional concept which connotes changes within all realms of society. Falodun et al. (1997) advance that development involves improvements in the overall quality of life for the majority of people (as cited by Igiebor, 2019, p. 497).

Igiebor (2019, p. 498) takes note that for Nigerian elites, self-enrichment is pursued through corrupt practices, and a sizable number of public officials become very rich after leaving office. As for the main causes of corruption in Nigeria, Igiebor (2019, pp. 499–502) lists seven of them: (a) political offices considered by many as avenues for wealth accumulation; (b) weak enforcement by governments of anti-corruption measures; (c) the lack of transparency and accountability in governance; (d) weak participation of citizens in governmental decision-making; (e) lack of genuine commitment to create a national political community (the country is stuck with ethnical divisions); (f) the strong influence of the extended-family favoritism and ostentatious lifestyle of the ruling class; and (g) the high cost of financing political parties and electoral campaigns. He concludes that this makes Nigeria one of the most unequal and poorest countries in the world (Igiebor, 2019, p. 506).

Theoretical Models Explaining Anti-corruption Effectiveness

Relevance of Models

Under these conditions, corruption in most SSA countries has become an institution with its own rules to follow, norms, habitus(es) to adhere to, as Bourdieu (1979) says, to make sure nothing changes and that the system in place rewards the people who collaborate to keep their privileges, in a system that creates profound inequalities, and reduces the chances of real development for the rest of citizens not included in the “System.”

Let us now examine three models that could increase the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives, including in PM methods applied within IDPs at various stages of their lifecycle. These models are: (a) the good governance model; (b) the model of long-horizon rent-taking; and (c) the developmental state governance model. Each one will be presented, with its main characteristics, but also the limits of their applicability, due to the contexts encountered.

Each of these constructions can be used either to estimate the level of sound governance in a society, and as a pragmatic way to counteract the phenomenon of corruption.

The Good Governance Model

The World Bank and the UNCAC both largely refer to the Good Governance Theory, as advanced by the World Bank Group.

The World Bank is making efforts to advance the importance of good governance in its official development assistance policy. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators put forward six key dimensions of governance, that measure the quality of governance in over 200 countries: (a) citizen voice and responsibility; (b) political stability and absence of violence; (c) efficiency of public authorities; (d) quality of regulation; (e) the rule of law; and (f) control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2020).

The World Bank (2020) reminds us that it is frequent to find strong inter-linkages between power, politics, and money in SSA. Political parties and campaigns are often financed through close links with business, which can be corrupt. Often, entrenched political elites are eager to maintain their grip on power and money (World Bank, 2020, p. xv). High-profile anti-corruption strategies have often been proven to be ineffective, only giving a temporary veneer of government action (World Bank, 2020, p. xv).

Most developed countries’ governments and public opinion support the good governance model.

The Transparency International (2021) report reveals that

While most countries have made little to no progress in tackling corruption in almost a decade, more than two-thirds of countries score below 50 (the average country score being 43). Its report shows that frequent recourses to corruption were found across the region related to the COVID-19 response: that … was the case for offering bribes to get COVID-19 tests, treatment and other health services, and also for public procurement of medical supplies and overall emergency preparedness.… (This) analysis reveals that countries that perform well on the Transparency International Index invest more in health care, are better able to provide universal coverage and are less likely to violate democratic norms or the rule of law when responding to a crisis.

We see that corruption has deleterious effects on various domains of society and humans’ quality of life. Moreover, according to Ahen (2021a), power asymmetries in global health governance result in the occurrence of two systems of health in the North and the South, leaving developing countries regularly battling epidemics without the adequate means to face them adequately.

Many SSA countries are hybrid states mixing democratic appearances of functioning (e.g., parliamentary settings, intermittent elections) with autocratic manners of governing. Being neopatrimonialist regimes, they tend to give the impression of following reasonable rules of democratic functioning, while ensuring that the incumbent politicians stay in power and keep their opponents away from it. These false appearances are found in other domains, such as in business, by building so many “Potemkin castles” to be able “to play for the gallery.” Two illustrative examples are the existence of thorough laws and rules against corruption in Nigeria, but are not applied (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). Also, modern corporate governance and accountability practices, apparently perfect by-the-book, are not used factually by Kenyan corporations’ boards of directors (Kimani et al., 2020).

The Model of Long-horizon Rent-taking

Another way to favor development, for a developing country, according to Kelsall (2013) is to shirk away from neopatrimonial ways, whose legitimacy is “tied to the distribution of economic favours to clients and cronies, meaning that industrial policies will inevitably fall prey to unproductive ‘rent-seeking’” (p. 1). This author proceeds with the analysis of case studies of four contemporary African states (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya), also in comparison with some Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and others, who were part of famous economic take-offs that occurred after World War II.

Since their independence, many African countries have developed their service sector, and have profited, in the first decade of the 2000s, from exporting oil, minerals, and agricultural products, notably to China, but have not improved their economic performance that would have seen the reduction of unemployment and poverty. “Governments must work more proactively with the private sector to remove market failures and structural distortions, boost productivity growth, diversify production and exports, upgrade technology in all sectors, and increase their global shares of high technology exports” (Amoako, 2011, p. 27 as reported by Kelsall, 2013, p. 5).

Heterodox development thinkers, according to Kelsall (2013, p. 6), believe that Africa, to sustain high growth and reduce poverty, must “adopt an ambitious form of industrial policy, referred as a ‘learning, industrial and technology’ (LIT) policy.”

Kelsall (2013) then proceeds to examine African examples of patrimonial-based development countries that have been successful, for instances, Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (1965–1975) and Ivory Coast under Houphouët-Boigny (1960–1975) (Meredith, 2005, pp. 65–66, 2014, pp. 595–596). An ideal model, familiar to the existing conditions in SSA countries, according to Kelsall (2013, p. 18), is the presence at the head of the country of an individual or group at the apex of the state, able to control the major rents created, and to distribute them in a productive way, thus being able to establish an efficient network of top-down patron–client relationships.

By contrast, elsewhere in the region, rent management was not centralized, and the leadership was unable to control rent-seeking, leading to unrestrained corruption, economic crisis, even the collapse of authority (Kelsall, 2013, p. 19). In such cases, with numerous low-level actors all seeking rents for themselves, it becomes difficult to coordinate their actions and not fall into unmanageable corruption (Kelsall, 2013, p. 20).

Kelsall (2013) presents a four-part typology model of rent management:

Competitive clientelism (with low centralization of state power and short time horizon). This leads to a weak economic performance characterized by a “winner takes all” scenario. Politicians and cronies extract maximum rents, looting the economy, with repression and violence (Allen, 1995, p. 308).

Non-developmental kleptocracy (with high centralization of state power and short time horizon). In that model, the regimes take on a kleptocratic aspect, cronies being allowed to enrich themselves without limits, as was the case in Zaïre-Congo under Mobutu (1965–1997) (Meredith, 2005, pp. 93–115, 293–308, 2014, pp. 570–579, 609–610, 640–641; Reno, 1999, pp. 147–181). It is also the case of Siaka Stevens (in Sierra Leone from 1967 to 1971, and from 1971 to 1985) who became rich dealing with “dirty diamonds” (Meredith, 2014, pp. 642–643; Reno, 1995, 1999, pp. 113–117, 220–223; Schatzberg, 1988), and South Africa under Jacob Zuma (2009–2018). The most extreme and dysfunctional cases can be found in the predatory regimes of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda (1971–1979), Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (1968–1979), and Jean Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa (1966–1979) (Bach, 2011, p. 279; Chehabi & Linz, 1998).

Ineffective developmental state (with low centralization of state power and long-time horizon).

Developmental patrimonialism (with high centralization of state power and long-time horizon). In that model, a substantial portion of rent-earning opportunities goes to activities that increase the value-added industrial activities, making it possible to transform the productive forces in the long run (MacIntyre, 2000, p. 265, 270).

This model 4 applies to Côte-d’Ivoire for the period of 1960–1975, with a strong economic performance under Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The same comment applies to Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (1965–1975) (Meredith, 2014, pp. 558–563). Here, the leadership has succeeded in centralizing control over rents, taking a long-term approach to maximize rents, with a more or less blurring of the boundaries between public and private property of the ruler(s) (Kelsall, 2013, p. 25–26). Bach (2011) considers the regimes of Houphouët-Boigny and Kenyatta, as “blessed periods,” that resulted in an enlightened type of “regulated neopatrimonialism,” combining a benevolent personal rule with the use of a balanced regional, ethnic, generational, and even of personal rivalries put at the service of the national party in power (see also Crook, 1989, p. 227–228).

In this model 4, rents serve to finance party activities and finance domestic investment, including public works and original policy initiatives. In that model, corruption looks more predictable and moderated (Pavlik, 2018). The rent process does not hurt the climate for domestic and foreign investment. Other examples are South Korea (1961–1987), Malaysia (1957–1997), Indonesia (1967–1997), and Botswana (1966–1998) (Poteete, 2009).

In these instances, there is the presence of strong Party System Institutionalization (PSI) (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020). Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) also consider the case of Rwanda under Paul Kagame as a fitting example of developmental patrimonialism (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 102–144; Purdeková, 2011; Purdeková et al., 2018).

Model 4 is interesting for aid donors and allies to support. However, regime changes tend to happen sooner or later, and may put a stop to such governance choices. Also, an interesting option for donors is to identify change leaders when they happen to have a stake in the governance of their country, when in charge of a ministry or department, and engage a fruitful dialogue with them to encourage them and learn from their experience.

The Developmental State Governance Model

Another theory proposed to transform a developing country for the better is the Developmental State Governance (DSG) model. In that model, the state takes control over entire sectors of the economy, especially strategic industries (Beaudet & Benhmade, 2019, p. 200; Johnson, 1982, 1999; Leftwich, 2011; Wade, 1990).

“The state, in this model, wants to be an actor in the structural transformation of the economy. Initially, the goal is to catch up, then later to compete with developed countries” (Leftwich, 2011).

The main historical examples of the DSG model are found in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In many Asian countries, at first, the DSG option was primarily a nationalist project, adhered to by the ruling elite. Also, we find that there is the presence of an effective institutional fabric, combined with political stability and the success of economic reforms.

The Developmental State Governance model is structured around a set of institutions, whose mission is to choose the economic sectors to develop through a series of interventionist measures. DSG leaders intervene in the market to govern and discipline the private sector through various incentives or coercion, for example by regulating access to credit. (Gaudreault, 2019, p. 200)

The collaborative link between the political and business elites provides institutional channels for the permanent renegotiation of development objectives and strategies to be deployed (Gaudreault, 2019, p. 200). Developmental states, at each stage, choose champion industrial sectors to sponsor, as strategic vectors of economic development. Then, they educate themselves to build expertise in these sectors chosen.

We see that the developmental state intervenes in the market, by leading and disciplining the private sector through various incentives or coercive measures, such as access to credit (Beaudet & Benhmade, 2019, p. 200). Close links are established between the government, a technocratic elite, and favored entrepreneurs. Strategic choices are made and changed when needed.

Conclusion

This article presented a practice-oriented outlook of increasingly dramatic cases of apparently incurable corruption in some countries that depend heavily on IDPs. As promising tools, PM was identified as a potential mechanism to help counter corruption, especially by imposing more rigorous good governance principles, in opposition to inefficient practices that may prevail in many contexts. The contribution was synthesized in a set of models to describe governance regimes and explain how managerial practices can help prosecute political elite found guilty of “killing a country” by excessive corruption and neopatrimonialism.

The concepts of project capture and state capture are essential to better understand the realities and obstacles encountered in official development assistance. We consider that the management of projects and programs, beyond their practical nature and their technical orientation, offer many opportunities to prevent the impact of corruption on the actors of the project. On the other hand, though, we noted that PM in SSA countries is often superseded by the sociopolitical dimension, with its structured neopatrimonialist system of governance and hybrid quasi-states, that are lacking to fulfill many duties that go with the exercise of power according to the rational–legal Weberian model.

It appears that more studies of the neopatrimonialist system of governance will be useful, to better grasp how corruption works as a structured way of governance, to grasp resources for rent-taking purposes. Such a system appears to be fundamentally detrimental to the effectiveness of the fight against poverty and to attain the objectives of the UN SDGs (2015–2030). It seems that corruption remains a too abstract and underestimated concept if we want to organize the fight against it.

Otherwise, it seems to us that corruption will be partnering with other deep threats to our planet, such as climate change, lack of jobs and family planning in developing countries, pandemics, extinction of the species, augmentation of the desertification of lands in many regions, rarefaction of fish in the oceans, Islamist terrorism, organized crime, and other contemporary plagues we face.

The absence, in too many countries, of a political leadership that prioritizes the development of the country and improvement of life prospects of its citizens is a determining factor. Instead, several regimes take advantage of aid primarily for rent-taking purposes, for themselves and their supporters, and to stay in power if possible. This observation appears to us to constitute a fundamental and unavoidable reality in terms of the impact and failures encountered in IDPs.

Within a post-colonial perspective (Ahen, 2021b), we conclude that ID agencies must recognize their failures so far at imposing more adapted PM methods. Aid donors should acknowledge the need for developing countries to count upon stronger political elites, capable to rely on legal institutions to help prosecute leaders who abused their country. For that, corruption analysts must go beyond the technocratic outlook of projects, and toward theoretical framework or models of governance regimes, based on countering acts of neopatrimonialism.

As well, there is potential for finding innovative solutions through greater transdisciplinary research integrating social and administrative sciences. One example is to develop new PM practices and methods that can contribute, analytically and pragmatically, to help redress the actual and despicable situation encountered. Both at professional and academic levels, management research is ever more concerned with ethics and transparency, integrating these concepts at the heart of many traditional theories of organizational leadership. It opens the door to create effective PM solutions for IDPs informed by both social and administrative sciences.