Abstract
The article seeks to get closer to an understanding of the legal implications of the notion of the indivisibility of human rights as distinct from the philosophical implications. While the first part of the article (Sections I-IV) deals with the notion of indivisibility in a general way by discussing possible interpretations and legal principles for pursuing an integrated human rights approach, the second part of the article (Sections V-VIII) deals with indivisibility in the concrete context of deprivation of liberty for medical or social reasons. Despite increased awareness of the possibilities of an integrated human rights approach, the European Court of Human Rights has in this particular context been reluctant to accept a blurred dividing line between social and civil rights. By emphasising the close connection between the existence of treatment and the duration of the confinement, the article, however, argues that fulfilment of the civil right to personal liberty is dependent on recognition of the interdependence between social rights and civil rights. Even though social and civil rights have been separated into two conventions proportionality and teleological considerations lead to the conclusion that the (social) right to treatment ought to be considered an integrated component of the (civil) right to personal liberty.