Abstract
In cross-cultural research the validity and universality of stages of preconventional reasoning in Kohlberg's theory of moral development has often been taken for granted, while in developmental research a growing bulk of evidence yields indications that the theoretical assumptions underlying preconventional morality may not be adequate to the data. In order to further clarify the problems raised by this research, data collected from Icelandic and German subjects about a Kohlberg dilemma were analysed. In order to probe the structure of stage 2 in particular, only those interview protocols were taken into account which were given stage 2 global scores in Kohlberg's Joe/Judy dilemma. Qualitative analyses of subjects' reasoning showed a substantial amount of arguments which could not be matched to criterion judgements in the standard scoring manual. Structurally these arguments could be interpreted in terms of stage 2 reasoning. With regard to content, however, they showed genuine normative and relationship concerns which do not fit the individualistic and instrumental exchange notion of stage 2. The findings evidence that there may be more variety in early moral reasoning than demonstrated by published research. An action-theoretical framework is proposed in order to achieve a reformulation of preconventional moral reasoning.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
