Exceptions to Mutual Trust: Children's Use of Second-Order Beliefs in Responsibility Attribution

Abstract

Children of 6 to 9 years and adults judged a story protagonist's degree of blame for a traffic accident. All stories depicted a collision between a protagonist, who had the right of way, and another road user. Stories differed, however, in protagonist's second-order belief about the other road-user's knowledge. For instance, in one story, the protagonist mistakenly thought that the other had noticed her coming and that she could therefore rely on him abiding by the priority rule (principle of mutual trust) and grant her the right of way. This story contrasted with one where the protagonist knew that the other had not seen her and so was not justified in claiming priority. Most 7 and 8-year-old children understood the difference in second-order belief and about half of them were also able to make the correct responsibility attribution that the mistaken protagonist, thinking the other character knew, was less to blame for the accident than the one who knew about the other's ignorance. By 9 years, almost all children understood second-order beliefs and three-quarters were also able to make the correct responsibility attribution. The application of second-order beliefs to the principle of mutual trust is discussed in relation to communication failures and cooperative interaction.

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