Abstract
This article examines the changes in the press in Hong Kong during its political transition. The practical consequences of ideological differences between China and Hong Kong for the press might be limited to only three taboos — no advocacy of Hong Kong, Taiwanese or Tibetan independence; no subversion of central government; and no personal attacks on Chinese leaders. The ownership structure of the press is still diverse. In actual operation, however, the Chinese authorities have already exerted their pressure through punishment, rewards and public relations. Covert and overt self-censorship are increasing. In the selection of the Chief Executive of the post-1997 government, the press showed a dramatic turn towards legitimating the Chinese authorities and appears to be inherently power dependent. After 1997, it is suggested that the press will take up a public relations role, serving mainly as a conveyor of positive messages for government.
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