Despite progress in negotiating treaties to ban deployment of particular classes of
weapons, such as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the "qualitative" arms
race remains largely uncontrolled. Supposed theoretical obstacles, based on various
versions of technological determinism, need not be a barrier to practical efforts,
however. The reasoning usually cited to explain the competition does not preclude
agreement to control it. The varcous perspectives on weapons procurement—realist,
action-reaction, bureaucratic politics, technological imperative, and economic—are, as
the case of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) indicates, all subordinate to the
"primacy of politics. " Given political will, even the qualitative arms race is amenable
to control.
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