Developmental new space in South Korea: Militarized developmentalism and the privatization of outer space

Abstract

“Developmental New Space” might, at first glance, seem to be an oxymoron since New Space is often conceptualized as being free from centralized government support or state programming. However, a historical and discursive analysis of contemporary South Korean policy reports, media reports, public education programs and interviews illustrate that developmentalism very much shapes South Korean New Space policy. “Developmental New Space” in South Korea emerges from its history of militarized developmentalism and continues to shape neocolonial inter-Asian relations as South Korea exports New Space technologies and products globally and expand South Korean influence. This paper contributes to the theorization of emergent forms of capitalism in outer space by placing it in histories and politics that shape market relations in South Korea. In doing so, it shows that no account of New Space can be decontextualized from the geopolitical and neoliberal hierarchies that have structured global capitalism since the Cold War. Interviews and participant observation with South Koreans illustrates that the public is divided over national investments in New Space. Some seek a future in outer space that is not contingent upon militarized developmentalism, while others support New Space for what they perceive to be continued economic growth and global competitiveness.

Introduction

“Wouldn’t it be great if one day Korean space rockets became as popular as South Korean cars?” Mr. Kim, an owner of a restaurant in Goheung commented excitedly after we watched the Nuri rocket successfully take off from South Korea's space launch station in Naro Island, Goheung, in May 2023. Nuri, a Korean word meaning cosmos, is the prototype of the first Korean-developed rocket to be launched from Korean soil. This was the second successful launch event of rocket Nuri, the first one being in mid-2022. South Korean News Media commented on this launch as a “baby step toward a New Space Age in South Korea” (Choi 2023a). Nuri was lauded for having been developed in a successful public–private partnership, with chaebol (corporate conglomerates) such as Hanwha and Hyundai Heavy Industries participating in the construction of the rocket and the launch capacity. New Space start-ups also participated in supplying satellites that were launched through Nuri in 2022, and in 2023. Kim's insight that connected South Korean rockets with South Korean cars, a symbol of South Korea's economic success achieved through a close partnership between the state and the private sector, illustrates that for many South Koreans, the privatization of outer space is a national matter.

Several months later, about 30 people gathered along the coast of Jungmun, in the southern part of Jeju Island in South Korea on 4 December 2023, to protest a rocket launch scheduled for later that day. Hanwha, a private corporation building satellite and launch capacities, was going to stage their first satellite launch off the coast of Jeju. The people gathered held an open mic performance to share their thoughts on the encroachment of space industries in Jeju. People shared their fears about the militarization that these space programs will bring to Jeju Island, and the loss of outer space as a commons, as privatization intensifies.

Since the late 2010s, South Korean politicians, media and policymakers have been eager to name an emergent space economy as the “Age of New Space” (Choi 2023c). While policymakers and politicians present New Space as a departure from the previous model of South Korean government-centered development projects, the history of South Korea's militarized developmentalism tells a different story about what is unfolding in the privatization of outer space. Funding, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks are all dependent on the state (Shammas and Holen 2019), and further, New Space policies are informed by discourses of militarized modernity and export-oriented development, a reference to South Korea's economic development model under military dictatorships, where the two developed closely (Kwon 2019; Moon 2005).

Methodologically, this research is based on content analysis of policy papers, media reports, public education projects, participant observation in Jeju and Goheung, and interviews conducted in 2022–2024 with activists opposing New Space, as well as members of the broader South Korean public interested in outer space. ¹ For this article, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 people, using snowball sampling methods. The recruitment process and the interviews were conducted following Institutional Review Board protocols provided by University of California, Irvine. IRB approval was received prior to conducting human subject research. Some of my interlocutors have been anonymized according to their request. Interviewees were asked what they thought about New Space, and why they supported or rejected South Korea's investment in New Space and in outer space more broadly.

This paper contributes to science and technology studies (STS) in two ways. First, it theorizes emergent forms of capitalism in outer space by illustrating how capitalism in outer space is closely informed by state-driven capitalist accumulation free from state control or military intervention. Rather, it places New Space, and capitalism in outer space, as situated in the history and politics that shape market relations on Earth (Messeri 2016).

Second, it contributes to post-colonial STS by conceptualizing the neocoloniality of post-colonial science and technology projects, by showing how South Korea's developmental New Space participates in colonized networks informed by capitalist modernity. Specifically, I analyse how South Korea's developmental New Space shapes neocolonial inter-Asian market relations, connecting to the theme of inter-Asian technocapitalism of this ST&HV Special Issue. South Korean policy papers recommend an export-oriented model that encourages its New Space partners to export satellite technologies to what it calls “space latecomers” such as Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. South Korean policymakers are aware that local space industries cannot currently compete with other Western space powers, but that Korea can potentially dominate markets in Southeast Asia. Policymakers use this possibility to project potential wealth and national prosperity for South Koreans, and to convince the public of the importance of the privatization of outer space.

My analysis of interviews with people critiquing developmental New Space and others enthusiastic about New Space serves to articulate spatio-temporal pluralization when thinking about space futures (Valentine and Hassoun 2019). It also shows how divided the South Korean public is about new developments in outer space. South Korea's post-coloniality, marked by Cold War militarized developmentalism, is taking a neocolonial turn in outer space and space exploration (Bawaka Country et al. 2020; Sammler and Lynch 2021; Shammas and Holen 2019; Trevino 2020; Utrata 2023). Post-colonial interventions in space studies (Bekus 2022; Redfield 2002), and the intersections of post-colonial studies and capitalism (Appel 2019; Bear 2020; Mezzadra 2011) provide frameworks to understand how a formerly colonized nation, South Korea, after developing capitalist and technological capacities to participate in the New Space race, eagerly participates in novel forms of outer space capitalism and neocolonialism. Critical scholarship about New Space in the United States and Europe has analysed power and coloniality by framing Silicon Valley as a metropole (Bawaka Country et al. 2020; Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Parker 2009; Sammler and Lynch 2021; Shammas and Holen 2019; Trevino 2020). Indeed, most space studies focus on space programs in the Global North, which have long been the center of advances in space technology (Dickens 2023; Sage 2014; Vidmar et al. 2020). I argue that examining neocolonial inter-Asian market relations through South Korea's New Space reveals that no analysis of New Space can be decontextualized from the geopolitical and neoliberal hierarchies that have structured global capitalism since the Cold War.

While developmentalism and neocolonialism is one kind of a political economic agenda, other space futures emerge in South Korea through the rejection of developmental New Space by some citizens. For example, since late 2023, a loosely organized network of individuals has been mobilizing under the name People Opposing Space Militarization and Rocket Launches (Ujugunsahwawa Rok'ennpalsarŭl Pandaehanŭn Saramdŭl—우주군사화와 로켓발사를 반대하는 사람들—or POSM in short). This group combines an ideological critique of the militarization and privatization of outer space with practical concerns about the environmental consequences of rocket launches. Led by Choi Sung-hee, a seasoned anti-military activist based on Jeju Island, People Opposing Space Militarization (POSM) challenges dominant developmental narratives that position space as the next frontier of national economic growth. Instead, POSM advocates for preserving outer space “as is”—not as a site of expansionist ambition but as a domain of shared humanity and ecological stewardship. This article situates this emerging grassroots critique within the broader historical context of militarized developmentalism and the neocolonial dimensions of South Korea's New Space initiatives.

Developmental New Space in South Korea

New Space is a term coined by US space entrepreneur Rick Tumlinson, who contributed to building the new commercial space industry in his country as early as the late 1980s. New Space signifies a break, or a renewal, from the Cold War–era state-centered visions of space exploration. Having a commercialized space industry relatively untethered from state planning and regulation is deemed an important component of new levels of market freedom—hence the “New” in New Space (Shammas and Holen 2019; Valentine 2012).

However, recent scholarship on New Space in the United States and the West shows how New Space is more embedded in state–corporate relations and the history of colonialism than billionaires like to portray (Utrata 2023). Drawing on the history of corporations spearheading imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries, political scientist Utrata documents the same discourse and funding structures in the United States shaping corporate–state relations in outer space. Legal scholar Patrick Salin (2001) makes two similar observations on the commercialization of outer space at the turn of the twenty-first century in the United States: first, that private space companies are increasingly executing national interests in outer space, able to perform activities that cannot be directly sponsored by the state; and second, that commercial competition is another way for nations to increase their influence in the international sphere. Some scholars have argued that the rise in public–private partnerships in space projects and the rise of New Space is the result of a confluence between the cost-effectiveness of the private sector, the rising public profile of outer space and renewed international competition (Melamed et al. 2024).

Scholarship on New Space in Asian countries has also increasingly focused on the relation between New Space and the military. For example, studies on Chinese New Space describe the close cooperation between the state and privatization efforts to achieve the state's “military-civilian integration” strategy (Goswami 2018; Nie 2020). Studies on Japanese New Space have focused on its “market-to-the-military” strategy where national security has become the centerpiece of the Japanese space development strategy (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010). As such, recent scholarship points to the importance of contextualizing developments in New Space in the specific history of public–private partnerships in each nation state, and in shifting international relations (Melamed et al. 2024). These insights are aligned with the OECD's (2022) emphasis that commercial activities in space are “firmly grounded in national innovation frameworks where different actors, policies and governing institutions constitute a multi-layered and interdependent system.”

Drawing on existing research, I argue that a historical and material analysis of New Space in South Korea reveals a much closer relation between New Space and the militarized developmental agendas of the nation state than has been suggested by South Korean policymakers. What makes South Korea's developmental New Space unique is that it emerges in the context of technological developmentalism (Kim 2017) in the post-colonial nation's history. In this section, I analyse how policy, media and public education projects in South Korea construct what I call “developmental New Space,” highlighting how developmentalism informs the discourse, understanding and policymaking of New Space in South Korea.

Developmentalism or “desarrollismo” was a term first coined by Latin American authors to describe the subscription by economists in post-colonial nations after 1945 to the idea that, through proper economic policies, they would become as technologically advanced and as wealthy as countries in the North (Wallerstein 2005). Developmentalism, according to historian Arif Dirlik (2012, 30), is:

An ideological orientation characterized by the fetishization of development, or the attribution of development of the power of a natural (or even, divine) force which humans can resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation or poverty.

Developmentalism has been central to the formation of the South Korean state (Kim 2017; Vu 2007). The desire for post-colonial national development in South Korea reinforced statist and state-centered development models that development studies scholar Hae-Yung Song (2020) described as “fetishism of national development.” Sociologist Eun-Sung Kim (2017) has framed South Korea's science research policy and South Korea's sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim 2009) through “technological developmentalism,” or the idea that technology is the means for national economic growth.

Historically, the developmental South Korean state has relied on mobilizing the public to support programs such as the Saemaeul Undong or “New Village Movement,” a government-led developmental movement to modernize rural life and to implement modern infrastructures (Park 2012). Educational programs and nationalist propaganda were used to promote the developmental movement (Hong, Park and Yang 2023; Sonn and Gimm 2013). Although unfolding in a democratized context rather than under authoritarian rule, contemporary developmentalism in outer space similarly operates by mobilizing the public's excitement about—and emotional investment in—outer space as a national project. To promote public interest and investment in outer space, space museums have been constructed near space launch facilities in South Korea. For instance, the Naro Space Museum next to the space launch station in Goheung, South Korea, run by Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), emphasizes capitalist and developmentalist futures in South Korea to its audience.

One of the educational videos shown at the Naro Space Museum is a speculative vision for an international and intergalactic space hotel, run by South Korean space entrepreneurs. The narrator of the video excitedly introduces “South Korea's development of a space hotel” and shows how South Korea's economic possibilities will be transformed through investment in outer space. A parent of a child who visited the space museum told me in an interview:

We came to visit the museum all the way from Seoul because our daughter is interested in outer space. She wants to become an astronaut one day and work at the International Space Station. We wanted to support her future dreams. These days, it seems like many South Korean kids want to go to outer space and become astronauts or work in space. I think this is great for the future of our nation. (Interview, 2023)

Naro Space Museum's exhibits and events are geared toward children, who are presented as the generation of humans who will get to travel more extensively, live in and settle outer space at some point in the future. Lee, a science educator based in Goheung, told me this about the space museum:

The children are the future of Korea, and outer space is the future of the children. We need to do more to promote interest in outer space for the future of our nation. America's NASA and space agencies in other countries spend a lot of budget and dedication on education and outreach about outer space. We need to do the same if we are to not lose out in the space race. (Interview, 2023)

Furthermore, space museums frame New Space as an important part of the success of the national space program. The outer space exhibition at the Jeju Aerospace Museum in Jeju Island concludes with a video introducing three different New Space companies that were involved in the launch of the Nuri rocket: Justek, Kairospace and Lumir. The video explains that each company provided different types of satellites for the rocket launched in 2022. Then, the video lauds the successful launch of rocket Nuri for finally providing a “comfortable launch environment” for South Korean New Space companies. The video emphasizes that due to the success of Nuri, South Korean New Space companies can now launch their satellites from South Korean soil, instead of having to transport their satellites to other countries such as Australia, Brazil or the United States—countries from which satellites had been launched before South Korea developed its own launch capacity (Choi 2021; Park 2023). As such, in educational videos and museum narratives aimed at the public, the success of New Space and the national space program are intertwined—framed together as markers of national development, achievement and progress.

In South Korean media and policy documents, New Space is framed as the next logical step for South Korea's economic development. Beginning in 2018, a series of policy papers published by the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) emphasized the importance of New Space for increasing South Korean competitiveness in outer space. The STEPI is a government-funded and government-run think tank and research institute based in Sejong City, South Korea. Established in 1987, it serves as the nation's central body overseeing research and policy development in science and technology. In the 2018 policy paper Strategies for Becoming a Space Technology Power, the authors define New Space as:

A shift from a government-centered industrial ecosystem where the government funded most space-related activities and purchased hardware developed by a large civil company, toward a new model based on entrepreneurial activity and small corporations. (AN et al. 2018, 6)

In this 2018 report, the researchers at STEPI emphasize the difference between “Old Space” and “New Space,” where “Old Space” was driven by a “national” motive such as the military, national security, economic development, scientific knowledge and national prestige, while New Space is driven by a “profit” motive. The main actors for Old Space are state research centers and large corporations, while the main actors for New Space are small and medium-sized corporations and start-ups. They characterize Old Space as “Conservative, risk-averse, trust-based,” and New Space as “Innovative, risk-taking, high-risk.” These distinctions have been used in policy circles globally, where policymakers and New Space advocates accept New Space as the neoliberal alternative to state-centered policies and interventions in outer space (Parker 2009; Vidmar et al. 2020).

While the authors of the STEPI report (AN et al. 2018, 6) emphasize that New Space is a radical departure from state-centered Old Space, the policy recommendations for New Space reiterate developmentalist discourses. New Space is prescribed as the next step in South Korean developmentalism, at a time when other industries are becoming more vulnerable to foreign competitors (An et al. 2021). One of the stated reasons for investing in New Space is that South Korean manufacturers of automobiles, ships and smartphones, which successfully found global markets, are losing their dominance as global competition intensifies (AN et al. 2018). They identify outer space as a potential market to which South Korean manufacturing companies can shift their attention, especially given South Korea's strengths in Information and Communication technologies (ICT). In a 2020 report in STEPI, the authors urge for a policy to promote New Space because “there is a limit to the ability to generate profit through government-centered space development” (AN et al. 2020). Another policy paper states:

In this paradigm shift toward private sector–driven space development, there needs to be a national-level space agency that can address technological innovation and changes in the industry. With these preparations, South Korea will be able to claim a leadership role as the 7th global space power. (AN 2022)

In another STEPI report, a chart illustrating a positive trade balance is included to show that continued investment in space industries goes hand in hand with national economic growth (AN et al. 2018, 15). The quantification of a positive trade balance is central to South Korea's developmentalist imaginary. The report goes on to analyse the current New Space market in South Korea and recommends priority areas to maximize profit. The report notes that in 2016 South Korean space industries’ exports increased by 21.5 percent, while imports decreased by 13 percent. Despite celebrating marked increases in the export of space technologies, the authors of the STEPI report lament that South Korea's satellite technology has reached a “global standard” (AN et al. 2020). To remedy this lag and to boost the space industry, the authors urge increased governmental support. According to the report, as of 2020, the South Korean government planned subsidies worth USD3 million for research and development, while also subsidizing satellite export. It planned to spend another USD15 million on additional support for the space industry over the next 5 years. The recommendation for increased governmental support and interest in space industries ironically shows the centrality of governmental funding that makes New Space possible in South Korea.

The STEPI reports emphasize that outer space is the only logical venue through which South Korea can maintain its strength as a developmental power and keep its status as the 13th largest nation by GDP, a measure routinely used by the South Korean state to boast how far the nation has come since the Korean War. As Dirlik has pointed out, the ideology of developmentalism is a belief that a negative trade balance and lack of development is correlated with poverty or loss of power. From participant observation and interviews, I have learned that many people that support South Korea's space program and New Space also tend to believe that South Korea would not have recovered from the ashes of the Korean War (1950–53) and ensuing poverty if not for the authoritarian dictatorships that pursued developmental and modernization projects. Many respondents were very conscious that they can lose their newfound prosperity if they do not keep up with the momentum of developmentalism by developing new markets to export South Korean products.

Thus, the discourse of continuing developmentalism in outer space resonates in many communities affected by South Korea's space program and related infrastructures. The belief in the importance of maintaining a developmental pace is visible in media depictions of New Space. From major news outlets to online news companies, South Korean media have reported on New Space in terms of securing a national future. Media analysis of New Space reveals what this emergent form of space exploration signifies for the South Korean state.

One news outlet stated that “Korean space companies have invested a lot” but New Space is “only sustainable through obtaining new markets and specialization” (Kil 2022). Another reported “Korea's New Space Age is here” (Choi 2023b) in an article featuring an interview with Su Jong Kim, CEO of Innospace, one of the major New Space companies in South Korea. Kim says in the interview: “The opportunity to knock on the global space launch market has been opened…We will continue to develop space launch capacities and expand our corporate capacities to focus on entering the global space market” (Choi 2023b). His interview was framed as creating new market opportunities for South Korea.

Despite the binary division between “Old Space” and “New Space” drawn by policymakers, South Korean New Space is enfolded under a developmentalist umbrella in policy, public education programs and everyday discourse. Park, a local in Goheung and an outer space enthusiast who has been fully supportive of South Korea building its first space launch station in Goheung in 2009, told me that South Korea needs to “rush” and “make its mark” in outer space before the space market becomes saturated. He said to me:

I worry that outer space is quickly becoming a red ocean where it is going to be harder for South Korean companies to enter the market. I know that South Korea has a lot of potential to grow its economy through investing in outer space technologies. But South Korean companies will lag if it does not make its mark in outer space now. (Interview, 2023)

As Peter Redfield (2002, 810) writes in his analysis of the Space Center in French Guiana, “the very framing of development projects contains a modernist sensibility, one in which certain people are moving ahead and others left behind.” As in Redfield's post-colonial analysis of French Guiana, the problems of modernity and development are foregrounded in South Korea's policy recommendations, media discourse, public education projects and some public sentiments. Such developmentalism has a longer historical connection to militarism in post-colonial South Korea.

Militarized Developmentalism and the Privatization of Outer Space in South Korea

Militarized developmentalism in South Korea emerges from its unique post-colonial experience of Japanese colonization and the Korean War which created the “division system” (Paik 2011) between North and South Korea and entrenched the Cold War on the peninsula, as well as the authoritarian dictatorships in South Korea that spearheaded developmental and modernization projects (Moon 2005). South Korea's unique post-coloniality can be understood through the framework of militarized developmentalism. Historian Peter Kwon (2019) has examined the connection between state-sponsored defense industries and private sector developments in 1970s South Korea. He shows how militarized modernization in South Korea equipped Korean manufacturers with technological assistance, which aided them in becoming major global exporters.

In South Korea's post-colonial history, military dictatorships, especially that of Park Chung Hee (1961–79), played a central role in modernizing and industrializing the nation. Park Chung Hee's regime has been characterized as a “developmental state” (Amsden 1989; Evans and Stephens 1988; Johnson 1987). Park's developmental state aimed to create a wealthy country through science and technology (Kim 2017). Sociologist Seungsook Moon (2005) has coined the term “militarized modernity” to describe the centrality of the military and militarism in South Korea's industrialization. Historian Carter Eckert (2016) has traced Park regime's militarism back to Park's exposure to Japanese militarism in colonized Manchuria (1934–45).

Drawing on Moon's and Eckert's theorization, Kwon shows how the Park regime achieved the dual agendas of establishing a home-grown weapons production system and a thriving private sector. According to Kwon, subsequent South Korean governments have maintained Park's “parallel track” strategy of defense and civilian industries as military expansion, so commercial high-tech industrial advancement went side by side in South Korea. Kwon identifies four characteristics of South Korean developmentalism: Export-centered (promotion of Korean export products for profitability), Economic Growth (expansion of the government's defense spending; increase in tax), Expansion of Government Investment (investment in public and private sector defense technology and R&D) and Domestic Arms Production (increase in local productivity and employment rates in defense manufacturing).

These four factors are central to South Korea's New Space policies. One of the “spillovers” of the military industry was satellite technology and GPS navigation, two key technologies in contemporary space industries. Currently, the South Korean Agency for Defense Development (ADD) is pitting Korean Aerospace Industry and Hanwha Space, two major space industry corporations in South Korea, against each other in a competition to win a government contract for building microsatellites. The ADD will decide the winner of the contract between the two competitors in 2027. Building on this momentum, Hanwha is planning to open a new launch base in the southern part of Jeju Island.

“I felt a sense of doom come over me, knowing that Jeju has now come this far in becoming the nation's base for space exploitation,” Sung-hee, an activist against the militarization and privatization of space, told me after the 4 December launch on the sea in Jeju. Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Aerospace are two related companies that received technology transfers from the South Korean ADD. The ADD transferred technology to Hanwha by co-developing the launch capacity for rocket Nuri. The December 2023 launch was the first successful satellite launch by a South Korean private corporation.

While national media lauded the successful satellite launch as signaling a new stage of New Space in South Korea, Sung-hee, who has long been vocal about the connection between militarization and privatization of outer space, felt a sense of despair when she saw the rocket take off from the very sea she has fought to be free of military presence. She said:

I see militarization and privatization as two horses (ssangdumacha) pulling the wagon of the South Korean nation. Militarization and Privatization work in tandem to support South Korea's mission to be competitive in the space industries and in outer space. (Interview, 2023)

Jeju Island, where Sung-hee's anti-naval base and peace activism have taken place, epitomizes the relations between militarism and developmentalism in South Korean history. With a humid subtropical climate, Jeju is in the southernmost part of the Korean peninsula, where the Asian continent meets the Pacific Ocean. Jeju is currently the largest island in Korea both for population and landmass; it has a population of 700,000. Jeju is rapidly becoming a primary destination in South Korea for the fledgling commercial space industry: New Space private companies such as Hanwha, Contec, IOPS, SIIS and Perigee Aerospace have all set up their research and development centers in Jeju.

The Jeju provincial government has been actively recruiting space industries to the island and promoting New Space. In May 2023, it held a “Jeju Space Day” at the provincial office and invited the leaders of New Space companies based in Jeju, to create a “sustainable New Space ecosystem” (Kang 2023). Each of the companies based in Jeju specialize in different aspects of the New Space market. Contec specializes in the collection, distribution and use of satellite data and is currently expanding its satellite base in the southwest of Jeju Island. Perigee Aerospace focuses on launch capacities. In 2021, it was the first civilian company to attempt a rocket launch in Jeju, but the launch failed. IOPS provides consulting for tracking and managing satellites and is currently collaborating with the Satellite Operations Center, which is a military and security facility based in the eastern part of Jeju. SIIS is a subsidiary company of Satrec Initiative and specializes in producing ultra-high-resolution satellite images. These space facilities are promoted as potential sources of high-income employment and increased tourism revenue to residents in Jeju, which has been effective at eliciting local support for space industries (Jeon 2025). News media frame the local economic gains of the space industry as emblematic of national progress, portraying Jeju as the foundational “base” of a burgeoning national space economy (Jwa 2025).

Jeju also holds a distinctive place in the national imaginary as the site of a brutal massacre which began on 3 April 1948. Sanctioned by both the United States and the newly formed South Korean state, at least 30,000 people were killed by the militia in the name of anti-communism and protecting the capitalist economy. Activists like Sung-hee revisit the history of the 3 April incident to articulate the importance of complete demilitarization of Jeju Island. The activists now see the expansion of South Korea's space program in Jeju as another threat to demilitarizing the island. Jeju has been historically used as a military base by the Japanese colonial government, US military and the South Korean military due to its strategic location in the Pacific, between China and Japan.

The US military and South Korean military continue to use the strategic location of Jeju Island in the name of anti-communism and national security against a perceived threat from North Korea and the ongoing Korean War. ² National security against North Korea is often invoked in media and policy papers as a reason for developing military technologies as well as satellite technologies for surveillance and monitoring. This historical background explains why activists claim that the state is again promoting harm and trauma by allowing corporations to use the land and ocean of Jeju Island to develop militarized industrial output such as space rockets (Kim 2024). The collage map below of Jeju Island, created by Sung-hee, illustrates how the land and ocean of Jeju are being used by the military and commercial space industries (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Collage map of military and commercial space facilities in Jeju Island, made by Choi Sung-hee (2023b). https://ecosophialab.com/몸살-앓는-제주-③-제주를-항공우주전쟁섬이-되게-할/?fbclid=IwAR2pApBM-6Ukgzg9IDgDUnjt_mSe6YcAOsWJaHAJjJ1rK7Q_YT6KEBtihSU. On the map, Figures numbered 1~7 and Figure 10 indicate facilities that already exist or have been fully constructed. Figure 8 illustrates a facility currently under construction, while Figures 9 and 12 represent facilities that are near completion. Figure 11 denotes a facility that is still in the planning stages and have not yet begun construction. Round-shaped markers indicate satellite antennas and radomes. The facilities are as follows, marked by numbers:

Moseulbong Radar (Taejŏng-ŭp)

Sung-hee explained that she had designed the collage map to show that Jeju Island is “under assault” by militarized and privatized interests in outer space, and to show how these processes are interconnected. For example, she pointed out that Hanwha space center, an institution for research and development of space rockets and satellites, is being built a mere ten minutes by car from the Kangjŏng naval base, officially called the Civilian-Military Complex. She told me:

As you can see, Kangjŏng naval base is a swift ten-minute car ride from the Hanwha space center. The roads to the naval base have been continuously expanding and newly paved over the past decade, to facilitate the easy movement of the military in and out of the naval base. Now these roads can easily be used to transport the rockets made in the Hanwha space center to the naval base for their launch in the ocean. This is what they mean by the ridiculous euphemism, civilian-military complex. (Interview, 2024)

Scholars of militarism have pointed out that neoliberalism does not mean the end of militarism; rather, it changes the contours of militarism (Mabee and Vucetic 2018). ³ As Sung-hee pointed out, the geographic proximity between the Hanwha space center and Kangjŏng naval base illustrates that the relations between capital and the military are going to become even tighter through the concurrent process of militarization and privatization of outer space. New Space in South Korea takes militarism to new markets and new possibilities, rather than representing a radical break from the history of militarized developmentalism.

Neocolonialism and Developmental New Space in Inter-Asian Relations

To make outer space profitable, the South Korean state has been encouraging its New Space partners to export satellite technologies to what it calls “space latecomers” such as Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. South Korean companies like Satrec Initiative have already been exporting its satellite technology to Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia. As examined above, South Korean New Space is informed by a developmental model based on export-centered industries in close cooperation with the military and the state. The label “space latecomers” illustrates that South Korean policymakers subscribe to an economic developmental model and modernization theory reminiscent of economist William Rostow's (1959), with distinct stages of development and advancement, where each nation must strive for the next “stage” of development. Creation of new markets and exporting surplus capital to underdeveloped or undeveloped regions is also a tactic that has been analysed in relation to capitalism and outer space (Shammas and Holen 2019).

It may seem that exporting satellite technology to “space latecomers” can equalize access to the internet. Low Earth orbit satellites can deliver broadband internet to areas such as islands where 5G is hard to obtain. For instance, US-based entrepreneur Elon Musk's New Space company Starlink advertises itself as an equalizer, delivering internet access to underserved areas (Hillebrand 2025). However, private control of technology and markets can increase inequality instead of ameliorating it. Activist Sung-hee sees this export model as a form of neocolonialism. She said:

South Korea is using less developed countries in Southeast Asia and Africa as a market to dump its older technology and products. These companies will keep searching for new markets and they will never stop trying to export whatever they can, whether that's space rocket technology or weapons, regardless of what kinds of wars and conflict they may cause. (Interview, 2023)

Geographer Uma Kothari (2006) has theorized mainstream forms of economic development as a neocolonial project of modernity. Neocolonialism, in relation to development cooperation, is manifest through “the terms of trade, the need for aid, the repatriation of profits, and technological dependency” (Smith 1996, 57). Post-colonial critiques see official development assistance, or ODA, as a form of neocolonialism that reinforces the traditional hierarchies of the Global North and South. However, South Korea holds an interesting place in the history of development and modernity, as the first recipient of aid from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee to become a donor in 2010. As such, post-colonial critics have been reluctant to criticize South Korea's role in global market relations and its participation in ODA as neocolonial. However, South Korea's status as a “middle power” is used by traditional Western donor nations to justify aid systems and policies and thus hold over the development aid debate (Kim and Garland 2019).

In the STEPI series of policy papers discussed previously, especially in the 2020 report, the authors suggest several strategies for ensuring that South Korean New Space companies successfully enter what they call a global “Value Chain” of space industries. One of the recommendations they make is to expand the market based on cooperation between countries through ODA. South Korean policy papers often cite Japanese ODA funding to Vietnam as a model for exporting satellites to Southeast Asia. The Japanese ODA in question was called the “Project for Disaster and Climate Change Countermeasure Using Earth Observation Satellite,” which entailed financing of an earth observation satellite, equipment and related facilities for satellite development (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2022; Lee 2020). Through this project, the Japanese government loaned 18,871 million Yen (about USD128 million) to the Vietnamese government, to be repaid over 40 years with 0.11 annual interest rate starting in 2022. While it could be argued that this type of ODA helps underdeveloped countries in areas of space exploration and satellite data utilization, ODAs place underdeveloped nations in a perpetually indebted relation to the loaning nations.

Hwang, a head policy researcher at the KARI said in an interview with news media that:

For New Space to develop in South Korea, we need to get demand from foreign markets. ODA or Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) can be an alternative. This is in fact the realm of the government, but it works through for example developing satellites for space latecomers. Japan exported two satellites to Vietnam through EDCF. Vietnam will pay back the loans over time. Through these types of venues, we can develop and display South Korean technology globally, and then create more demand [for South Korean exports in space]. (Kim 2022)

In line with these recommendations, in 2023, KARI signed a contract with Thailand's Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency to provide consultation for the construction of Thailand's space launch station. At the request of the Thai government, South Korea agreed to conduct a joint feasibility study for the establishment of a space launch site in Thailand. The implementation agreement outlines six key areas of assessment: selecting an appropriate location, developing a viable business model, estimating construction costs, evaluating launch licensing and safety regulations and planning the operation of the launch site and its facilities. South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT projects this contract as the first step toward major South Korean New Space companies to expand into markets in Southeast Asia (Jeong-Ho Lee 2023; Young-Ae Lee 2023).

“It's a rat race” says peace activist Sung-hee. “As long as we live in capitalist modernity, companies and nations will compete and fight for dominance, even all the way to outer space.” She added that South Korea is moving toward imperialism since it is a highly militarized and developed country. South Korea is searching for new markets, a “spatial fix” (Shammas and Holen 2019) to export its militarized and industrialized goods. As such, South Korea's militarized developmentalism has informed “developmental New Space,” which is being extended to what it calls “space latecomer” Southeast Asian nations, informing neocolonial inter-Asian market relations in outer space.

Conclusion: Rejecting Developmental New Space

Developmentalism in post-colonial South Korea has been a political and economic system backed by institutions such as the state and the military. Technological developmentalism (Kim 2008, 2017) and militarized developmentalism have been defining features of South Korea's modernity, also informing contemporary privatization of outer space. However, there are many in South Korea, like Sung-hee, who reject militarized developmentalism in outer space. Those who gathered in December 2023 to protest the launch of the Nuri satellite rocket from Jeju Island reject the use of outer space for militarized and commercial purposes and believe that space should be left for peaceful and communal uses only.

People who gathered at the Jeju Island protest on 4 December 2023 were a heterogenous group of activists and concerned citizens. The protest was organized in haste, as they were not informed about the satellite test launch until two days before the event. Sung-hee scrambled to organize her network and resources and put the event together in less than two days. The locals were not even informed of the exact time of the launch despite the potential environmental impact that a rocket launch can cause. Despite the rush to organize the protest, about 30 people were able to gather in time.

People who gathered talked about how much they loved their island and the ocean, and why they did not want private corporations to pollute the ocean in the name of space exploration and the promise of economic development. They emphasized their objection to Hanwha's involvement in the arms industry, and the connection between satellite rockets and militarization. In addition to protest, there was singing and communal sharing of food and drinks. In this moment of communal sharing and belonging, an alternative spatio-temporal horizon for space exploration was being created; one that values peace, human and nonhuman lives, demilitarization and space futures not contingent on developmentalism. Opposing militarized space industries challenges the very fabric of South Korean society that has been built on militarized developmentalism. One participant of the protest, Hwang Yong-Woon, told me:

What is the point of going to outer space if we destroy the environment on Earth along the process? And what outer space will be left for the rest of us if it's all owned by private corporations? (Interview, 2024)

While developmentalism is a prominent ideology backed by policy, many activist communities in South Korea have been actively pushing back on developmental agendas on land as well as in outer space. Activists based in Jeju Island see privatization of outer space as an extension of Jeju's militarized developmental policies that have been destroying their community and environment. Hong Young-Cheol, an environmental and civic activist based in Jeju, told me that the South Korean state continues to trigger harm and trauma through continued militarized developmental projects in Jeju. His activism focuses on stopping a rampant developmental agenda, especially around tourism and the construction of the second airport. He said:

The plan to build the second airport in Jeju is a continuation of the militarized developmental agenda to bring more tourists to the island and make Jeju the “second Hawai‘i’, which will be not only environmentally destructive but also destructive for the sustainability of locals” livelihood. I think the development of outer space for military and capitalist purposes is a continuation of these developmental schemes that only really benefit the capitalists like Hanwha. (Interview, 2022)

One of the militarized developmental projects that Hong discussed with me is the Jungmun tourist complex, a giant resort area in the south of Jeju comprising hotels, museums, aquariums, duty free shopping, golf courses and a convention center. Jungmun is also the place where the satellite was launched on 4 December. This place used to be called Baeritnae, meaning “a river where the stars are falling.” Due to the developmental project led by the military dictatorship of President Park in the 1970s, people from Baeritnae village were forced to move, and their lives were uprooted. Hong emphasized that the village used to be known as a great place to watch the stars from the rivers. The activists that gathered on 4 December did not think it was an accident that the Hanwha satellite launch took place in Jungmun. It is now a tourist area where local relations with land and sea have been displaced and destroyed through developmental schemas, which makes it easy to repurpose Jungmun for other militarized developmental projects such as rocket launches.

Developmentalism is a belief in continual and perpetual economic growth. It has often come at the cost of the loss of land and livelihood of those without capital or power. Another space activist, San-Ja, told me that to achieve peace in outer space, “we should leave it as it is.” These sentiments signal caution against the privatization of outer space. The POSM members, who are pushing back against rampant development of Jeju, believe that spaces like Baeritnae, where everyone can watch the stars together, should be protected, and that access to outer space should be protected as a human right that should not be monopolized by a few. These activists draw on ideals of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) that stated outer space should only be used for peaceful purposes and declared all interplanetary bodies as a common good for humanity.

This paper has shown that a post-colonial horizon does not grant an anti-colonial possibility. Rather, South Korea's post-colonial militarized developmentalism has participated in colonized networks informed by capitalist modernity. New Space in South Korea does not represent a radical departure from South Korea's history of militarized developmental economic policies. Couched in terms of futurity and exploration, especially for the next generation, New Space extends militarized developmentalism into emerging markets and gives it newfound sources of excitement and justification. Development of space museums and public education programs serve as ways to convince the public of the importance of investing in New Space for the next generation of South Koreans. News media in South Korea also frame New Space as a vehicle to ensure continued national economic success and to not “lag behind” in the global race to outer space.

Recent studies on New Space in contexts such as the United States and other Asian countries have also emphasized the connection between nation state, the military and privatization of outer space. What makes South Korea's developmental New Space unique is how tethered New Space is to the nation's militarized developmental trajectory, and how the commercialization of outer space is framed through national development by policy experts, media and the public. Although the framework of “developmental New Space” as an emergent form of capitalism in outer space is specific to South Korea's economic and political history, it encourages researchers studying New Space elsewhere to closely examine how New Space in each context has evolved in relation to shifting public–private partnerships, the military and the state.

Furthermore, an examination of the inter-Asian market relations created through South Korean New Space policies and activities reveals the neocolonialism of ODAs and plans to export New Space products to “space latecomers.” A militarized developmental agenda to expand South Korean influence and market share informs South Korea's participation in inter-Asian outer space networks and markets. As such, New Space cannot be decontextualized from the history of post-Cold War and post-colonial market relations that have structured global capitalism and hierarchies between the Global South and North.

Lastly, space activists in South Korea call for a radical departure from developmentalism and coloniality, and urge the public to imagine outer space futures and possibilities not contingent on militarized developmentalism. The People Opposing Space Militarization and Rocket Launches (POSM) group continue to organize against what they see as militarized developmentalism of New Space. The rejection of New Space by some South Koreans, and its wholehearted embrace by others, shows that despite the South Korean state's attempt to mobilize the public to support developmental New Space, the public is largely divided over meanings of national futures and investments in outer space.