With the noted intelligence failures prior to the September 11 attacks and the 2003 Iraq War, the US intelligence community has recognized the need to acquire new, outside expertise to mitigate against future intelligence breakdowns. This recent attention on intelligence outreach provides Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars with an opportunity to consider the role they might play in these efforts, as well as the various opportunities and difficulties that can shape these relationships, and the types of knowledge that can be produced and known from engagements with these secret communities. This paper provides a reflection on how two STS scholars have attempted to intervene into intelligence and the lessons learned.
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