Stank and Russell (2002) present arguments that refute Prawat's two-part thesis that Dewey underwent a dramatic midcareer change in his philosophy and that this change drew heavily on Pence's metaphysics. In response to this critique, Prawat presents additional evidence to support his claim that a comparison of the 1910 and 1933 versions of How We Think reveals a major change in Dewey's views about inductionism. Prawat also presents new evidence to support the claim that this shift occurred at midcareer (i.e., 1915) and that the resulting change in philosophical outlook maps closely onto Pence's earlier, groundbreaking work on inquiry and epistemology.
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