Abstract
This study investigates the effect of adopting right-to-work on unfair labor practice charges filed at the National Labor Relations Board. Most charges accompany union elections, which are expected to decrease under right-to-work. However, this work's synthetic control method results show that unfair labor practice trends in rates and success are generally unaffected by right-to-work adoption. Underlying these stable rates of filing and success is a more resource-intensive strategy where federations collaborate on charges with their constituent members. Using the cases of Michigan and Indiana, which both adopted right-to-work in 2012 and a unique dataset of all charges filed from 2000 to 2019, I show that legal mobilization is one union activity that adjusts under right-to-work as unions and federations look to protect workers.
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