Abstract
State preemption of local government discretion is examined through the lenses of county cooperation with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and “immigration federalism.” Through a mixed-method approach, we examine why counties collaborate with ICE as well as how and why they deviate from state preemptions on local support for immigration. Analysis of a sample restricted to Georgia and Texas, states with especially robust preemptive anti-immigrant laws, suggests that special interests—those related to immigrant-dependent industries important to county economies—have significant influence over county decisions to minimize cooperation with ICE.
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