The United States is a country of many overlapping local governments. Theoretical explorations of the potential influence of this institutional arrangement abound; however, empirical evidence as the influence of such an arrangement on local public sector remains relatively thin. Using a county-level data set from 1972 to 2012, this overlap problem is explored. The results suggest that a positive relationship between the jurisdictional overlap and the size of local public workforce amounting to approximately a 1 percent increase in employment or an increase of less than one full-time equivalent employee.
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