This study explores the Great Recession’s effect on the commitment by the city of Dallas, Texas, to its private partners in seventeen tax increment financing (TIF) districts. What effect did the recession have on private investment in public–private partnerships? Did the recession cause a loss of credibility in the city’s commitment, resulting in lower levels of private investment? Was there a lasting structural change in the determinants of private participation stemming from the recession? Results from a random effects Tobit model show that the city’s proposed budget for each TIF district was a significant determinant of the level of private investment. However, during the recession, the actual amount of investment by the city was essential to reassuring private investors of the city’s commitment.
AgranoffRobertMcGuireMichael. 2001. American federalism and the search for models of management. Public Administration Review61:671–81.
2.
AlterCatherineHageJerald. 1993. Organizations working together. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
3.
AnsellChrisGashAlison. 2008. Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory18:543–71.
4.
BardachEugene. 1998. Getting agencies to work together: The practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
5.
BlandRobert L.2013. A budgeting guide for local government. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: ICMA Press.
6.
BovairdTony. 2004. Public–private partnerships: From contested concepts to prevalent practice. International Review of Administrative Sciences70:199–215.
7.
BoyneGeorge A.1998. Competitive tendering in local government: A review of theory and evidence. Public Administration76:695–712.
8.
BrudneyJeffrey L.FernandezSergioRyuJay EunghaWrightDeil S.. 2005. Exploring and explaining contracting out: Patterns among the American states. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory15:393–419.
9.
BrysonJohn M.CrosbyBarbara C.StoneMelissa Middleton. 2006. The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. Public Administration Review66:44–55.
10.
ByrnePaul F.2006. Determinants of property value growth for tax increment financing districts. Economic Development Quarterly20:317–29.
11.
CarlinoGerald A.2011. Three keys to the city: Resources, agglomeration economies, and sorting. Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of PhiladelphiaQ3:1–13.
DyeRichard F.MerrimanDavid F.. 2000. The effects of tax increment financing on economic development. Journal of Urban Economics47:306–28.
14.
FeiockRichard C.2013. The institutional collective action framework. Policy Studies Journal41:397–425.
15.
FeiockRichard C.SteinackerAnnetteParkHyung Jun. 2009. Institutional collective action and economic development joint ventures. Public Administration Review69:256–70.
16.
FleishmanRachel. 2009. To participate or not to participate? Incentives and obstacles for collaboration. In The collaborative public manager: New ideas for the twenty-first century, ed. O’LearyRosemaryBinghamLisa, 31–52. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
17.
GrayBarbara. 1989. Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
18.
HawkinsChristopher V.AndrewSimon A.. 2010. Linking cooperative arrangements and economic development strategies: An institutional collection action framework. International Review of Public Administration15:1–16.
19.
JohnstoneNickWoodLibby. 2001. Private firms and public water: Realising social and environmental objectives in developing countries. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
20.
KenyonDaphne A.LangleyAdam H.PaquinBethany P.. 2012. Rethinking property tax incentives for business. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute for Land Policy.
21.
KlijnErik-HansTeismanGeert R.. 2005. Public-private partnerships as the management of co-production: Strategies and institutional obstacles in a difficult marriage. In The challenge of public-private partnerships: Learning from international experience, ed. HodgeGraemeGreveCarsten, 95–116. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.
22.
KoppenjanJoop F. M.EnserinkBert. 2009. Public–private partnerships in urban infrastructures: Reconciling private sector participation and sustainability. Public Administration Review69:284–96.
23.
O’LearyRosemaryBinghamLisa B.. 2009. The collaborative public manager: New ideas for the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
24.
OstromElinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
25.
OstromElinor. 1998. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American political science association, 1997. American Political Science Review92:1–22.
26.
RogersDavid L.WhettenDavid Allred. 1982. Interorganizational coordination: Theory, research, and implementation. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
27.
SchneiderMarkTeskePaul. 1992. Toward a theory of the political entrepreneur: Evidence from local government. American Political Science Review86:737–47.
28.
SteinackerAnnette. 2004. Game-theoretic models of metropolitan cooperation. In Metropolitan governance: Conflict, competition, and cooperation, ed. FeiockRichard C., 46–66. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
29.
TobinJames. 1958. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society26:24–36.
