In this article, we present the findings of a study on the electoral use of intergovernmental grants for municipal infrastructure. The study adds to the body of work on redistributive politics by showing that both federal and provincial governments use intergovernmental grants for electoral purposes. The study also shows that grant distribution seems to be skewed toward electoral districts hold by governing party and by legislators who are influential in their party because they have more seniority or they fill ministerial positions. Therefore, this finding does not match the predictions of McGillivray’s model according to which in a political system like Canada’s, grant distribution would benefit to swing districts.
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