Boards of directors have been the subject of extensive conceptualization and empirical research. We review literature addressing boards of directors from the perspective of the control, service, and resource dependence roles that directors are hypothesized to fulfill, with particular focus on that research reported after the Zahra and Pearce (1989) compendium. We also discuss a number of methodological and conceptual elements which complicate the aggregation of research in this area of inquiry.
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