This research examined the subsequent longterm investment consequences of the adoption of antitakeover charter amendments by U.S. industrial manufacturing firms. Longterm investment a major determinant offuture economic growth and business competitiveness was assessed by analyzing research and development and capital investment intensity levels. In a matchedpair design, analyses were conducted on two separate samples of companies to assess the relationship between antitakeover amendment adoption and future oriented re source allocation decisions. Results fail to indicate the existence of a general main effect of antitakeover amendments on longterm investment for either sample offirms.
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