Earlier work has examined executive control and merger activity and suggested that mergers are sometimes undertaken in the best interests of managers rather than stockholders. This study has examined the relationships among firm control (owner versus manager), merger strategy (related versus unrelated) and returns to stockholders. The results suggest that both firm control and merger strategy affect merger performance. Therefore, an assessment of the control of the acquiringfirms should temper the interpretation of any research comparing the performance of related versus unrelated diversification strategies.
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