This study presents a conceptual model of corporate merger behavior that specifies the roles of corporate ownership, executive motivation, and market constraints in determining merger strategy choices and performance. It is suggested that an understanding of both executive intent and competitive market conditions is necessary to predict the consequences of mergers for the acquiring firms. Propositions regarding expected merger strategy choices and performance under different ownership and market conditions are presented.
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