Abstract
Privatization—defined here as the transfer of ownership of state-owned organizations to private parties—has attracted the attention of scholars across multiple fields. Privatization programs have been based on the assumption, grounded in microeconomic theory, that a shift from public to private ownership will incentivize more efficient management of available resources. However, failure to deliver the expected outcomes in some cases and the more nuanced perspective on state-ownership offered by recent research in management seem to challenge this assumption, calling for revisiting this literature. Our comparative review of existing studies suggests that the mixed results of privatization programs could be partly explained by what was privatized, how it was privatized, and the regulatory regime under which it was privatized. By doing so, our review provides conceptual clarity and structure to a rich but fragmented body of literature, making seemingly divergent findings more legible, outlining theoretical gaps, and identifying avenues for future exploration.
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