Strong or Weak Synergy? Revising the Assumption of Team-Related Advantages in Integrative Negotiations

Abstract

When negotiations are complex and consequential, organizations usually send teams rather than individuals to the negotiation table because teams are expected to provide additional beneficial negotiation processes and, thus, generate superior outcomes. Similarly, theoretical accounts of integrative negotiations assume higher outcomes for teams than for individual negotiators as a consequence of team-related advantages (e.g., increased information processing and problem-solving capabilities). In this study, we challenge this established assumption and across three negotiations and various empirical tests, we show that the advantages of teams are merely the result of individual-level processes (i.e., one person asking interest-related questions). Moreover, Bayesian estimation supported our claim and rejected the extant account: The probability of the teams achieving better outcomes than the best individuals in commensurate nominal groups (i.e., strong synergy) was up to four times smaller than the probability of the teams not achieving better results than the best individuals in commensurate nominal groups. Finally, in the majority of our analyses, individual negotiators generated better relationship outcomes than teams even though the economic outcomes were comparable. On the basis of these results, we revise the assumption of team-related advantages in integrative negotiations. We discuss the implications of our results for future negotiation research and for the practical assignment of teams or individuals to negotiations.