This paper reviews literatures on the two competing theoretical views of the antitakeover provisions–shareholder value relationship — managerial entrenchment and shareholder interests — and offers a contingency framework to reconcile these views. This framework, based on a broader agency theory perspective and the organizational literatures on power, incorporates two key moderators: corporate board and shareholder monitoring, and draws attention to when rather than on whether antitakeover provisions enhance or erode shareholder value.
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